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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
This issue’s President’s Forum is based on remarks by Vice Admiral
Cebrowski to the “Required Naval Capabilities” panel of the
College’s Current Strategy Forum, convened 13–15 June 2000 with
the theme, “The Future of U.S. Naval Forces in the Pacific Region.”
IWILL START BY LOOKING at the Navy’s competitive space broadly, and at con-cepts of how the future Navy will fight in it. Next I will examine some al-
ternative mental models of Asia, and then focus on several specific
capabilities and platforms.
First, the policy sector. In the national security “hierarchy of needs,” home-
land defense occupies the broad base. Above that is economic well-being, in-
cluding the security of global systems and their operations. Finally, at the top are
concerns about a favorable world order and the nation’s values—where such is-
sues as genocide and the exporting of democracy appear. As one moves up this
hierarchy, the nation has more discretion whether or not to act; at the bottom,
however, there is more pressure to spend. That is why people are willing to enter-
tain spending, for example, sixty billion dollars for national missile defense. The
U.S. Navy, of course, participates in homeland defense: the strategic SSBN de-
terrent is a major piece of that, but now there is talk about the Navy participat-
ing in such things as interception in the boost phase of ICBMs launched at the
United States.
From its birth, however, the Navy has worked most steadily at the center of
this pyramid, to help secure global stability and the nation’s economic well-being.
We are very closely coupled with the commerce of the world. What are the rules
by which the Navy should play in this policy domain? There are at least three.
First, we should cede no maritime areas that are of importance to the nation.
That means we should grant no sanctuary. Warfare is very path dependent—great
changes in outcomes arise from small changes in initial conditions. To grant
sanctuary to a foe is to surrender the initiative, the ability to alter the initial
9
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conditions. In other words, the enemy will have essentially the prime control
over the outcome; this must not be allowed.
Second, we must ensure that the littoral is not a barrier. That implies—
though I am in favor of being very “joint,” and of course I am keen on
interoperability—that there are things the Navy–Marine Corps team simply
must be able to do autonomously and quickly. The most obvious of these is to
bring to bear combined-arms, sea-based, self-deployed forces.
Third, we must be able to do—if not all equally well—every kind of task that
the nation expects. The traditional tasks are mastery of the seas, projecting and
protecting long lines of communications, landing and supporting armies, rescu-
ing armies and governments, conducting blockades and enforcing sanctions,
and exerting forceful diplomacy. All of these, by virtue of the information age,
are characterized today by rapid change and often instantaneous awareness.
Thus we see, for example, increased emphasis on surveillance, information war-
fare, the landing of special operations forces and great attention to media cover-
age. What naval forces can—or cannot—do anywhere in the world is likely to be
known everywhere in the world.
COMPETITIVE ATTRIBUTES
What competitive attributes are required of our Navy if it is to be successful in
doing these tasks? Consider the choice between maintaining forces forward ver-
sus “strategic response from home”; it is central to the design of navies and how
they operate. There is a view in America today that favors bringing forces home,
as well as a presumption that if a view is new it is also superior. Hence, some
pundits embrace the idea that we should bring forces home rather than make
difficult specific judgments whether that is the right thing to do, especially for
particular locations in the Asia-Pacific region.
Our war games here at the College over the last two years have indicated very
strongly that speed of response to a regional crisis is important. If it is, then hav-
ing forces close to the scene of action matters a great deal, because they can alter
initial conditions. Naval forces are meant to dominate the “front end” of a prob-
lem. To do that, they must have a large body of tacit knowledge—knowledge that
cannot be conveyed on a network but can be gained only by immersion in an
area, through experience, judgments, feedback, and assessment. Such back-
ground knowledge is a real powerhouse; this is why one hears recommendations
to reinvigorate the Foreign Area Officer Program, for example, and why there
are military exchanges and bilateral and multilateral exercises among militaries.
It is also, of course, one of the key reasons why the Naval War College has its in-
ternational students program—we learn from them, and they learn from us.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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In building a national-security system, we speak of strategy, operations, and
policy. At the strategic level, from a military perspective a nation generally has
only three ways to secure its global interests: deploy forces forward, rely on stra-
tegic deployment from home, or have friends or allies who will look out for
those interests. In fact, this nation generally takes a balanced approach to look-
ing after its far-flung interests, using all three means. Sometimes there is no
choice. Consider, for example, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, where it is
difficult and expensive to maintain forces forward but where our friends and
allies—as good friends and allies as they might be—simply do not have the
means to support all of the U.S. interests, and whose own interests sometimes
diverge. Further, the opposite side of the planet is one of the most difficult places
to surge meaningful forces from home. We know—we have done it.
Operationally, we deter enemies, and we reassure allies; if we fail to deter the
enemies, we must seek to compel them with military force to adopt more ap-
propriate behavior. As for policy, we frequently see our challenge as a pro-
cess of balancing—between shaping the environment, preparing for the
future, and responding to crisis.
What happens when we pull back our forward forces? We find that support
from allies becomes tenuous, entailing an increased reliance on strategic deploy-
ment from home. This is difficult, and it is expensive; think of the hundreds of
millions of dollars we spent to reposition forces in 1994 to respond to Iraq’s
movement of forces to the south, even though we already had significant forces
in the theater. The support of allies becomes tenuous because we are essentially
withdrawing from the theater; so our operational reassurance of allies goes
down. Further, because our forces are no longer close to a potential enemy, their
deterrent power diminishes, which means our reliance on “compellance” in-
creases. Similarly, we are not shaping the environment as well as we had been,
and so we must posture ourselves to respond to many more contingencies. That
degrades our ability to prepare for the future—our planning horizon moves in.
Next, our discretion goes down with regard to supporting values, as we have to
focus more on homeland defense, which means spending goes up. Finally, the
debate between “selective engagement” and “cooperative engagement” essen-
tially goes away; we must adopt a posture that is not always congenial to our
friends around the world, let alone to potential enemies.
The fact of the matter is that this would not be an America we want to have. It
essentially describes the Roman Empire shortly before the fall. Remember what
triggered that fall—withdrawing from forward areas of vital interests. Another
interesting historical case occurred early in the twentieth century, when Sir John
Fisher, as First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, asked for fast battle cruisers with ac-
curate gunnery to deploy around the world and secure the interests of the
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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empire. Instead, for political reasons, he got dreadnoughts—which were then
stationed near home. The first competitive attribute of U.S. naval forces, then, is
that they must be forward. If there were only one ship in the fleet, it could not be
alongside a pier in San Diego.
The second competitive attribute the Navy must have is “full-spectrum”com-
bat capability. To visualize strike warfare is easy, particularly if we assume that
we can find the target and then put a weapon precisely on it. Indeed, at least in
the United States, many now think that dropping a bomb using clever tech-
niques is the sum and substance of warfare—which simply could not be farther
from the truth. Weapon delivery is an element of warfare, a part of it, but only
that. There are many reasons why the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps constitute a
maneuver force. Counting the bombs or assessing the damage they do is really
an input measure; we need to be more interested in output.
The third competitive attribute is that we must be a “full-service” navy. If we
become very good at the “high end” and spend all our money there, enemies will
threaten at the bottom, and we will have a difficult time. We need “low-end” ca-
pabilities to do those things that navies have traditionally been asked to do,
which include working in the highly contested, dense, dynamic, dangerous,
close-in littoral. We must truly own the littoral—to be able to get in, stay there,
support ourselves, not be intimidated or pushed out, and perform every func-
tion of naval power. Monitoring refugee movements, controlling coastal ship-
ping, and enforcing economic sanctions with ships best suited for the high seas
has historically been shown to lead to failure. All the more, fighting in the nar-
row seas calls for unique capabilities. We must be thinking about measures of
output and the full range of required capabilities. These are important consider-
ations about what tomorrow’s U.S. Navy must have.
NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS AND WARFARE
How will that force operate? Over the last year and a half we have developed the
“Capstone Concept for the Navy after Next,” a concept based, not surprisingly,
on network-centric operations and network-centric warfare. A theory of war
identifies sources of power and their relationships, to include the value struc-
tures and how those sources of power couple with outcomes and political objec-
tives. Network-centric warfare develops and enables information superiority,
stresses operations in multiple domains including space and cyberspace, accepts
the highly complex and chaotic environment, and assumes that there will be a
great diversity of players (friends, foes, and neutrals or noncombatants).
Network-centric warfare translates an information advantage into a competi-
tive advantage; it derives its power from robust networking of well informed,
geographically dispersed forces. Commentators are inclined to focus on the
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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technology aspect, but the important word is “warfare”—and warfare, of course,
is a human undertaking, a behavioral matter.
The four primary supporting pillars of the Capstone Concept are information
and knowledge superiority, assured access, speed of effects, and sea basing. Infor-
mation and knowledge superiority is not an issue only of bits and bytes, or volume
of information; it has to do with the relevance, timeliness, and accuracy of the in-
formation, and of course what one does with it. It is a two-sided game: each side
satisfies (and tries to reduce) its own needs, while the other side attacks its oppo-
nent’s ability to do so. One of our major failings these days is that no war plan,
body of knowledge, or doctrine takes a holistic view of this. If we are going to fight
first for information superiority—if the primary value-adding processes have to
do with information—then surely leaders must focus on this, not leave it to junior
staff officers or technologists. We hear that in the Kosovo campaign, Nato had very
poor operational security, which is an element of information superiority. What
judgments were made about operational security? Did a commander consciously
trade it off? For what? What would be the logic of doing so? Information superi-
ority should become the main thrust of joint doctrinal development.
One of the many elements of information superiority could be expeditionary
sensors, a complex network of sensors ranging from space down to the sea floor.
Being netted, they must be tactically agile and fully responsive to the on-scene
commander. This is a matter of making information accessible, not managing
information for someone else. We learned a long time ago that operators want to
be able to create their own information domain, not have someone remote from
the scene of action decide what they should know.
Another important element is space. The Navy has a proud history in space:
we formed the original cadre for NASA; space-based sensing, space-based navi-
gation, space-based communications, and space-based meteorology all have
roots in the U.S. Navy. Many of those things have migrated elsewhere, but the
Navy still has unique capabilities that should allow it to reenter that domain. We
use all of these things in our operations, but in the future we should expect an
enemy to do so as well. The Navy should capitalize on its advantages in proxim-
ity, mobility, endurance, and stealth to assist in controlling space by focusing on
commercial and military optical imagers, radar imagers, weather and communi-
cations satellites, Global Positioning System downlinks, and terrestrial delivery
and distribution systems.
A key concern of the information/knowledge-superiority pillar is mobile tar-
gets. For fixed targets, an information-update rate of days is acceptable. We do
that very well, because we practice it a lot. But moving targets are the heart of the
problem. The update rate has to be in minutes or seconds. Much work remains
to be done. In Kosovo in 1999, 6 percent of the targets given to Carrier Air Wing
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8 were fixed; the rest were moving. The solution to this problem lies in network-
ing tactically responsive sensors.
The next pillar of the Capstone Concept is assured access—not just base
structure but access to domains of competition, in peace and in war, to do what-
ever the nation needs done. That brings us to the collection of concepts called
STREETFIGHTER, which addresses the requirement to assure access. Utility to the
nation is a function of combat power multiplied by access. With no credible
access potential, there is no utility in a force, no matter what its combat power
may be. Access capability, in turn, is a function of several force and platform
characteristics, the principal of which is survivability, for which new technolo-
gies are available.
One emerging technological area that captures my imagination is in naval
architecture—new designs and materials that allow ships greater performance
and sharply increased payload fraction, adaptability, and survivability. Increas-
ingly, U.S. forces are characterized by tactical instability—an enemy with
surprisingly small capabilities can hold at risk something very much larger. U.S.
forces have unwisely caused combat power to grow while allowing survivability
to remain constant or go down. The result is a risk-averse force. This is why one
worries about sanctuaries for maritime prepositioning shipping and why tacti-
cal aircraft will not challenge defenses at low altitude. They are tactically
unstable. That is not how the United States should go to war.
Another threat to assured access is the antiship cruise missile. It is not new to
us; we have known this phenomenon since Okinawa, when more ships were
sunk or damaged than we have in the U.S. Navy today. Hundreds of missiles have
been fired at ships over the intervening years, and we have a lot of information
on the results. Tankers do very well, but their only mission is to survive and
move. Surface combatants have proven to be quite brittle. It matters little how
big the ship or how much firepower it has. In general, below twenty thousand
tons the survival curve goes flat. That means as we dress up a ship with combat
power, all we do is put more combat power at risk. Saying that we can substitute
quality for quantity simply does not hold water any more.
Initially, few countries had antiship cruise missiles, but now seventy-five
states have cruise missiles of some eighty different types, in large inventories.
This exacerbates the issue of tactical instability, and clearly the force must
change to come to grips with it. There are in general two types of cruise missiles:
subsonic missiles tend to have longer range, rely on stealth, and have more ma-
neuverability; supersonic missiles confront defenders with the time-compression
phenomenon. Also, there is a new hybrid weapon, which flies at subsonic speeds,
quite stealthily, for long distances until it gets close to the target, when the
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slow-speed airframe falls away, and a hypersonic terminal missile appears—a
quarter-ton warhead moving at Mach 3. This is a growing concern.
How can we redress this tactical instability? Many things can be done today.
For example, ships can be made to draw less water; the less hull below the waterline,
the less subject the ship is to underwater blast damage. Composite materials can
be used for fragmentation protection. Ships can be made far more maneuverable,
with looser or more open interior designs. Densely packed, extensively inte-
grated ships incur enormous vulnerabilities. Modular adaptivity for specific
missions can be designed in. We can increase speeds greatly—well in excess of
forty knots—which enables the ship to convert a direct hit to a near miss.
Also, numbers by themselves are helpful; numbers do indeed count. The U.S.
Pacific Fleet does not have overwhelming size with respect to other navies in
the region. Are there ways to increase the numbers? to increase the strength? to
have a more robust, tactically stable force? Undoubtedly, yes.
The third pillar of network-centric warfare is “speed of effects.” It used to be
that nations mobilized their citizenries into mass armies. The whole concept of
mass is now defunct for the purposes of foreign wars; even the nation that gave
us modern conscription no longer does it. Yet much of our thinking in the mili-
tary has to do with the annihilation of armies. We, of course, have been pursuing
precision weapons, and we do a good job with them. But we are finding that
physical destruction in itself is not always closely coupled with success in attain-
ing political objectives. All the students of warfare know that battles are won and
lost in the minds of the commanders. It is in the domains of belief and reason,
not in the physical domain, that decisions are made. When we look at history, we
see that most of the reasons for which forces have abandoned a strategy had to
do with elements of maneuver, very few with attrition. The quest, then, must be
for precision effects, not precision weapons.
The fourth supporting pillar of network-centric warfare is sea basing—not
just logistics but basing broadly from the sea, so that forces are self-contained
and self-sustained. This concept sharply increases the survivability of all ele-
ments of the force, especially traditional land-based forces.
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: MENTAL MODELS
The task now is to put these future naval capabilities into the context of the
Asia-Pacific region. As Professor Stephen Rosen notes, the current military con-
ventional wisdom with regard to Asia is that nuclear weapons do not matter; of-
fense dominates defense, and we can do whatever needs to be done; the allies are
great, and they will always be there, at least to provide bases; and though it is a
long way to Asia, we know how to get there, and it is not difficult. However, the
reality is quite different.
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All the potential enemies and even some of the friends in the theater have nu-
clear weapons, or could have them, and that fact raises questions everywhere
from policy to tactics. The balance between offense and defense is shifting; the
offense is good, but only when one can fight from a sanctuary. Also, there are
some adverse trends with regard to basing structure, and the reason it is so easy
to deploy to and operate in Asia now is that nations there allow it to be easy.
When their interests are at great risk, they may not.
Another mental model is based on Asian geography. Asia is all islands, even
where there are land borders. The terrain across those borders is treacherous.
There is no road structure; instead there are cultural barriers, social barriers, re-
ligious barriers, legal barriers, and—most notably—the barrier of vast dis-
tances. Asia is a domain of real and virtual islands, ideally suited for navies, air
forces, missiles, information operations, and special operations forces. It is in
these areas that Asian nations are increasing their spending for research and
procurement. Internally, however, armies are generally favored in Asia—not for
foreign wars but for such things as nation building at home, civil affairs, keeping
the peace, and keeping governments in power. This indicates the military capa-
bilities that must be pursued.
WHAT KINDS OF CAPABILITIES ARE REQUIRED?
Clearly, nuclear deterrence is important; all weapons of mass destruction matter
a great deal. Defense against an attack using weapons of mass destruction is
dominated by intelligence and surveillance. If we are going to do that well, we
will have to ratchet up our intelligence and surveillance capability significantly.
In tomorrow’s conflicts, maneuver and sensors will dominate, not attrition.
To exploit their potential, the U.S. Navy is going to need, first of all, numbers. It
will need the STREETFIGHTER capabilities that I described, the expeditionary
sensor program, and sea-based tactical air assets.
Defense of allies matters, in Asia no less than elsewhere. If that means ensur-
ing that our friends and allies can stay in the battle and reassuring them that we
will be there too, then we are talking about projecting defense in a broad
way—which means more than just theater ballistic missile defense. But cruise
missile defense is a tough problem, and in addition we will have to be able to
counter the emerging threats in information operations and information war-
fare, while still being able to resist air attack, submarine warfare, and incursions
by special operations forces.
Finally, actually being there is vital, more valuable than simply being able to
get there. Forward presence is so profoundly important that alternative ways of
keeping the forces forward need to be found. The U.S. Navy needs to revisit its
thinking about our interdeployment training cycle, and we have to look at new
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ways of incorporating the strengths of our allies. It is a matter of speed, speed of
response, in a theater dominated by vast distances.
These are complex requirements, and many things will be required to fulfill
them. First, we should pursue with great vigor the concept of network-centric
operations and warfare, with its emphasis on information (or knowledge) supe-
riority, assured access, speed of effects, and sea-basing. In addition, our “Cap-
stone Concept for the Navy after Next” points to a set of programs and initia-
tives that would be quite disruptive to an enemy—unmanned vehicles; the
whole STREETFIGHTER approach; cruise missiles that will cost no more than
sophisticated gunnery; submarines that can be bought in great numbers;
high-speed amphibious ships and armed lighters; numerous, inexpensive ex-
peditionary sensors; and command and control systems that facilitate destruc-
tion of moving targets.
The rebalanced fleet of the future will require these kinds of characteristics. If
we produce them, the U.S. Navy can expect to operate effectively not just in Asia
and the Pacific but around the world.
ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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STRATEGIC TRADITIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Stephen Peter Rosen
What are strategic traditions? Why should we be concerned with them whenwe think about American strategic behavior in the Asia-Pacific region?
Why should we not concentrate on the material factors, the “hard” data that will
determine what nations will do?
Traditions are usually thought of as past patterns of behavior that affect, in
some way, current and future behavior. Traditions may be familiar and comfortable,
and for a social and political conservative, they are to be observed because they
embody the collective experience and wisdom of a society. But in the field of
military studies, tradition has both positive and negative implications. Tradition
may reflect the habits of the last war, vividly imprinted on the minds of the men
who waged it—valuable lessons learned, lessons paid for with blood. Tradition
may also be habits of the last war that make it difficult to see and react to change.
A strategic tradition can also be thought of as a variation of “strategic cul-
ture,” the cognitive lens through which we view the world, the lens that fo-
cuses our attention on the policy options that are worth taking seriously,
and away from the frivolous options, the “nonstarters.” Strategic culture also
tells us what we should expect in terms of the reactions of other players, and
what the most important forms of interaction are. Because it is often difficult
to get good information on these issues in a timely way, strategic culture helps
us make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Academics may recom-
mend that under conditions of uncertainty one ought to wait until the nec-
essary information has been collected, but policy makers often do not have
that luxury, and at such times strategic culture or tradition is an invaluable
decision aid.
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Why do people have the strategic cultures or traditions that they do? Their
cultures emerge from the intense emotional experiences through which they
have passed, experiences that created vivid and enduring memories that readily
spring to mind. Munich, Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis, and the war in
Vietnam were such experiences. When future, or even present, conditions are
difficult to discern, people make decisions based on what they see, and what they
see is influenced by their memories of what has happened in the past. Sometimes
these are personal memories; sometimes they are organizational or national
memories. For example, when confronted with Ho Chi Minh, about whose ulti-
mate intentions there
was some doubt ,
Americans tended to
observe that he was an
ideological dictator.
He was, but memory then added statements about what ideological dictators
were likely to do and what this nation needed to do in anticipation: “We know
what ideological dictators are like, because we faced them in the past, and we
know that we need to stop them with military power.” That was not objective re-
ality, but it was the way Americans decided what reality meant in terms of what
they had to do. These sets of interpreted memories can be thought of as part of
our culture, our tradition.
When a nation is confronted with complex, ambiguous situations that are
difficult to understand, its cultural perspective may affect how it reacts. Peter
Schwartz is an expert in helping business executives realize, by means of discus-
sions and interviews, what their assumptions are about how the world works
and what factors drive developments in the marketplace. It is important for ex-
ecutives to understand how they look at the world, because they may not fully
realize what is driving their decisions and what factors they may be paying too
little attention to.
Iain Johnston analyzes the same kind of issues with regard to the Chinese na-
tional security elite, not by means of direct discussions and interviews but by
reading the texts that members of the elite study and discuss. This is a useful
technique—though not without problems, since what people read and study
does not always reflect the ideas inside their heads. It is a particularly problem-
atic technique when the books that people read say contradictory things or in-
clude passages that can be interpreted in contradictory ways. The technique
works better for people who are told explicitly how they should read the relevant
texts and are punished if they deviate from the correct interpretation. The cadres
of the communist parties of the world constitute such groups, as do, to a lesser
extent, the officer corps of military organizations that have officially approved
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doctrines and training materials. Members of hierarchical, disciplined organi-
zations are especially likely to have meaningful, shared strategic traditions.
That said, what can we say about the American perspective on Asia and the
Pacific? There are all kinds of Americans; they have had different experiences
and have read different books. It is next to impossible to point to a particular
American tradition that says anything useful or specific about the shared mental
perspectives of nearly three hundred million rather individualistic people. Let
us, instead, talk about four smaller groups of people, about whom we may be
able to say something a bit more specific, because they share experiences and
belong to disciplined organizations. Then we will suggest how and why objec-
tive reality may cause problems for people who have these mental images of
Asia and the Pacific.
What are the strategic traditions and perspectives of the U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps, Army, and Air Force with regard to this region? What have these services
experienced there over the last fifty years? How might those experiences have
created memories that affect their outlooks? It may be objected that services do
not have genuinely national strategic perspectives, that they concern themselves
with military operations, not the general relationship of political goals to mili-
tary means. Yet services do have strategic perspectives that relate military means
to military goals, and their views on what a future war would be like and how it
would be fought often have a powerful impact on higher-level policy. For these
reasons, service perspectives matter.
When speaking of the Pacific, it is natural to begin with the U.S. Navy. Let us
simplify matters: what would senior naval officers say if asked how they thought
about the Pacific? The response of a representative officer might be as follows:
The Pacific belongs to us. The most important experiences my organization has
lived through over the last fifty years demonstrated over and over again that we can
dominate the Pacific and so enable the United States to project power and influence
to the periphery of the Asian landmass. After the defeat of Japan and withdrawal of
the British, we were the only major naval power left in the region. As the Japanese
navy revived, it did so under our tutelage, in cooperation with us, and in ways that
did not challenge us. The United States was able to fight a major war in Korea uti-
lizing our unchallenged command of the sea for aircraft carrier operations, am-
phibious landings, and logistical support of ground and air forces in Korea and
Japan. We were able to use carrier aviation in the Vietnam War unopposed by na-
val forces or significant land-based antiship weapons systems. We had a problem
with air-to-air combat in Vietnam, but specialized training, the Top Gun pro-
gram, fixed that.
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The Soviets were a problem, but we dominated the strategic antisubmarine-
warfare world, and they never really learned how to do blue-water naval opera-
tions: the Soviets had severe problems up to the end of the Cold War with at-sea
replenishment, for example. They never mastered even the rudiments of carrier avi-
ation. The Backfire bombers could have been a problem, particularly if they had
used nuclear antiship weapons, but we never really believed, in our heart of
hearts, that the Soviets would go nuclear at sea early in a war. If we had believed
that, we would have had to acknowledge that we had a big problem for which we
had no solution.
The Chinese navy is not in the same league with the Soviets, let alone us. The one
or two advanced destroyers and antiship missile systems they have do not funda-
mentally change that picture. When we sent two carrier battle groups to the waters
near Taiwan in 1996, we showed everybody that we still rule the Pacific and can in-
fluence events on the Asian periphery.
Today and for the future, we can operate in the Pacific by means of a network of
bases and ports on foreign soil. This way of conducting operations began with the is-
land-hopping campaign across the Central Pacific in 1943–45 against Japan. It
continued through the Cold
War with bases in Japan itself,
Okinawa, the Philippines, and
elsewhere. We have had some
problems with the Philippines
and in Okinawa, but we can manage them. In any case, other people, like the
Singaporeans or the Indians, would open their doors to us if and when a serious
Chinese naval force emerged.
What about the Marine Corps? A senior officer from that service might give
this kind of response:
We have fought many times in the Pacific-Asia theater, and it has been a deadly
place for us. From the Boxer Rebellion to Tarawa and Iwo Jima, from the Chosin
reservoir to Khe Sanh and Hue, a lot of Marines have died there. As amphibious
forces, as straight-leg infantry, as urban warriors, we have taken very heavy casual-
ties in Asia. We do not take this part of the world lightly, and we do not assume that
we would be able to execute our missions there easily, even with all the high-tech
weapons in the world—and which we, as Marines, get only the leftovers. We think
very hard about what to do there, militarily, and we are not sure what the answer is.
Why else would you think that we are engaged in the most serious set of military ex-
periments of any of the services to explore the future?
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
That was not objective reality, but it was the way
Americans decided what reality meant in terms of
what they had to do.
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 27
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/27
An Army officer might reply to our question in this way:
We cannot trust American politicians when they talk about war in Asia. They
keep saying that the Army will not fight ground wars in Asia. But if you look back,
after World War II we never fought in Europe; all we did was fight ground wars in
Asia. First we excluded Korea from our defense perimeter in 1950, then Lyndon
Johnson said he would not send American boys to Vietnam to fight battles that
Asian boys should fight, and look what happened. Ground wars in Asia are like
other dirty, nasty things: they happen.
Asia is a big headache for the Army. When we fight in Asia, we compromise and
degrade our core skills in the conduct of high-intensity, combined-arms maneuver
warfare. Sure, we used a lot of helicopters in Vietnam, but that was still nothing like
going up against the Soviets. What we would like is a big, friendly Asian land power
on our side so we do not have to send hundreds of thousands of our soldiers into bat-
tle. General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell had it right, in the Second World War: train the
Nationalist Chinese and let them fight the Japanese. We did it right in Korea by
building up the South Korean army so we could go home. If Creighton Abrams had
been in charge earlier in Vietnam, Vietnamization would have started earlier, and
we would all have been better off.
And the Air Force:
We have air supremacy in Asia, and air supremacy is good. Strategic bombard-
ment works, it can win wars, and it has. Look at Japan in 1945: eighty Japanese cit-
ies on the target list, eighty Japanese cities destroyed, and the war was over with no
need to invade Japan. Nukes were nice but not essential. In Korea, airpower was the
war winner. After the Army and Marine Corps had fixed the Chinese, we could
plaster them and their supply lines, human waves or not.
The problem in Vietnam was that bastard Robert McNamara. When he became
secretary of defense, he crippled us with an incremental, politically micromanaged
air campaign. When Richard Nixon authorized LINEBACKER II, we showed what
we could do with a real air campaign. We got the North Vietnamese back to the ne-
gotiating table with the Christmas bombing of 1972. It was the Strategic Air Com-
mand that deserved the Nobel Peace Prize, not Henry Kissinger.
Like the Navy, we can operate in this region by means of a network of bases on
foreign soil. Air-to-air refueling means we can use fighters with ranges that work
very nicely in the European theater as bombers in Asia. That is a good thing, be-
cause it means that fighters can remain the dominant platforms in our service.
Putting words into the mouths of service officers is presumptuous. Drawing
out implications from the remarks we put into their mouths is even more
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presumptuous. Nevertheless, there seem to be common elements implicit in
what the services had to say.
• Nuclear weapons have not mattered very much in practice in the Asia-Pacific
region. We can still bomb and fight in Asia the way we would in the
“pre-nuke” environment, except for strategic sanctuaries in China and the
Soviet Union or Russia, since our wartime enemies have been small,
nonnuclear powers.
• Offensive forces, not defensive systems, have been dominant in this region.
• We have had, and will have, allies who give us bases and help when we
need them.
• Finally, getting to Asia from the United States is not a problem for warfighters,
however large a problem it is for the logisticians. We do not have to worry
about military opposition as we move our supplies across the Pacific.
The exercise becomes interesting at this point. Will future conditions in the
region be consistent with what our traditions tell us we can expect? There is
good reason to think not.
First and foremost, the as-
sumption of the irrele-
vance of nuclear weapons
for warfighting will clearly
be called into question. All of the potentially hostile nations with whom we may
have military problems are nuclear powers or nearly so: China, North Korea,
Pakistan, India, Russia, a unified Korea in the future, maybe Taiwan. How would
we use American military power against targets in the homelands of nuclear
powers? Would we attack the naval vessels of nuclear powers in wars about issues
less weighty than saving the world from military domination? Nuclear weapons
will matter a great deal; they create large areas that are off limits to American of-
fensive military power.
American ports and air bases on foreign soil will be increasingly vulnerable to
precision, nonnuclear attack. How will host nations that do not have nuclear
weapons with which to deter attacks against them feel about this? How will we
operate in the region if theater ballistic missile defense turns out not to be the
answer to our prayers? Defensive systems to protect and reassure our allies may
become the dominating factor, for American political purposes.
The availability of American allies is by no means assured. If there is a mili-
tary crisis involving China, Taiwan, and the United States, and if Japan does not
help, many Americans will ask why we are doing so much to help Japan. Trends
are already visible in Japanese politics that advocate security policies that are less
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closely tied to the United States. There could be significant anti-American senti-
ments in a unified Korea, since there would be no North Korean threat to justify
our presence. It will be many decades before India offers us bases, if it ever does.
It is hard to see how we will use significant amounts of conventional ground
forces in Asia. This has been said before. In the past, however, we went to war to
deal with what American political leaders perceived to be military aggression
across international boundaries. We would fight to help Taiwan for that reason,
but that would not involve ground forces. We really do not want to go to war
with China on the mainland of Asia. North Korea will not last forever. For what
will we use ground forces in this theater?
Over time, China will probably be able to make it harder for the United States
to intervene militarily in political crises near China. The question will not be
whether Chinese military forces are better or worse than ours but whether they
could increase the risks of American operations near them in diplomatic cri-
ses. Even getting to Asia will not be as simple as it used to be, because the Chi-
nese will have information warfare techniques that can slow us down; they
could “hack” into civilian air traffic control networks, for example, as James
Mulvenon of the RAND Corporation has pointed out. Other forms of attack
on our trans-Pacific logistics train are not too difficult to imagine, including
the use of biological agents.
What, then, is the point? We have drawn an overly simple picture for the pur-
pose of suggesting that the experiences of the American military over the last
fifty years have, in different ways, given the services collectively a perspective on
this theater that may make it difficult for them to perceive the emergence of a
probable future. If so, there may be subtle lags in this nation’s adjustment to the
future. Of course, things could work out differently. China could become com-
pletely democratic and peaceful, or it could fall apart. Asia could become like
Europe—rich, democratic, and peaceful. It may be that we suffer from the habits
of thought acquired during the Cold War: we have been thinking here about this
region as a theater of war, but perhaps it will not be a theater of war at all, actual
or potential, for decades. If that is the case, however, the United States will have
an even larger process of adjustment to manage. But if interstate war remains
possible in this region, the American military’s strategic traditions may not be
good guides to action.
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STRATEGIC TRENDS
Asia at a Crossroads
Paul Dibb
The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia,followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The stra-
tegic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than any-
where in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia
involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation
still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Paki-
stan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more
confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indone-
sia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future
that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense
(about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States
and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military
spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world.
Asia’s security is at a crossroads: the region could go in
the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide
into confrontation and military conflict. There are posi-
tive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic
growth and the spread of democracy, which would en-
courage an optimistic view. But there are a number of
negative tendencies that must be of serious concern.
There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological,
and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no
history of successful multilateral security cooperation or
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Asian Studies, The Australian National University. He
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arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be in-
effective when confronted with major crises.
In judging the strategic future of Asia, we should learn from previous failures
of assessment and refrain from overconfident, straight-line extrapolations. Af-
ter the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, there was great fear that communism
would spread quickly to the rest of Southeast Asia and that the dominoes would
fall. That did not occur. In the 1980s, we were told that the coming Japanese eco-
nomic superpower would soon outstrip the United States; instead, Japan has re-
corded barely one-third of the economic growth of the United States since 1990.
Less than five years ago, it was being forecast that the so-called “Asian economic
miracle” would inevitably give the region a larger economy than the United
States and Europe; that view was destroyed by the Asian economic crisis. There
have also been predictions that China will be the new economic giant and that its
gross national product will be bigger than that of the United States by 2010. But by
most measures, China’s economy is only a fraction of that of the United States.1
This article assesses the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region over
the next five years, which is the period of most relevance to policy. It analyses the
geopolitics of the region, the strategic outlook and balance of power, and the risk
of military conflict in such places as the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula,
and the Indian subcontinent. It also examines the prospects for Indonesia’s se-
curity and what that might mean for Southeast Asia as a whole. The article con-
cludes by analysing, from the viewpoint of a prudent defense planner, America’s
policies toward the region and by assessing whether they need improvement.
THE GEOPOLITICS AND MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF ASIA
There is a fashionable view that geography and geopolitics are no longer rele-
vant in the post–Cold War era. That is demonstrably untrue in Asia, where there
is a fierce sense of national sovereignty, enormous variations in culture and
civilisation, and a struggle for power and influence among the region’s great
powers. There are more than two dozen outstanding territorial conflicts in this
part of the world; some of them—such as those between China and Taiwan, be-
tween the two Koreas, and between India and Pakistan—are potentially very
dangerous. Whilst it is the case that globalisation and the information revo-
lution are having an increasing impact on Asia, the assertion of old-fashioned
nationalism and state sovereignty undermines the argument of those who assert
that the importance of the state is declining.
The strategic environment of Asia is characterized by the presence of three
great continental powers: China, India, and Russia. An arc of maritime powers,
many of which are allies or friends of the United States, flanks them. Except for
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Japan, most of these countries are middle-sized or small powers: South Korea,
Taiwan, the ten ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand, and the small is-
land nations of the South Pacific. Almost half of the world’s maritime trade
passes through the confined straits and archipelagic waters of Southeast Asia
and the South China Sea. The United States has traditionally been the dominant
naval power in this part of the world. Neither China nor India will have a true
blue-water navy over the next five years—although they will both seek to extend
their naval influence, and therefore their strategic ambitions will overlap in
Southeast Asia. This is an area of great strategic significance for the United States
and its allies—especially Japan, which transports nearly all of its oil imports
through the area’s chokepoints. China too is becoming more dependent upon
sea lines of communication as its trade increases, and China will need to import
more oil and gas to meet its energy requirements.
The political makeup of Asia is highly varied, and this adds to the geopolitical
complexity of the region. Unlike Europe, where a broad swathe of democracies
now occupies most of the continent, Asia has four of the world’s five remaining
communist countries: China, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Laos. Whilst there has been an encouraging rise of democ-
racy in recent years in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
the Philippines, authoritarian regimes are firmly in power
in Pakistan and Burma, and the governments in Malaysia
and Singapore practice forms of “soft authoritarianism.”
As for Indonesia, it remains to be seen whether democracy
will survive there. In any case, the trend toward democracy
in the region, if it continues, does not necessarily imply
easier relationships with the United States, as the New
Zealand case demonstrates. The highly questionable
proposition—which has become an article of faith in
some quarters in Washington—that democracies do not go to war with democ-
racies may be disproved one of these days in Asia. In any case, deep-seated histori-
cal, cultural, religious, and territorial differences in Asia suggest that, irrespective of
the development of democratic institutions, the dangers of armed conflict remain.
Late in 1999 there was a risk that military conflict would erupt (over East Timor)
between Australia and a newly democratic Indonesia.
As the “revolution in military affairs” spreads to Asia and introduces longer-
range and more accurate weapons supported by good surveillance information,
the geography of Asia will be compressed. The introduction of long-range cruise
missiles and the development of ballistic missiles will make smaller countries
much more vulnerable if deterrence fails. The risk then will be either of an
escalating proliferation of ballistic missiles, or of the acquisition from the United
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States of a protective ballistic missile defense, which in turn may lead to the multi-
plication of offensive missile systems. The ballistic missile proliferation challenge for
the United States and its allies will be more acute in Asia than anywhere else.
The ready availability of advanced conventional weapons not only com-
presses but alters the geography of the region. For instance, the proliferation of
supersonic antiship cruise missiles will make it more dangerous for the United
States and its allies to operate militarily in the littoral environment of many
states of the region. Thus although the long lead-times in acquiring major mili-
tary platforms are likely to keep the overall orders of battle of regional countries
from changing much over the next five years, capabilities in many instances can
change quickly through the acquisition of quite limited numbers of relatively
cheap, long-range, and accurate tactical missiles.
The structures and doctrines of many of the region’s armed forces are also
changing. In particular, there is less emphasis on land forces and greater atten-
tion to developing small but capable navies and air forces. There is also a trend
toward the development of amphibious troops for the protection of offshore
territories and assets. Fielding modern air forces and navies is becoming increas-
ingly expensive; the cost of acquiring and operating military platforms approxi-
mately doubles with each new generation. But newer platforms are in many
instances able to deliver more lethality and firepower. The ready availability of
satellite photography with a resolution of one meter or less, together with accu-
rate Global Positioning System information, will mean that even small powers
can have credible deterrent forces.
Nonetheless, the gap between the military technology of the United States
and that of potential peer competitors will, if anything, widen over the next five
years. The central question for America’s Asia-Pacific allies will be whether they
will be able to keep up with U.S. military forces in terms of basic interoperability
of communications and weapons systems.
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA
The Asia-Pacific region has entered a particularly complex strategic situation; a
new balance of power may be evolving. The Asian economic crisis, tension be-
tween China and the United States over Taiwan, North Korea’s nuclear and bal-
listic missile programs, the risk of war between India and Pakistan, and the
possibility of Indonesian disintegration have all arisen suddenly, and they serve
to underline the basic insecurity of the region. But whether Asia remains a
peaceful region will largely depend upon the struggle for power and influence
between the major powers: China, Japan, India, Russia, and the United States. It
is not in the interests of the United States or of its allies to see the region domi-
nated by any one Asian power or by a concert of them.
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China is a rising power that sees itself as the natural leader in Asia. It perceives
its aspirations in this regard as being thwarted by the American military pres-
ence in the region and the U.S. alliance network. China is acquiring, with assis-
tance from Russia, modern military equipment that will enable it to prevail
militarily in the South China Sea against any regional power, if it so wishes. Were
China to succeed in asserting sovereignty over the South China Sea, it would be
able to penetrate deeply into Southeast Asia and influence events there. Thus
there are serious questions surrounding the rise of China to power. Will China
be a responsible and cooperative member of the international community, abid-
ing by the community’s rules of nonaggression? Or will China become an ex-
pansionist power, as have other rising powers in the past?
World history has been marked by the rise of ambitious new powers seeking
to displace weaker powers. China is many decades away from being a peer com-
petitor of the dominant world power, the United States; already, however, the
main danger to the region is the risk that the next military confrontation will
be between the United States and China. David Shambaugh stated in early 2000
that growing “strategic competition”
is likely to characterize Sino-Ameri-
can relations for most of the coming
decade, whatever American adminis-
tration came to office in 2001.2 The
greatest danger is over Taiwan: war
between the United States and China in the Taiwan Straits might well draw in
America’s allies, including Australia. Washington would expect its other allies,
particularly Japan and South Korea, to support it, and such expectations could
seriously damage its alliances in the region.
Short of such cataclysmic events, the main danger is that pressure might in-
crease for individual nations to side with either China or the United States in
their respective struggles for influence, thereby dividing the region. Some
countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, would probably climb on the
U.S. bandwagon. Others, such as Malaysia and Thailand, might incline toward
China. Indonesia has traditionally been hostile to China, but President
Abdurrahman Wahid has talked recently about a triangular relationship with
China and India that would offset Indonesia’s former close relationship with the
United States. The future course of Indonesia’s relations with China will be fol-
lowed with the utmost scrutiny, not least by Australia. The purchase by Indone-
sia of arms from China, for instance, would raise alarm.
There is the further issue that China does not accept the rationale for the U.S.
forward military presence in Asia. It explicitly calls for the abrogation of all
alliances, arguing that they are not conducive to peace and security in the
2 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
In judging the strategic future of Asia, we
should learn from previous failures of assess-
ment and refrain from overconfident,
straight-line extrapolations.
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 27
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/27
post–Cold War world; Chinese officials have openly called for the removal of
U.S. forces from the region. Before his visit to Australia last year, President Jiang
Zemin proclaimed that alliances were “obsolete.” However, China must accept
that the United States is not going to withdraw from Asia and that America’s alli-
ances are not going to disappear. China needs to understand that Asia without
the United States would be an especially dangerous place, vulnerable to conflict
between China and Japan.
As China’s influence in Asia grows, India—which wants to be accepted as a
major power—will seek to compete with China. Until recently, India’s poor eco-
nomic performance, its preoccupation with Pakistan, and earlier its alliance
with the former Soviet Union served to limit its interest elsewhere in Asia. But
the Indian economy now seems set on a path of reform and is growing strongly.
The military balance on the subcon-
tinent now firmly favors India, and
with each year that passes its superior
economic performance will improve
its military advantage. India, there-
fore, will be able to lift its strategic
horizons. Southeast Asia is a natural
area for its future focus; India has
long-established ties to that region and has territories, including the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands, in close proximity. Already India is seeking to strengthen its
old relationship with Vietnam, as well as with Japan. The United States could be-
come a useful partner for India in its upcoming competition with China.
Japan is by far the most important power economically in Asia; its economy
accounts for 60 percent of Asia’s gross national products. Nonetheless,
China—whose economy is less than a fifth the size of that of Japan—has a
higher political profile in the region. Japan spends more on defense than any
other Asian country, and it has the most modern navy (both surface combatants
and submarines) and air force in the Asia-Pacific. Japan, however, continues to
be unwilling to use its military forces except in the most modest of United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations. Japan’s resulting inability to provide leadership
in Asia commensurate with its economic power is a worry. Partly, this has to do
with lingering memories of Japan’s aggression in the Second World War. It also
stems from Japan’s preoccupation with its domestic problems; its economy has
been virtually stagnant for a decade. Moreover, as was demonstrated during the
Asian economic crisis three years ago, the United States is not willing to allow
Japan to become the financial leader in the region. Still, it is important that
Japan take on more of a leadership role in order to offset the growth in China’s
influence. When it does, Japan will face a challenging strategic environment,
D I B B 2 7
INDONESIA
31
War College: Winter 2001 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
marked by the rise of China’s power and by the prospect of a unified Ko-
rea—over seventy million people who see Japan as a traditional enemy.
The most crucial strategic relationship in the region will continue to be the
alliance between the United States and Japan. This relationship has recently been
reaffirmed and reinterpreted to provide for greater logistical support to U.S.
forces operating in the area. It remains to be seen, however, whether in fact Japan
would support American military operations on the Korean Peninsula or across
the Taiwan Straits. For the rest of the region, including China, the United
States–Japan alliance provides an essential assurance that Japan will not danger-
ously rearm. Japan could double its conventional military forces within five
years, or produce nuclear weapons. Neither will occur as long as Japan continues
to have confidence in the United States and in its military presence in Northeast
Asia. Even so, there are already signs that for the first time in over fifty years
Japan is beginning to develop its own strategic concepts and dedicated
force-structure elements, such as military satellites and a defense intelligence or-
ganization. The Japanese are also beginning to worry about the durability of the
U.S. commitment in Northeast Asia and about America’s tendency to go over
Japan’s head in dealing with China. What must be prevented at all costs is an ero-
sion of Japan’s confidence in the United States and a consequent military con-
frontation (or strategic accommodation) between Japan and China.
Russia, which is the other major power, is unlikely to be a significant player in
Asia for the foreseeable future, even though it possesses important military as-
sets in Northeast Asia. It will remain preoccupied with its internal political and
economic affairs and the situation along its borders, especially in Siberia and the
former Soviet Central Asian republics. Russia’s ability to supply advanced con-
ventional weapons to China and India is, however, a matter of concern. Arms ex-
ports are one of the few competitive products of the ailing Russian economy.
Russia has the capacity to upset the regional military balance, and it is already
doing this through its arms shipments to China.
POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS AND TROUBLESPOTS
The most dangerous part of Asia at present is, as we have noted, the Taiwan
Straits. There seems to be in the domestic politics of Taiwan an inevitable dy-
namic that leads the island to assert its international status as an independent
state and to challenge the “one China policy.” The situation is exacerbated by
growing tensions between the United States and China over this issue, as well as
by unease in Washington over China’s nuclear weapons program, and in Beijing
over the U.S. desire to deploy national and theater ballistic missile defenses. Dis-
pute over these issues brings with it real risks of miscalculation. China lacks the
conventional military capability to mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,
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and this will remain the case for at least the next five years.3 But there are other
options open to China, including a naval blockade and the use of ballistic mis-
siles. War across the Taiwan Straits would inevitably bring in the United States,
and then (as already mentioned) involve enormously difficult choices for U.S.
allies in the Asia-Pacific region—hence the strong desire by those allies to see the
current tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan resolved by
peaceful means.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains fraught with danger, as it
has been for almost fifty years. The possibility of a North Korean attack is
ever-present, despite the recent lessening of tensions. Even so, the outbreak of
war is unlikely. Unlike in the early 1950s, North Korea could not now count on
military support from China and Russia; it would face the bleak prospect of total
defeat by the United States and South Korea. Still, miscalculation by the North
Korean regime cannot be discounted, nor can a sudden collapse of the North,
which would present the South
with the horrendous costs of creat-
ing a unified nation.4 The most
likely scenario for the next five
years is a continuation of a man-
ageable degree of tension. Developments in relations between the two states
since June 2000 suggest that there may now be some prospect of direct peace ne-
gotiations between them. Should war break out, however, the United States
would naturally expect its allies quickly to provide tangible and useful military
contributions. If Japan were to refuse to do so, it would put at risk its relation-
ship with the United States.
India and Pakistan have been in confrontation with each other since their cre-
ation as separate states in 1947. The possession of nuclear weapons by both these
countries and their development of ballistic missiles have produced a dangerous
situation. Their religious and territorial differences, as well as the fact that the
military balance between them is moving in favor of India, may result in a highly
volatile scenario in which the use of nuclear weapons is a real possibility. There is
a serious lack of early-warning technologies and of nuclear weapon command
and control arrangements in both countries. If the world ever experiences ex-
changes of nuclear weapons, the first may well be between India and Pakistan.
In Southeast Asia, the most crucial question is the future of Indonesia. Indo-
nesia is in the middle of a dangerous political transition; the central issue is
whether Indonesia will remain a cohesive nation-state or disintegrate. There is a
better than even chance that Indonesia will muddle through and retain its
basic territorial integrity, although the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya (West
Papua) are high-risk regions. Were Indonesia to disintegrate, the implications
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for neighboring countries—especially Singapore and Malaysia, as well as Papua
New Guinea and Australia—would be serious. These nations would be faced
with an unstable and violent neighbor. Relations between Indonesia and
Australia have already become strained over the East Timor issue; friction be-
tween the two is now higher than it has been for many decades. There are those
at senior levels in the Indonesian armed forces (the TNI) and foreign ministry
who believe that Australia’s next step will be to destabilize West Papua.5
The most optimistic scenario leads over the next two to three years to a stable,
democratically elected central government in Jakarta. But transition from an au-
thoritarian military regime to democracy is always dangerous. The Indonesian
defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, has said that the shift will be gradual, that
it could take ten to fifteen years.6 There is no doubt that the creation of a
rules-based civil society will take a very considerable amount of time. Those in
the United States who want to push Indonesia quickly in this direction need to
learn more patience.
The reaction from the TNI to any attempt at creating independent states in
Aceh or Irian Jaya would be intense and might well put an end to democracy in
Indonesia. The focus of the external powers, as well as of such major interna-
tional institutions as the International Monetary Fund, must be on helping
Indonesia to recover economically and build a democratic society. This will be
no easy task. As a 1998 World Bank report commented, “Indonesia is in a deep
crisis. No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever
suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune.”7 The Indonesian economy remains
very vulnerable to another economic crisis, just when the political situation in
Jakarta has become so volatile. A combination of religious fervor and strident
nationalism in a failed Indonesian democracy would be of great concern to In-
donesia’s neighbors, especially if aggressive foreign policies were the outcome. A
more extreme Islamic stance in Indonesia, when similar sentiments are emerg-
ing in Malaysia and the southern Philippines, would be deeply disturbing. A
unified, secular, and democratic Indonesia is in the region’s interest.
Another dangerous part of Southeast Asia is the South China Sea, where there
are overlapping territorial claims between China (which claims all the islands
and reefs), Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
The United States is not a principal party to these territorial disputes, but it must
make it clear to China that it will not tolerate Chinese territorial hegemony over
the South China Sea. Regular demonstrations of the naval capabilities of the
United States and its allies would be useful reminders to China that its proper
course of action is negotiation with the countries of Southeast Asia.
The South Pacific has traditionally been the most stable part of the Asia-
Pacific region, but it now comprises a number of failed states. Papua New
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Guinea, which shares a common border with Indonesia, has a fragile economy,
high levels of corruption and violence, and an active secessionist movement on
Bougainville. If Bougainville secedes, New Britain, New Ireland, and regions ad-
joining Indonesian Irian Jaya may also separate. The peoples of Papua New
Guinea and Irian Jaya share a Melanesian origin and a dislike of Indonesia. In
the event of conflict between Indonesia and its Irian Jaya province, the Papua
New Guineans—who have a security treaty with Australia—would side with
their Melanesian brothers.
Several of the other South Pacific islands are scarcely viable economically and
have regimes noted for corruption. In the Solomon Islands there is an active in-
surrection between the peoples of Guadalcanal and Malaita, which has led to the
overthrow of the elected government. Fiji has experienced its third coup since
1987, and ethnic tension between the indigenous Fijians and the Indian commu-
nity has resulted in widespread violence and disenfranchisement of the Indians;
George Speight’s coup was no more than the act of an armed thug. Harsh diplo-
matic and economic sanctions have been applied by Australia and New Zealand.
New Zealand, which is Australia’s oldest ally, is no longer a member of the
ANZUS alliance and has so reduced its defense capabilities that it is capable of
little more than peacekeeping operations. As a result, Australia, which confronts
an arc of instability stretching from Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to the Sol-
omon Islands and Fiji, will increasingly see New Zealand as more of a liability
than a useful defense partner.
UNCERTAIN U.S. POLICIES
American political power and military presence is the key to maintaining a
peaceful balance of power in Asia over the next five years.8 Only the United
States has the power, credibility, and distance (both geographical and cultural)
from the region to maintain the regional balance. Other contenders for this role
would not be acceptable locally: China is feared as a potentially dominant—and
perhaps expansionist—power; great suspicion still surrounds any ambitions for
regional leadership that Japan might have; India is seen as essentially peripheral
to East Asian affairs; and Russia is a weak and distracted power.
U.S. credibility is based not only on its military presence but also on its long
historical ties to the region, extending back a hundred years. Most countries in
the region, apart from China, agree that the departure of the United States
would leave the region open to fierce contention between China and Japan or
India, possibly leading to war. But the United States is distracted these days by
domestic events and Europe. It is also much more severely stretched than in ear-
lier decades; it must react to crises across the globe with a military little more
than half the size it was in the Cold War.
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For that reason, there must now be some doubt whether the United States can
fulfil its much-vaunted East Asian strategy, based on a capacity to handle two re-
gional conflicts “almost simultaneously.”9 Inability by the United States to cope
with a major crisis in, for example, the Korean Peninsula at the same time as it
was fighting a regional adversary elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East, would
be disastrous for its alliance system. The United States is the only nation with the
power to enforce security across the region. No reasonable ally, however, can ex-
pect Washington to be a perfect arbiter and enforcer of security, and indeed,
there is a growing perception that the United States tends to carry out its mili-
tary duties only after armed conflict has broken out.
This uncertainty over the speed of a U.S. response has consequences for
countries in Asia that expect the United States to maintain regional peace and
security. Many in Asia believe that the United States will not necessarily be on
the spot (except in Korea) at the moment when conflict breaks out. It may—de-
pending on the degree of strategic interest and the nature of domestic reac-
tion—turn up quickly, and it might ultimately restore the status quo ante, but
this will be of little comfort for nations whose territory has been threatened in
the meantime. Moreover, the manner in which the United States intervenes will
be strongly shaped by domestic considerations: it will seek to respond to an
armed conflict in the most domestically acceptable way—in other words, with
airpower. But in some of the more likely regional scenarios, ground forces would
be essential.
Strategic inconsistency was evident in the U.S. response to the Asian eco-
nomic crisis. Asia’s multilateral institutions—APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation), ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum—failed to play any
role in addressing the crisis, underscoring how heavily regional economic and
strategic stability relies on the policies and initiatives of the United States. This
means that Asia’s welfare depends critically on the depth of strategic under-
standing in Washington. But it appears that U.S. policy makers still weigh strate-
gic significance in Cold War terms: South Korea received quick and substantial
economic assistance, because it faced a communist North armed with nuclear
weapons; Indonesia did not, because, the Cold War being over, the world’s
fourth-largest country is no longer important to the United States as a bastion
against communism in Southeast Asia. Instead, Washington let the IMF im-
pose dangerously destabilizing measures on Jakarta. Apparently, human rights
rather than geopolitics dominate the United States–Indonesia relationship to-
day. While human rights have an undeniably important place in international
diplomacy, they should not dominate relations with an Indonesia struggling to
maintain its social and political cohesion. For the sake of the stability of the
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whole of Southeast Asia, the United States needs to focus more on the critical
importance of Indonesian unity and cohesion.
The United States does not appear to have developed a new standard by
which to measure the strategic significance of countries such as Indonesia. A
decade after the end of the Cold War, it is time for Washington to develop a more
refined process for deciding the policy response to crises in Asia—some of
which will determine the future of the region. Washington should cease allocat-
ing economic and political support on the basis of Cold War strategic values and
devise new tenets for its strategic engagement policy in Asia.
There is also growing unease in the region about America’s longer-term
commitment to keeping about a hundred thousand troops deployed in North-
east Asia, which has been the position of U.S. administrations for the last decade.
Adding to the sense of uncertainty is open discussion in the United States
about how emerging military technologies, particularly in long-range precision
strike, could lessen the need for forward operating bases. The total number of
U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan and at sea with the Seventh Fleet is in any
case now much closer to ninety thousand; the figure of a hundred thousand is
becoming increasingly less credible. Thought also needs to be given to the im-
pact on the American presence of
a future unified Korea, both in
Korea itself and in Japan. This is
not to argue that there are no
imaginable political circum-
stances in which there could be a phased reduction of American forces in North-
east Asia. But the implications for confidence within the region of a sudden and
large-scale reduction suggest that any drawdown would need to be planned in
advance, in consultation with allies.
There is no unifying enemy like the Soviet Union to keep the United States
and its European allies together, yet the Nato alliance has adjusted, by rejuvenat-
ing its charter and expanding its membership. Will the United States and its al-
lies in the Asia-Pacific region similarly devise a new common security concept?
Or will there be a gradual weakening of the bilateral alliances with Australia, Ja-
pan, and South Korea? The alliance in the Asia-Pacific should no longer be
threat based but rather should emphasize shared interests in the maintenance of
regional stability.10
There seems to be growing interest in the United States in multilateral secu-
rity. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, has promoted the concept of “security communities.” The idea here is to
encourage “collective efforts into resolving regional points of friction; contrib-
ute armed forces and other aid to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to
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support diplomatic solutions; and plan, train, and exercise . . . armed forces to-
gether for these operations.”11 According to Admiral Blair, these security com-
munities may be alliance-treaty signatories, participants in nonmilitary
organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum, or simply groups of nations
joined by geographic considerations or common concerns. The communities
would be committed to policy coordination—including combined military co-
operation on specific regional security issues—to advance peaceful develop-
ment over time without major conflict.12 The problem with this idea is that it
risks diluting the primacy of strong bilateral security alliances in the region, and
that it may be seen as being aimed, eventually, at the creation of a multilateral se-
curity enterprise in Asia.
Asia has not had a good track record with multilateralism. The Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, which was created in 1954 and dissolved in 1977, was not
an effective organization. Unlike Nato, it never had standing forces that could be
committed in the event of conflict. The ASEAN Regional Forum started off in
the early 1990s with much fanfare and with the aim of progressing steadily from
military confidence-building measures to preventive diplomacy and, eventually,
conflict resolution. But in the eight years of its existence it has not progressed
much beyond discussing basic confidence-building measures.13 Many of the
military forces in Asia are highly secretive, declining to publish even the most
basic information about their capabilities. They resist arms-control ideas and
transparency measures, even those of kinds common in Europe. It is difficult
therefore to be optimistic about the outlook for multilateral security coopera-
tion in Asia. American ideas in this regard need to be better thought through,
and they need to avoid any appearance of being aimed at containing China.
GUIDELINES FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS
Strategic developments in Asia are not likely to pose fundamental challenges to
American military power and influence over the next five years, as long as the
United States retains a credible forward military presence and is not found
wanting in a major military crisis involving its allies. However, the United States
and its allies need to do more together, given the unpredictability of the strategic
situation in Asia and the speed with which adverse events could unfold.
There is no doubt about the fundamental economic strength of the United
States and its allies in the region, or of the military superiority of the U.S. alli-
ance system. The concern is the cohesion of America’s alliances in an era when
there is no common threat but doubts exist about the political will of leaders to
use force if confronted with military adventurism in Asia. Any perception of wa-
vering or ambiguity in the U.S. military commitment to the region could lead to
rapid destabilization. America’s allies need to do much more to provide for their
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own security, to develop military forces that can deal with crises in their imme-
diate neighborhoods and that can also make useful contributions to U.S. opera-
tions farther afield.
With these guidelines in mind, let us proceed to some specific policy recom-
mendations. First, United States security planners and their allied opposite
numbers need to prepare for less benign strategic futures in Asia, not relying on
comfortable predictions that the region will experience prolonged stability and
peace. These alternative futures obviously embrace such scenarios as war be-
tween the United States and China over the Taiwan Straits, and conflict on the
Korean Peninsula. But planners should also examine what the United States
should do in the event of nuclear war between India and Pakistan; of Chinese
use of military force in the South China Sea against a friendly ASEAN country;
and of the emergence in Indonesia of a strongly nationalist regime that antago-
nizes its neighbors.
There is a clear implication here for allied intelligence services: the size of the
task in the Asia-Pacific region suggests more (rather than less) in the way of in-
telligence cooperation. But the sheer outpouring of data from overhead col-
lection systems threatens to overwhelm our analytical capabilities. Allies need to
do more about training good minds who are expert on Asia and who are not
afraid of challenging conventional intelligence wisdoms.
From a defense planning perspective, it is important to understand that in the
Asia-Pacific region potential military operations will be essentially maritime in na-
ture. Apart from the Korean Peninsula, U.S. military forces are not likely to be in-
volved in large-scale ground-force operations. The dominant geopolitical change
in the new security environment has been the virtual elimination for military
planning purposes of allied continental
commitments; the emerging struggle for
power in Asia will focus on political fault
lines that are maritime rather than conti-
nental in aspect. The development of
China’s military power and the response to
it of India and Japan are likely to put pressure on the chain of America’s friends
and allies in the long littoral extending between South Korea and Taiwan in the
north to the ASEAN countries and Australia in the south.
The new technological challenge in this maritime environment is the growing
threat from high-speed, precise cruise missiles—both air and sea launched—
and long-range ballistic missiles that can threaten fixed forward operating
bases.14 These technological changes mean that the U.S. and allied forces op-
erating in the complex littoral and archipelagic waters of the region will be
more vulnerable than they have been; maritime battlefields in the
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Asia-Pacific will become more lethal. For America’s allies who want to oper-
ate in joint task forces, there will be force-structure implications in the cost
of platforms, like air-warfare-capable destroyers, that can operate in
high-threat environments.
While no peer competitor to the United States will emerge over the next five
years, the political challenge is that alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion will be less predictable, and less committed to allied war-fighting, than they
were in the Cold War. America’s key allies in the region (Japan, South Korea, and
Australia) would be most reluctant, for example, to commit forces in a U.S.-led
coalition war with China over Taiwan. Also, America’s aversion to casualties sug-
gests that the United States will be most unlikely to commit forces on the ground
in Southeast Asia—as was demonstrated in East Timor.
The United States will continue to hold the balance of power in Asia over
the next five years, but its policies will come under increasing scrutiny by its
friends and others. It is important in this context that American policy not
demonize China as the next “evil empire.” Neither Japan, South Korea, nor
Australia would be willing parties to such an ill considered approach. Of
course, America’s allies must make it clear to China which side they are on
and that they will not tolerate Chinese interference in alliance relationships.
However, the United States needs to develop much more thoughtful policies
toward China, including in such areas as ballistic missile defense.15
The commitment of the United States to forward basing in Northeast Asia
and to the maintenance of a nominal hundred thousand troops needs careful
handling over the next five years. The new administration will most likely re-
view the question of U.S. forces based overseas. At least until the Korean
question is settled, it would be unwise to announce any hasty withdrawals.
Care also needs to be taken following any U.S. withdrawal from South Korea
with any subsequent effects on the American military presence in Japan and
on inclinations in Tokyo to build up its own capabilities. While Japan should
be encouraged to improve its defense forces over the coming years in order to
become a more useful security partner of the United States, this should be
done gradually and with due regard for the sensitivities of other countries in
the region.16
Given the greatly reduced size of the U.S. Pacific Fleet since the end of the
Cold War, and the much broader range of potential contingencies in which it
could be involved, the United States should expect more of its allies. Japan and
Australia in particular could significantly supplement the Pacific Fleet’s sur-
face ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft.17 While these platforms
will not generally be of the same combat capability as those of the United
States, they should be adequate for littoral operations in mid-intensity
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conflicts. Some, like the conventional submarines of Japan and Australia,
have operational advantages not possessed by those of the United States.
In general, the United States needs to develop more coherence and predict-
ability in its Asia-Pacific security strategy. This applies especially to its policies
toward China, as mentioned, but the United States also needs to give greater at-
tention to Southeast Asia and, especially, Indonesia. The central importance of
Southeast Asia to the maritime trade of the entire Asia-Pacific, the fact that the
ten ASEAN countries have a combined population of over 500 million, and the
key role of Indonesia all point to the need for Washington to give greater atten-
tion to this part of the world. For instance, Australia cannot be left essentially on
its own, with only episodic U.S. interest and involvement, to help Indonesia
emerge from its current acute political and economic difficulties.18 As we have
seen, the future of that country will profoundly affect peace and stability in
Southeast Asia. Its potential to interfere with freedom of passage in the Malacca,
Sunda, and Lombok Straits should be a matter of concern to defense planners in
the United States as well as Australia.
Finally, the United States needs to take great care in developing multilateral se-
curity ideas, such as “security communities.” While the intention may be to pre-
pare for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, there is a growing
unease that well tried bilateral alliances will be eroded in the process. There is al-
ready a view in the region that America’s key alliances are nowhere near as im-
portant to it as they were in the Cold War, that vital American national security
interests are no longer clearly defined, and that Washington involves itself un-
predictably in some overseas episodes and not in others. In these circumstances,
there is a risk that the alliance framework in the Asia-Pacific will begin to fray.
In light of the uncertain strategic future facing the region outlined in this ar-
ticle, the United States and its allies need to do more together to shape the re-
gional security environment to their advantage. With better coordination they
are well placed to do so—but they need to develop habits of franker strategic di-
alogue about contentious issues. The United States should listen more carefully
to its allies and friends who are in the region and who well understand the nu-
ances of strategic developments there.
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THE MARITIME BASIS OF
AMERICAN SECURITY IN EAST ASIA
James E. Auer and Robyn Lim
American policy toward East Asia must be based on an understanding ofhow the region’s strategic geography bears on the interests of the United
States as the dominant maritime power. The western Pacific has resumed its role
as the focus of world economic growth, but it is not “all economics now.” East
Asia is the one part of the world where great-power war remains thinkable. That
is because it is the only region where the Cold War left a residue of unresolved
great-power strategic tensions.
Hanging off the eastern edge of Eurasia, the Korean Peninsula (half-island)
continues in its historical role as the focus of great-power rivalry—albeit on the basis
of new configurations of interest. Tension between the United States and
China is growing in relation to the island of Taiwan, a flourishing democracy
located in a key position on the “first island chain,” running down the East Asian
littoral. Farther offshore, China and other regional states contest the ownership
of the scattered reefs and archipelagoes of the East and South China Seas.
These strategic tensions on the East Asian littoral must engage the interests of
the dominant maritime power and all those who rely on
its protection. The United States has obligations to protect
the maritime security of Japan, the world’s second-largest
economy. That is a matter of great convenience to both
parties, as well as to the wider region, since the U.S.-Japan
security treaty provides Japan with maritime protection
in ways that do not disturb Japan’s neighbors. Freedom of
the seas is also an essential interest of the United States in
its strategic capacity as the global offshore balancer.
Dr. Auer, who served for twenty years as a naval officer
and five years as a civilian employee in the Defense
Department, is director of the Center for U.S.-Japan
Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University’s
Institute for Public Policy Studies. Dr. Lim, a former
strategic analyst in the Australian government’s Office
of National Assessment, is now a professor of interna-
tional relations at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Ja-
pan. Professor Lim is grateful for a Pache grant from
Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan.
© 2000 by James E. Auer and Robyn Lim
Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 1
43
War College: Winter 2001 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
THE UNITED STATES AS GLOBAL OFFSHORE BALANCER . . .
In May 1940, with most of Western Europe’s coastline in Hitler’s hands and Brit-
ain threatened with invasion, the United States inherited the British role as the
global offshore balancer. No longer could America enjoy the “free security” pro-
vided for so long, de facto, by the Royal Navy. Since then strategic circumstances
have changed, but strategic interests are remarkably enduring. The United
States, having become the offshore balancer, must take a close interest in what is
happening strategically on the opposite shores of its great ocean moat. Unless
America can maintain a balance of power at both ends of Eurasia and ensure
freedom of the seas, it cannot wage war much beyond its own southern and
northern borders.1
Long before it became the global offshore balancer, America had a vital inter-
est in the balance of power in the western Pacific. The United States became a Pa-
cific power when it acquired Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898. Its need to see a
balance of power struck across the Pacific Ocean was understood by President
Theodore Roosevelt, who was much influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Roose-
velt knew that the Philippines was the nation’s Achilles’ heel: it was too close to
Japan and too far from Hawaii. In 1905, he brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth,
which concluded the Russo-Japanese War after the parties had fought to exhaus-
tion. The equilibrium struck at Portsmouth did not last, because Japan had con-
tinental ambitions that clashed with America’s interest in the “Open Door” to
China. Soon, the U.S. Navy was gaming conflict with Japan. The Pacific War was
not inevitable, but it had its roots in America’s refusal to grant Japan a free hand
in East Asia.
Ever since Portsmouth, the balance of power in East Asia has been up for
grabs. Throughout last century’s global strategic contests—the two world wars
and the Cold War—the East Asian balance remained unsettled. The collapse of
Soviet power brought equilibrium to Western Europe but not to the East Asian
littoral. For reasons of history, culture, and domestic politics, the United States
has been facing the wrong way strategically since it won the Cold War—toward
Europe rather than the western Pacific. Still fighting the last war, America risks
forgetting to deter the next.
The United States, because it is the offshore balancer, cannot tolerate a bid for
hegemony over Eurasia or any of its critical parts. China, not Russia, is the cur-
rent chief aspirant. To concede hegemony to China would mean that the United
States would have little influence over what happens in East Asia and would be
forced to operate there on terms set by Beijing. History’s lesson is that a mari-
time power cannot concede dominance over vital seas to any rising power with a
continent-sized base on the opposite shore. To do so invites strangulation and
ultimately invasion. In its long history as the offshore balancer, the United
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Kingdom stood at greatest risk of invasion—in 1588 and 1940—when a state
dominant on the continent developed sufficient maritime power to threaten the
British in their island redoubt.
. . . AN OCEAN AWAY FROM THE EAST ASIAN LITTORAL
The Pacific is the widest of the world’s oceans, larger than the Indian and Atlan-
tic Oceans combined. Located as it is in the Western Hemisphere, the United
States cannot hope to maintain a balance of power across the vast reaches of the
Pacific unless it has access to bases on or just off the East Asian littoral. That is
why America’s alliance with Japan rests on a congruence of strategic interests: in
return for providing the United States with bases—which also provide access for
a range of regional contingencies—Japan is afforded maritime and nuclear pro-
tection. Japan is an industrialized but resource-poor archipelago barely off the
littoral, dependent on long sea routes for vital energy imports from the Persian
Gulf. The uncontested exercise of hostile maritime power by any littoral state
would rapidly bring Japan to heel, without need for invasion.
The United States, in the interests of its own security and that of Japan, can-
not grant China a free hand in East Asia. It simply cannot afford to accept that in
East Asia its “ability to ensure regional stability through forward presence and
the deployment of naval power may be nearing an end.”2
WHY TAIWAN MATTERS
Taiwan is the current locus of great-power strategic tension, as Berlin was dur-
ing the Cold War. The preservation of Berlin’s independence was a strategic in-
terest of the United States, one that justified the risk of war with Moscow.
Force-balances matter. By providing military capacity adequate to protect the
Western Europeans from Soviet attack, and demonstrating the will to fight if
necessary, the United States ensured that it did not have to go to war with the So-
viet Union. America’s possession of nuclear weapons played a critical role in de-
terring Soviet assertions (based on proximity) of hegemony over Eurasia—the
1948 Berlin airlift providing an early test.
For similar reasons, preservation of Taiwan’s de facto independence is an
American interest that justifies risking war with China. China sees Taiwan as a
renegade province that it has the right to bring to heel, by force if necessary. No
one in the current leadership in Beijing wants to go down in history as having
lost Taiwan, which all see slipping away. But if China were to succeed in taking
Taiwan by force or threat, it would be well on the way to hegemony over East
Asia. Japan would lose confidence in U.S. protection and might opt to go it
alone, developing long-range maritime power and a nuclear capability. That
would be likely to destabilize the region, as others became afraid of Japan and
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started to arm against it. Only by maintaining adequate force levels in the
western Pacific, and demonstrating the will to use them if necessary, can the
United States deter Chinese assertions of regional hegemony made on the basis
of proximity. No doubt, this would have been readily comprehended by the
geostrategist Nicholas Spykman, that great Yale Dutchman, who died in 1942.
MUDDLED THINKING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Strategic geography is enjoying an overdue revival in the United States, but the
United States has not produced another Spykman. Recent analysts of East Asia’s
strategic geography are muddled in their approaches. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for
example, is mistaken when he says that America should focus on moving the pieces
around the Eurasian chessboard.3 To the contrary, as the offshore balancer the
United States must concentrate on controlling the waves on either side of the board.
Brzezinski’s flawed logic helped underpin the misguided eastward expansion
of Nato. It gave reassurance where none was needed, and on a basis unnecessar-
ily antagonistic to Russia. It also played into the hands of Beijing, by distracting
America’s attention from the more pressing strategic problems of East Asia.
Brzezinski’s mistaken assumption that America must seek geostrategic consen-
sus with China in order to gain a political foothold on the Asian mainland also
helped generate President William Clinton’s bizarre notion of “strategic part-
nership” with China.
That notion received support from the dominant school in American politi-
cal science, which has fostered concepts of “bipolarity” between the United
States and China, leading to supposedly shared interests.4 Because they thought
that bipolarity was inherently stable, the “structuralists” thought the Cold War
would go on for ever. They did not see that in the late 1970s the Soviets were out
to win. Unlike, however, the political scientists and his own predecessors,
President Ronald Reagan did correctly perceive Soviet intentions. Reagan also
understood the importance of forthrightly confronting the enemy. That goal in-
formed his strategic programs, including the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Current imaginings of U.S.-China bipolarity are as misguided as the bipolarity
concept was during the Cold War. Their anti-Soviet alliance of convenience hav-
ing dissolved, the United States and China now represent opposed poles of strate-
gic interest in the western Pacific. True, they have some common interests on the
Korean Peninsula—for example, that there should be no war and that neither Ko-
rea should acquire nuclear weapons. However, after the Koreas are reunited, China
and the United States will have even fewer shared interests in the western Pacific.
China already advocates the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula,
as a first step to seeing them removed from the entire western Pacific.
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Nor do East Asia’s strategic tensions arise from so-called “security dilem-
mas”—those analytical dei ex machina—as the arms control fraternity believes.5
The advocates of arms control treat China and Japan as equally likely to cause
problems. What they fail to see is that China has strategic ambitions, while Japan
has strategic anxieties.6 Japan is already starting to feel Chinese strategic pres-
sure on its energy lifeline from the Gulf. Strategic tensions arise from collisions
of interest, not from simple misunderstanding, accident, and so on; they are not
amenable to resolution by confidence-building measures, preventative diplo-
macy, or other arms control panaceas. Deterrence prevents war. Why must these
essential lessons of strategic history be constantly relearned?
MARITIME POWER AND GEOSTRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES
Today’s Sino-U.S. tensions represent the latest round of the historic competition
between maritime and continental powers. Currently, China has little ability to
project power beyond its frontiers. Still, its strategic geography means that
China does not have to become a “peer competitor” of the United States in order
to collide with its vital interests.
The United States can remain an Asian Pacific power only as long as it can
project maritime force across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. It no longer
has bases in the Philippines. Because China, in contrast, enjoys the advantages of
proximity, it does not need to develop maritime power commensurate with that
of the United States in order to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Un-
contested exercise of maritime power in the South China Sea would allow
Beijing to plant its foot on Japan’s resource jugular; then, calculating that Japan
could feel compelled to comply, China might insist that Japan evict the United
States from its bases there.
It is also important to read history with an eye to geostrategic asymmetries.
Throughout the last century’s great strategic contests, the dominant land pow-
ers did not seek hegemony at sea, because it was not a prerequisite for hegemony
on land. What they sought was sufficient maritime power to deter the offshore
balancer from playing its traditional role—which was to prevent a continental
power from achieving hegemony over Europe/Eurasia.
Drawing analogies between Germany in the years leading up to the First
World War and China now, Robert Ross notes that Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s
“risk fleet” was bound to fail, because Germany could never have developed suf-
ficient naval capabilities to threaten British maritime supremacy.7 But that
misses the point. The “risk fleet’s” purpose was not to challenge the Royal Navy
all around the globe; rather, Germany sought to challenge the British navy
specifically in the North Sea, in order to prevent Britain from being able to play
its traditional role of offshore balancer in Europe. That was all Germany needed
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to do to win. Commanding the central geographical position in Europe, Ger-
many had advanced military and technological capabilities. Had the “risk
fleet” been able to preoccupy the
Royal Navy in the North Sea, Ger-
many would have succeeded in gain-
ing hegemony over Europe. With
the resources of Europe at its com-
mand, Germany would have eventu-
ally developed sufficient maritime power to invade the British Isles. Britain’s
accelerated dreadnought-construction program registered that it perceived the threat.
For similar reasons, after the fall of France in 1940 the United States had no
choice but to inherit the British role as offshore balancer. Although isolationism
remained powerful in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt under-
stood the threat posed by Hitler’s overthrow of the balance of power in Europe.
So he pushed through an accelerated program to build a two-ocean navy.
In the Cold War, geostrategic asymmetries meant that the USSR did not need
to match the American navy in order to win. The Soviet Union already com-
manded the dominant position in Eurasia. That was a consequence of the way
the Second World War had ended;8 when the fighting stopped, the Red Army
had been dangerously close to hegemony over Europe.9 In the 1970s, Moscow
was so encouraged by its achievement of strategic nuclear parity and by the U.S.
post-Vietnam strategic paralysis that it thought it could win the Cold War. Ad-
miral Sergei Gorshkov, Russia’s answer to Mahan, began to develop a Soviet
blue-water capability—the Soviet version of the kaiser’s “risk fleet.”
The Soviet Union, given its commanding position in Eurasia, did not need to
develop maritime power equal to America’s in order to challenge the United
States for first place in the world hierarchy. Rather, it sought sufficient power at
sea to deter the United States from playing the role of offshore balancer; that was
all that Moscow needed in order to win. Like Admiral Tirpitz before him, Admi-
ral Gorshkov did not set out to challenge the dominant global maritime power
all over the world; had the Soviet Union developed sufficient maritime power to
make the United States unable to keep the sea lanes open to Western Europe,
Moscow would have won the Cold War.10 That was why Admiral Gorshkov’s
push for a blue-water navy represented a threat the United States could not af-
ford to ignore. President Reagan’s maritime strategy registered Washington’s
understanding of the point—just as the British had met the German challenge
before the First World War with the dreadnought program, and President
Franklin Roosevelt had responded to the fall of France with the two-ocean navy.
We have probably seen the end of the grand strategic competitions for
superiority over Eurasia that propelled the United States into the box seat.
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America, called upon in two world wars and the Cold War to redress the balance
of power in Europe, achieved definitive success in the Cold War. In the latter it
defeated the Soviet Union, while Britain, France, Germany, and Japan all de-
pended on the United States for their ultimate security.
But strategic history has not ended. Like the ambitions of Admirals von
Tirpitz and Gorshkov, China’s ambition to develop a blue-water navy does not
signal an intention to develop maritime power in order to challenge the domi-
nant maritime power all over the globe. Rather, China—which occupies the cen-
tral geographic position on the mainland—seeks to develop sufficient maritime
power to deter the United States from playing the role of offshore balancer in
East Asia. Through purchases of sophisticated Russian equipment, China is
seeking to develop “asymmetrical capabilities” intended to deter U.S. aircraft
carriers from intervening in a Taiwan crisis.
History may not repeat itself, but some patterns are too obvious to ignore. If
China thinks it can enact another Pearl Harbor by attacking or even sinking a
U.S. carrier, Beijing ought to reflect on the consequences for Japan of the events
of 7 December 1941.
CHINA: A RISING CONTINENTAL POWER WITH
BLUE-WATER AMBITION
China does not represent a threat anything like that once posed by the Soviet
Union, when the USSR possessed huge military power and stretched across
Eurasia, threatening U.S. allies at both ends of that landmass. Nor has China
suddenly become powerful. Still, it is enjoying a strategic latitude unprece-
dented in modern times, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the with-
drawal of Soviet forward-deployed forces from Mongolia, and the ending of the
Soviet alliance with Vietnam. Pointing strategically eastward and southward,
China is pressing on its maritime frontiers in the East and South China Seas.
China is unwilling to consider the rights and interests of others; it is focused on its
own sense of entitlement and historical grievance. The parallels with Japan in the
1930s are striking.
China wants and needs no allies, because its strategic needs are regional
and concentrated. It requires only a regional military capability, supported by
a credible minimum nuclear deterrent as a shield against nuclear blackmail.
In contrast, because the United States is the offshore balancer, it needs large re-
sources of maritime power, nuclear weapons, bases, and allies. These require-
ments arise from strategic necessity, not hubris, although China does not see it
that way.
China’s vast territorial claims, turned on and off at will, in the South China
Sea are fueled by a drive for power and resources. China is pressing on the vital
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Malacca Straits, which link the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from both directions.
At the western entrance to the Strait, China has a strategic foothold in the Coco
Islands, owned by friendless Burma. At the eastern entrance to the Strait, China’s
claims extend as far south as the Natuna Islands, which guard the approaches to
Java, heartland of the Indonesian Archipelago.11
Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia’s other great archipelago, the
Philippines, has been a weak link in the offshore island chain. By requiring in
1991 that the United States leave its naval base at Subic Bay, the Philippines
stretched U.S. strategic mobility; it also did much to embolden China. A year
later, the Chinese rubber-stamp parliament reasserted China’s extensive claims
in the East and South China Seas—including, by implication, the right to use
force against U.S. allies. Central to China’s new assertiveness were the ideas of
the then-commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Admiral Liu Huaqing,
China’s answer to Mahan.12 In 1995, China’s grab of Mischief Reef in the Spratly
archipelago came to light. China has since proceeded to fortify the reef, claiming
that it is merely building fishermen’s shacks. Mischief Reef, which is also claimed
by the Philippines, is well within the Philippines’ two-hundred-mile exclusive
economic zone. It is unlikely that China would have seized the reef had the U.S.
Navy still been in Subic.
The Philippines, which has virtually no navy of its own, has long sought to
entangle America in its claims in the South China Sea.13 However, the United
States has no obligation to support Philippine claims in the Spratlys; it has no in-
terest in the ownership of these scattered reefs and archipelagoes. But it does
have a vital interest in maritime passage through the South China Sea—both on
its own account as the offshore balancer, and because of its commitments to Ja-
pan’s resource security. The United States also has an essential interest in deter-
ring China from making threats against its allies. America’s mutual security
treaties with Japan and the Philippines tie it to issues of strategic contention in
both the East and South China Seas.
In 1995–96, a tepid American response to China’s reassertions of its territo-
rial claims in the South China Sea encouraged China to go farther: it probed to-
ward the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Japan has
long claimed these islands, whereas China became interested in them only in the
1970s, when there seemed a prospect of oil deposits nearby. After the Second
World War, the United States administered the Senkakus as part of Okinawa and
developed a bombing range there. It handed over their administration to Ja-
pan when Okinawa was returned in 1972, thus continuing to include the
Senkakus, de jure, within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Nonetheless,
the Clinton administration, for fear of offending China, refused to acknowledge
publicly that the Senkakus come within the treaty’s ambit. That further
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emboldened China; it is not surprising that China’s probes around the Senkakus
and Okinawa increased. China has even become bold enough to send surveillance
vessels through the Tsugaru Strait, in the heart of the Japanese archipelago.14
In 1996, China “ratified” the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as if
it were an archipelagic state, which it was not entitled to do. Further, it drew
archipelagic baselines around the Paracel Islands, which it took from Vietnam
by force in 1974, to prevent their falling into the hands of North Vietnam,
China’s supposed ally at the time—a nice example of realpolitik. In 1988, Chi-
nese and Vietnamese forces clashed in the Spratlys.
For China, taking the Paracels was a pushover; the more distant Spratlys are
not. China, having learned lessons from the demise of the Soviet Union, is devel-
oping its military capabilities at a modest pace that does not outrun economic
growth. But China no doubt intends, once it has developed longer-range mari-
time capabilities (including sophisticated Russian military technology), to pick
off the other claimants one by one.
The Clinton administration persisted in seeing these sources of strategic con-
tention in the East and South China Seas as legal issues, whereas in fact they are
strategic issues with legal faces. If the United States continues to ignore its equity
in these islands, it is only a matter of time before China makes an archipelagic
claim to the whole of the Spratlys.
WOBBLES TO THE SOUTH
China sees time as a strategic asset, in the way that the Soviet Union saw space
(distance, that is, not kosmos) as a strategic asset. Beijing seeks to convince the
Southeast Asians that time is on its side. “Remember Saigon,” the Chinese say;
“the Americans are unreliable and may leave, but China will be here for ever.”
Thus the Southeast Asians are urged to accommodate Beijing now, lest the price
of future accommodation be made higher.
The Southeast Asians have not been completely supine, and some seek to
keep America actively engaged in their region. Thailand conducts annual mili-
tary exercises (COBRA GOLD) with the United States, and Singapore joined in
recently. Singapore, the region’s geostrategic pivot because of its vital position in
the Malacca Straits, is building a berth at Changi Naval Base to accommodate
U.S. aircraft carriers. It also bases much of its air force in Australia, a U.S. ally.
Both Malaysia and Singapore participate in the Five Power Defence Arrange-
ments, which provide an umbrella under which they can cooperate with each
other and with Western powers.15 Under the auspices of the FPDA, Royal Austra-
lian Air Force F/A-18 aircraft regularly deploy to Butterworth in northern Ma-
laysia; also, Australian maritime surveillance aircraft operating from
Butterworth conduct missions over the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
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Even the Philippine senate, which voted in 1991 to evict the U.S. Navy from
Subic Bay, caught a whiff of realpolitik when China started to build its base on
Mischief Reef; in 1999, the senate approved a new Visiting Forces Agreement
that will allow U.S. ship visits.
In general, however, confronted with a rising China, the Southeast Asians are
wobbly. The U.S. Navy, for instance, will not be returning to Subic Bay as a base;
Philippine miscalculation has done much to let China into the South China Sea.
China enjoys the advantages of centrality, as its history as the Middle Kingdom
shows. It also has size, demographic weight, and nuclear weapons. Unlike Japan
and Australia, the Southeast Asians do not enjoy the benefits of extended nu-
clear deterrence. They know that China, as a permanent member of the UN Se-
curity Council, could veto any reaction under the Charter to an aggression by
China itself.
Rising tension between China and America worries the Southeast Asians, and
they dread being forced to choose sides. They are unsure of how much they
could depend on external support, were they to stand up to China, or what
might result, such as a militarily stronger Japan. Except for Singapore, they have
been forced by the recession to reduce their military spending, while China’s has
gone on unabated. Most states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are
fragmented societies, and the economic downturn has exposed many fissures
within them. The economic power of China’s diaspora worries them, and many
fear its fifth-column potential.
Even the five founding members of ASEAN have been squabbling, undermin-
ing any notion that the association could act as a bulwark of regional stability.16
Indonesia, the primus inter pares in Southeast Asia, remains in post-Suharto tur-
moil and could break up; growing secessionist pressures in its outer islands re-
flect weakness at the center. For all these reasons, the Southeast Asians have been
unable to combine in defense of their interests in the South China Sea. They con-
tinue to pursue conflicting territorial claims there. That has allowed China to di-
vide and rule, even in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China also uses the ARF
as a forum for alliance busting: it argues that because the Cold War is over, the re-
gion no longer needs America’s alliance system or its forward-based forces.17
ASEAN AND TAIWAN: SEE NO EVIL
The Southeast Asians know that China is steadily building up its missiles oppo-
site Taiwan and that China has implicitly threatened Taiwan with nuclear weap-
ons. Yet they profess to see no connection between their own security and the
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996,
China sought to intimidate Taiwan as it held its first direct presidential elections.
It lobbed nuclear-capable missiles within a few miles of Taiwan’s ports, some of
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them landing close to Japan’s outer islands.18 The United States responded by
dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups, led respectively by the USS Nimitz
(CVN 68) and Independence (CV 62), to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. How-
ever, ASEAN was mute, except for mild complaint from Singapore.
In the wake of Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 2000, which saw the
ruling Kuomintang replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party, led by Chen
Shui-bian, the reaction of ASEAN has, again, been silence. Ignoring China’s
bluster and threats against Taiwan before the elections—which proved counter-
productive in any case—Singapore’s senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew, even
implied that Taiwan was at fault for “provoking” China and declared that reuni-
fication is inevitable.19
Lee should look over his shoulder. If China has the right to reintegrate Taiwan
by force, does not Malaysia have the right to reintegrate Singapore by the same
means? Lee seems unable to comprehend that the United States, in the interests
of its own security and that of Japan, cannot afford to let China take Taiwan by
force. If that happened, who in East Asia would feel safe? The fates of Taiwan and
Singapore, those wealthy ethnically Chinese islands off East Asia’s edge, are inex-
tricably linked, but Lee cannot seem to see it. Thus Southeast Asia’s senior states-
man plays into the hands of Beijing, which flatters Singapore as a model of a
market economy with party control. Also, of course, the democratic transition
in Taiwan, the first in the long history of the Chinese people, is an affront to au-
thoritarian Singapore.
No one expects ASEAN to stand up and shout at Beijing, but by professing to
see no stake in Taiwan’s continued de facto independence, it emboldens China.
Still, its timidity is no reason for the United States to give up on it. Indeed, the
United States cannot afford to do so, in the interests either of its own maritime
security or of Japan’s need for maritime protection.
JAPAN’S NEED FOR MARITIME PROTECTION
Commodore Matthew C. Perry, U.S. Navy, demonstrated in 1853 the vulnera-
bilities of an archipelagic state when he trained the guns of his “black ships” on
the decayed Tokyo forts—even though trade, not conquest, was his purpose.
Archipelagic states are especially susceptible to the exercise of hostile maritime
power because of the ease with which such power can be brought to bear against
their capitals. Japan took the point. If it wished to avoid the fate of China, which
the European powers were carving up into zones of influence, Japan could no
longer seek security in self-imposed isolation. After 1868, the Meiji Restoration
rapidly brought Japan into the global system, as a third center of economic and
military power, after Europe and the United States.
A U E R A N D L I M 4 9
53
War College: Winter 2001 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Because Japan is an island nation, its ambitions on the continent after 1905
were discretionary; they did not arise from strategic necessity. After the
Russo-Japanese War, which ended in that year, Japan had all it needed—it had
blocked the Russian threat via Korea and Manchuria; it enjoyed access to the re-
sources of Manchuria; and it had an alliance with Great Britain, the dominant
maritime power. By pursuing nonetheless its ambitions in China, Japan suc-
ceeded only in undermining its security. As it advanced down the China coast,
Japan increasingly came into collision with the two key East Asian interests of a
great industrial and maritime power having a continent-sized base in the Western
Hemisphere: America’s stake in the Open Door to China and in the security of the
Philippines led it to refuse to concede hegemony over East Asia to Japan.
The 1941–45 Pacific War demonstrated in spades Japan’s vulnerability to
hostile maritime power, a fact that the atomic bombings have tended to obscure.
Japan was strangled by a combination of the U.S. Navy’s fast carriers, fleet train,
amphibious assault forces, and submarines, and Army Air Force long-range
bombers flying from island bases seized by assault from the sea.20 While much of
the Japanese army was still thrashing about in China, to no strategic purpose,
American maritime power took Japan by the front door.
Prostrate, postwar Japan was vulnerable to the combined forces of the great
land powers of East Asia, the Soviet Union and China, who became allies in
1950. Indeed, their alliance was specifically pointed at Japan. As early as 1942,
Spykman had foreseen the need for the United States to protect postwar Japan
against the Soviet Union, whose Pacific face had long given it opportunities and
ambition. The need to defend Japan was one of America’s main reasons for en-
tering the Korean War; the United States could not afford to let the only indus-
trialized country in Asia fall to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Japan, assured of American
maritime protection as long as it agreed to provide bases for the United States,
was freed to concentrate on economic recovery. In turn, that helped the rest of
noncommunist East Asia to recover.
JAPAN’S ROLE IN WINNING THE COLD WAR
During the Cold War, Japan was neither an economic threat to the United States
nor a free rider, as so many now seem to think. To the contrary, Japan played an
important role in bringing down the overextended Soviet empire.
Japan’s geostrategic location made it a vital link in a global chain of maritime
power that depended critically on nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming So-
viet proximate power in Europe. In order to bring countervailing pressure to bear
on the vulnerable eastern flank of the Soviet Union, the United States needed a
combination of East Asian allies, maritime power, and nuclear weapons. Although
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the Cold War had its roots in Europe, over time the East Asian dimension of this
global strategic contest progressively grew in importance.
In the 1980s, Japan’s navy developed significant maritime capability, in con-
junction with President Reagan’s maritime strategy, and the Soviets perceived
that Japan was willing to fight if necessary. The U.S. maritime strategy published
in 1986 was a logical response to the global strategic challenge laid down by the
Soviet Union in the late 1970s.21 In
1979, the fall of the shah of Iran cre-
ated an “arc of crisis” in the Persian
Gulf. British withdrawal from “East
of Suez” brought the Soviet navy hot-
foot into the Indian Ocean, not least
from Vladivostok. Moscow also concocted arms control schemes in the Indian
Ocean. Deeply attractive to India, Moscow’s ally, these regimes aimed at hob-
bling U.S. access to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which was critical
to U.S. ability to reinforce the Gulf.22
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow’s support for Cuban
surrogates in Africa reflected the Kremlin’s belief that the “correlation of forces”
was moving decisively in its favor. The Soviet Union also tried to intimidate Ja-
pan by stationing a division of troops in the illegally occupied Japanese “North-
ern Territories” south of the Kurile Islands, visibly threatening Hokkaido. In
addition, two Soviet aircraft carriers were based at Vladivostok, just across the
Sea of Japan.
The maritime strategy envisaged Western navies taking the war to the en-
emy in both the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. Comparative advantage
at sea enabled the United States to exploit the key geostrategic problem of its
continental adversary—Soviet vulnerability to war at both ends of its eight-
thousand-mile east-west axis. Combined with China’s enmity to the Soviet Un-
ion (their alliance, though never formally abrogated, was far from close), the
maritime strategy posed an immense strategic complication for Moscow. It dis-
persed Soviet forces and made credible the threat that war in the West would also
mean war in the East.
To the east, an integral part of the maritime strategy was the development of
an effective, high-technology air defense and antisubmarine network around
the Japanese archipelago. Fully armed Japanese naval aircraft, alternating on a
daily basis with U.S. Navy antisubmarine aircraft, patrolled throughout the Sea
of Japan, upon which lie Vladivostok and other Soviet Pacific Fleet bases. That
convinced Soviet naval commanders that Japan was prepared to fight alongside
the United States if necessary. Officially, the Japanese government’s position was
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that it could not participate in collective self-defense; Japan’s actions sent a dif-
ferent message.
The strategic geography of the Japanese archipelago greatly facilitated the mar-
itime strategy, because Japan could control all the Soviet navy’s exits from its Sea
of Japan bases. By controlling the sea lanes through that sea, the United States and
Japan made it impossible for the Soviets to feel confident that they could, in war-
time, support their bases at Petropavlovsk and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam;23 all the
critical supplies had to come out of Vladivostok. The two Soviet aircraft carriers
stationed there were also much less capable than the USS Midway (CV 41), based
at Yokosuka. In addition, Japan played its part in ensuring that the global nuclear
balance did not tilt in Moscow’s favor. The U.S. and Japanese navies exploited So-
viet geostrategic problems by threatening the Soviet strategic ballistic missile sub-
marine (SSBN) fleet in its “bastion” in the Sea of Okhotsk.24 (At the other end of
Eurasia, its equivalent was the Barents Sea.)
Japan’s strategic geography also facilitated political management of Japan’s
contribution to the maritime strategy. Japan’s defense of the sea lanes out to a
thousand nautical miles sounded modest and did not arouse undue opposition
at home. The Soviet Union undermined its own objectives by minatory be-
havior that produced a palpable sense of threat in the Japanese public. Amer-
ica’s de facto alliance with China also helped, because Beijing did not oppose
the extension of Japan’s maritime capabilities. That helped mute opposition in
Japan, where the socialists had long sung Beijing’s tune. But the critics were not
so easily silenced in relation to nuclear weapons, a vital adjunct to American
maritime power.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MARITIME POWER: THE COLD WAR
Nuclear weapons are not popular anywhere, least of all in Japan, as a conse-
quence of the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Notwithstanding,
nuclear weapons were vital during the Cold War for the United States, because it
was a distant power that needed to counter Soviet assertions of hegemony, made
on the basis of proximity, over Eurasia. In 1952, the original U.S.-Japan security
treaty gave the United States carte blanche, including the rights to store nuclear
weapons in Japan and to launch them without consultation. A revision of the
treaty in 1960, at Japan’s behest, obliged the United States to consult Japan about
any changes to be made in the equipment of U.S. forces in Japan.
Nuclear weapons were removed from Okinawa when it reverted to Japanese
control in 1972. In 1969, Japan announced its three nonnuclear principles—not
to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them in Japanese terri-
tory—its prime minister Eisaku Sato (1966–72) even winning a Nobel Peace Prize
for his efforts in establishing those principles. Japan’s nonnuclear status preserved
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domestic harmony and also furthered its aspirations to be recognized as a great
power. Japan’s diplomats pursued the objective of nuclear disarmament, seeing it as
Japan’s main claim to permanent membership in the UN Security Council.25
Nonetheless, and sotto voce, Japan continued to rely on extended deterrence.
That seemed even more necessary when China exploded its first nuclear weapon
in 1964. So when nuclear-capable American ships entered Japanese ports, Japan
did not ask, and the United States did not declare, whether such weapons actu-
ally were aboard the warships. How could it have been otherwise in an alliance
critically dependent on nuclear weapons and maritime power?
If Japan had really believed that nuclear weapons were irrelevant to its secu-
rity or represented unacceptable dangers, it could have opted out of the U.S. alli-
ance at any time after 1971.26 It did not do so because the last thing the Japanese
really wanted was to be left alone to cope with China, Russia, and North Korea as
best they could.
Japan’s strategic geography also facilitated political management of nuclear
issues. As long as the United States had submarines capable of targeting the So-
viet maritime provinces, Japan felt no need to have nuclear weapons stationed
on its territory. Thus Japan avoided the political problems associated with inter-
mediate-range nuclear force deployments in Western Europe. There Moscow’s
exploitation of antinuclear sentiment, especially in Germany, came close to
splitting Nato. In 1992, President George Bush’s removal of tactical nuclear
weapons further eased the political management of nuclear issues in Japan. Still,
with the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons lost none of their salience for Ja-
pan’s security.
THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO EAST
ASIAN SECURITY
Even in changed strategic circumstances, some fundamentals of Asia-Pacific
security have not altered. Because it is the offshore balancer, the United States
still needs large resources of maritime power and nuclear weapons in order to
maintain a balance of power in the western Pacific. American nuclear weapons
and maritime power were critical in preventing the Soviet Union from winning
the Cold War on the basis of its assertions of domination over Eurasia. America’s
nuclear and maritime capabilities remain no less important in deterring China’s
designs for hegemony over East Asia. The United States must retain adequate re-
serves of nuclear weapons, resisting the clamor of those who say that nuclear
weapons have no utility now that the Cold War is over. Nuclear weapons, like the
old concept of the “fleet in being,” work all the time as deterrents, simply be-
cause they exist.
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Because Japan cannot rely on its three nonnuclear principles for its strategic
security, the United States must also continue to supply a credible nuclear um-
brella over Japan. India having tested nuclear weapons in 1998, Japan is now the
only Asian great power without them. East Asia’s strategic future will turn on
whether the United States, Japan, and China all continue to believe that the
United States will underwrite Japan’s nuclear and maritime security.
Japan cannot remain unconcerned when China rattles its nuclear-capable
missile arsenal in efforts to intimidate the Taiwanese into submission. Farther
north, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program no doubt continues, as does its
missile program. As the arms controllers tend to forget, the strategic value of any
weapon depends on who owns it. Although North Korea appears somewhat less
odious after the 15 June 2000 Korean summit, its enigmatic (if not irrational)
behavior, which includes the willingness to see millions of its own subjects
starve in order to preserve itself in power, remains largely unchanged.
North Korea’s missiles and nuclear ambiguity have been very useful in black-
mailing the United States and others into large-scale aid to North Korea, in order
to prop up that failed state, an orphan of the Cold War.27 Indeed, the North Kore-
ans seemed to have drawn appropriate conclusions from the Gulf War—that
those who wish to defy the United States should first seek nuclear weapons and
the means of delivery. If the process of Korean reunification is indeed in train, as
now seems possible, Japan will worry that a reunited state might inherit the
North Korean nuclear weapons program. Given the history and geography of
the peninsula, it would not be surprising if a reunified Korea responded to the
nuclear attraction. Would Japan then be content to continue to rely on the U.S.
nuclear umbrella?
The United States must be more attentive to Japan’s legitimate security
needs.28 Pursuing arms control and nonproliferation as objectives in themselves,
as the Clinton administration did, obscures the equations of power in East Asia.
In a region where the balance of power remains unsettled, states seek security
because they must. Japan is no exception, whatever the continuing strength of its
domestic pacifism.29
TOWARD AN ALLIANCE THAT IS READY TO FIGHT AT SEA
Many of the strategic lessons of the Cold War either were not understood in both
Japan and the United States or were rapidly forgotten. Since then, the U.S.-Japan
alliance has been allowed to drift because of lack of consistent attention at the
top in both countries. It now urgently needs an overhaul.
The Japanese government ducked its responsibilities to explain to its public
the role that Japan played in maritime strategy. As a result, Japan was unpre-
pared to respond adequately to the 1990–91 Gulf War. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
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and the threat posed to Saudi Arabia represented palpable menaces to Japan,
given its need for resource security. But because the threat was distant, few in Ja-
pan seemed to perceive it. Japan dithered, threw money at the problem, and
eventually sent four minesweepers to the Strait of Hormuz—after the war was
over.30 It got little thanks, even from Kuwait. Had the war gone on longer or
American casualties been higher, the U.S.-Japan alliance could have ruptured.31
Reading the lessons of the Gulf War, the United States moved to shore up its
alliance with Japan. It also recognized the economic importance of East Asia
and the critical fact that the power balance there remained unsettled. For those
reasons, it kept force reductions in the region to a minimum. At the other end of
Eurasia, the restoration of equilibrium as a consequence of the collapse of Soviet
power made it possible for Western Europe to absorb dramatic U.S. force reduc-
tions without compromising security. That was not the case in East Asia; accord-
ingly, the United States reaffirmed its intention to maintain a hundred thousand
forward-deployed troops in East Asia, the same number as in Europe.
Thus it was that the United States encouraged Japan to pursue a more
outward-looking security policy and to develop the resources needed to sustain
it. New U.S.-Japan defense guidelines now allow a modest amount of Japanese
rear-echelon support in emergencies in “areas surrounding Japan”—which
means Korea and Taiwan. Japan has also agreed to cooperate with the United
States in the development of theater missile defenses, including the Aegis
ship-based system, though China rails against it.
But these changes represent only modest improvements. The Gulf War showed
the need to readjust the offensive and defensive roles that the United States and
Japan, respectively, would need to play in any regional contingency. The alliance
remains exposed to a contingency in Korea or the Taiwan Strait. If Americans
start taking casualties and Japan does not do enough to help, political support in
the United States for the alliance could rapidly evaporate.
The critical thing Japan needs to do is to move away from the illogical notion
that while it has the right to collective self-defense, its (American-written) con-
stitution does not permit the exercise of that right.32 That notion means, at least
in theory, that if Japanese ships were patrolling with the U.S. Navy and only the
American ships were attacked, Japanese ships could not fight in their defense.
That absurd interpretation cannot be allowed to persist. It flies in the face of ev-
erything we have learned about deterrence—that status-quo powers who look as
if they are willing to fight rarely need to do so.
The current situation is even more absurd in that Japan has a navy second
only to that of the United States itself, albeit one without power-projection ca-
pabilities. Japan has not only a real navy but a unique maritime potential in East
Asia. Oddly, this has escaped attention. A recent analysis of East Asia’s strategic
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geography quoted Mahan: “History has conclusively demonstrated the inability
of a state with even a single continental frontier to compete in naval develop-
ment with one that is insular, although of smaller population and resources.”33
But the quotation was made in relation to China, not Japan.
Japan, unlike Asia’s other great powers, does not suffer from the immense
strategic distraction of potential enemies on land frontiers. It is allied with the
dominant maritime power, as it was in the years from 1902 to 1922. The differ-
ence is that this time Japan is not using its alliance as a shield while it pursues
ambition on the continent. Also, this time Japan is working in concert with the
great maritime and industrial power based in the Western Hemisphere, not
against it.
Together, the United States and Japan are providing security for almost the
entire western Pacific while spending, respectively, only 3 and 1 percent of gross
national product on defense. They must think, however, and act more strategi-
cally, which is always hard for democracies when they do not face palpable
threats. For reasons that have been laid out in this article, both the United States
and Japan have vital national interests at stake in the preservation of Taiwan’s de
facto independence. In a future Taiwan crisis, it should be possible for an Ameri-
can president to ask that Japanese warships accompany an American task force
sailing from Yokosuka, and for a Japanese prime minister to assent. If such
complementarity were to become operationally credible, it would not launch Ja-
pan on the road to revived militarism. To the contrary, it would credibly
strengthen deterrence under a U.S.-Japan umbrella, to the benefit of the entire
Asia-Pacific community.
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NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
What’s the Point?
Edward A. Smith, Jr.
What is network-centric warfare? What’s the point? Many attempts to an-swer these questions emphasize the “network” and the new technologies
used to create more effective sensor and communications architectures. These
architectures, it is argued, will enable us to create and exploit a common situa-
tional awareness, increase our speed of command, and “get inside the enemy’s
OODA [observe, orient, decide, and act] loop.”1 Yet such descriptions of tech-
nologies and capabilities can leave us asking the same questions: What is it? Just
what does it bring to warfare? Why is it so critical to America’s future military
power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it?
These questions highlight the need for a warfare-centered working concept of
network-centric operations. Such conceptual work can help us both recognize
the potential in networking and discern its limits and limitations. It also can pro-
vide a fundamental understanding of the role of network-centric operations on the
battlefield and across the spectrum from peace through war. An evolving working
concept is, in short, the first step in designing a network-centric “navy after next.”
Using technology to multiply the impact of military
forces seems almost axiomatic. The problem is in identi-
fying which technological combinations hold the most
potential. Information technology is one obvious force
multiplier, but what we really face are three concurrent
technological revolutions.2
The first is in sensor technology. The sensor revolution
is twofold: one movement toward sensors able to achieve
near-real-time surveillance over vast areas, and another
toward smaller, cheaper, more numerous sensors that
Dr. Smith holds an undergraduate degree from Ohio
State University and a Ph.D. in international relations
from The American University. Before retiring as a cap-
tain in the U.S. Navy, he served in combat in Vietnam;
on the staffs of Cruiser-Destroyer Group 8 and the
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command and the Su-
preme Allied Commander Atlantic; in the Office of
Naval Intelligence; and on the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions Executive Panel. He is now Senior Principal Tech-
nical Specialist in the Boeing Company’s Washington
Studies and Analysis Office.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 1
63
War College: Winter 2001 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
can be netted to detect, locate, identify, and track targets. Together, these trends
can produce systems that will provide the quantity and quality of data needed
to create a “situational awareness” that is “global in scope and precise in detail.”3
The second revolution is in information technology. The information revolution
will bring the geometric increase in computing power necessary to process, col-
late, and analyze this vast quantity of sensor data, and it will provide means to
distribute information to any recipient or “shooter” anywhere in the world at
near-real-time speeds. The third is in weapons technology. The weapons revolu-
tion is a matter of increasing numbers of precise munitions by reducing costs. It,
like the sensor revolution, is twofold. Better streams of targeting data can permit
a “dumbing down” of expensive guidance packages, while new designs, electron-
ics, “lean” manufacturing, and mass production can decrease the cost for a given
level of accuracy and capability.4
In the coming decade, these revolutions will interact and multiply each other’s
impacts and create a kaleidoscope of potential synergies that will change the char-
acter of war as we know it.5 These revolutions and this change in how we think
about war have come to be embodied in the idea of network-centric operations.
NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS
The first step in creating a working concept for network-centric operations is
identifying the key changes that grow from the triple technological revolution.
One change, clearly, is the increased precision and speed that may now be possi-
ble in military operations. Speed and precision make it feasible to exploit spe-
cific battlefield opportunities and operate at a pace calculated to overwhelm an
enemy’s capacity to respond. They also offer a highly agile force, able to change
from one rapid, precise operation to another at will and able to compress com-
plex targeting processes to fit the nearly real-time dimensions of the battlefield.
These emerging possibilities signal changes in how we wage war.
The leading network-centric proponents explain the impact of net-
work-centric warfare in this manner. In traditional military operations, a mis-
sion is assigned and planned, forces are generated, and operations are executed
to concentrate power on an objective. This is a highly coordinated, “stepped” cy-
cle: periods of relative inaction, during which forces are generated and actions
coordinated (the flat part of the step) alternate with periods of action, when
combat power is applied (the vertical part). However, if forces were networked
to create near-real-time situational awareness (see figure 1), we could act con-
tinuously. We would no longer need to pause before deciding on further ac-
tion; the information and coordination needed would already be there.
Moreover, shared awareness would permit a flattened, decentralized command
structure, with decisions made at the lowest practical level of command—a
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“self-synchronization” that
would permit us to reclaim
“lost combat power.” Then,
as we train and organize to
optimize these capabilities,
the pace of these semi-inde-
pendent operations would
accelerate further to permit
a new “speed of command.”
This description makes clear
that network- centric opera-
tions are really about opti-
mizing combat power—that
is, combat efficiency.
While equating accelerated,
self-synchronized opera-
tions to increased combat
efficiency makes intuitive sense, it needs further explanation. One approach is to
look at the above-mentioned “steps” in the context of the well known work of
Colonel John Boyd, U.S. Air Force, but treating OODA loops as a succession of
linear cycles overlaid on the steps.6 Boyd’s “observe,” “orient,” and “decide”
phases then would equate to the flat part of a step, while the “act” phase would be
the vertical. Plotted on axes of time (x) versus cumulative application of military
force (y), the steps become OODA cycles, with each “act” adding to the total of
the military force applied (see figure 2).
This construct of a combat cycle brings us to look not just at decision making
but also at the parallel process of generating combat power. For example, the
“observe” process includes both the decision to observe certain activities and
the physical actions needed to acquire the intelligence, surveillance, and target-
ing data and then transmit it to the right people or systems. New sensor and
information technologies can compress this process significantly, but there is a
limit to how much. To optimize the impact of precision, we need more than
sensor-based awareness; we need to identify specific vulnerabilities, and to do
that we need to know the enemy. Such knowledge draws on sensor informa-
tion—and will be subject to some time compression as a result—but it also de-
pends on regional expertise and on intelligence databases developed long be-
fore the battle begins. Thus, the new sensors and information technology can
shorten the cycle only to the degree that long-term collection and analysis are al-
ready available on the net.
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A similar limit emerges in
the combined “orient and de-
cide” phase.7 Better awareness
helps us avoid mistakes and use
assets more efficiently, but we
must still complete a set of phys-
ical actions to generate military
power. We may have to move an
aircraft carrier into range of the
objective, plan and brief a mis-
sion, fuel and arm aircraft,
and launch them. We may also
have to deliver follow-on air
strikes to achieve an objective.
The pace of these actions is de-
termined by the physical capa-
bilities of systems and people; a
carrier can move only so fast, and flight deck operations can be hurried along
only so much. “Efficiency” here is as much a function of how we organize, train,
and equip our forces as it is of information flows. The same is true of the “act”
phase. Once in the air, aircraft must proceed toward the target and then—at a
time dependent on the speed and range of the weapons used and the distance
they must travel—launch their ordnance.
To increase combat efficiency, therefore, we must accelerate both parts of the
combat cycle, the OODA cycle and the process of generating combat power. A
strike-sortie-generation demonstration conducted by USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in
1997 is a good example of how these two elements come together.8 Nimitz used
only a rudimentary network to aid targeting and decision making, but it then
focused on optimizing the operations of the carrier and the air wing to make
better use of the increased information that the network made available. For this
demonstration, among other things, Nimitz added pilots to its air wing, intro-
duced new high-speed cyclical operations, and relied on accompanying missile
ships for air defense.9 The result was a fourfold increase in sorties over a
four-day period. Arming each aircraft with multiple precision weapons, each of
which could reliably destroy an aim point, further multiplied the effect. The bat-
tle group thus established a faster, more efficient power-generation cycle, one
that produced—when combined with networks’ ability to identify the “targets
that count” in commensurate numbers—an order-of-magnitude increase in the
group’s combat efficiency.
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This is significant for several reasons. First, the Nimitz operation shows that
using better equipment, organization, training, and information can shorten
power-generation cycles and thus take advantage of network-centric speed and
awareness. However, it also indicates that the time required for power genera-
tion varies with equipment, training, and organization; that in turn suggests
that dissimilar military forces have power-generation cycles of radically differ-
ent lengths. For example, the length of Nimitz’s cycle would differ from that of a
squad of SEALs (Navy special operations forces) inserted from a submarine, a
cruiser firing Tomahawk land-attack missiles, a squad of Marines in a firefight,
or bombers operating from bases in the continental United States.
In a traditional battle, the commander manages the complex interaction
among different combat cycles by so coordinating units that their respective
“act” phases strike the enemy at the same time or in some prescribed sequence.
The more diverse the forces, the greater the coordination problem.10 The entire
effort is held hostage to the speed of the slowest combat cycle, all other units be-
ing deliberately kept from achieving their optimum operational tempos so as to
mass effects or be mutually supportive. This forgoes additional cycles that might
have been applied by quicker-paced forces, and as a result, less power is applied
overall (see figure 3). In short, by optimizing mass, we minimize efficiency.
Here is where agility becomes important. Precision and speed permit us
to reduce cycle length and thereby increase the pace of operations, but they are
insufficient by themselves to create a warfare revolution—or prevent it from
backfiring. To deal with changes in the enemy threat or take advantage of
emerging battlefield opportunities, we must be able both to conduct rapid,
semi-independent operations
and to mass forces and ef-
fects as required. We must
be able to change the mode,
direction, and objectives of
our actions, just as much as
we need to bring speed and
precision to targeting.
This agility and the speed
and precision it exploits all
derive from the amalgam of
information, sensors, and com-
munications that constitutes
the “information backplane”
of network-centric operations.
The network permits us to
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undertake more actions in a given time, to focus those actions better, and to act
and react faster and with more certainty. Yet, these attributes—better, faster,
more—still add up to little more than a more efficient form of attrition. How do
we make the leap to a level of efficiency that would permit us to break enemies’
wills rather than simply grind down their means of waging war?
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS
While increasing the number of aim points struck, the volume of fire generated,
or the damage inflicted remains a critical, irreducible core of what military
forces do, it is only the first step toward combat efficiency. The real payoff in
network-centric operations is foreshortening combat by causing the enemy to
yield long before his means to resist have been exhausted, or long before addi-
tional friendly forces might be expected to arrive in the crisis area. This effi-
ciency revolves around the ability of network-centric forces to undertake precise
effects-based operations, that is, outcome-oriented activity focused on enemy be-
havior. The objective of these operations is psychological rather than physical.
Hence, they are focused on the enemy’s decision-making process and ability to
take action in some coherent manner—especially “getting inside his OODA
loop” and inducing or exploiting chaos. The knowledge, precision, speed, and
agility brought by network-centric operations constitute the price of admission
into this realm.
“Getting Inside OODA Loops”
In our OODA-cycle diagram, any “act” or application of combat power can be
seen in two ways. From the perspective of straightforward attrition, it is an effort
that attacks, destroys, or in some way degrades the enemy capability to wage war
or sustain it. Yet, that same “act” is also a stimulus that enemies “observe” and
factor into their decision-making processes. The more significant the action, the
greater effect it will have on decisions. This “effect” is a function not solely of
how much we destroy but of what and how we attack. If the stimulus is signifi-
cant enough, the effect may be to force enemies to reconsider their courses of ac-
tion and, perhaps, begin their decision-making cycles all over again. That is to
say, we would disrupt their OODA loops. A succession of such stimuli might not
only disrupt a foe’s OODA loop but even create a condition of “lockout,” in
which the enemy can no longer react coherently (see figure 4).
The requirements for such effects-based operations are stringent. If we were
concerned only with attrition, improvement in efficiency would require only in-
creases in the size and frequency of our attacks—that is, the total quantity of
power applied. Breaking the will, in contrast, requires putting the right forces on
the right vulnerabilities at the right times so as to produce some particular effect.
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To make matters more diffi-
cult, this needs to be done
not just to a single enemy
OODA cycle, as in a one-on-
one fighter engagement, but
against the multiple and in-
teracting OODA cycles of
different enemy units and
forces, which are operating
simultaneously at the tactical,
operational, and strategic lev-
els of conflict.
A pointed, if serendipitous,
example of such a disruption
occurred in the battle of
Midway in June 1942. Intel-
ligence derived from the
breaking of Japanese codes enabled the Americans to anticipate the Japanese
attack, detect enemy carriers before their own were found, and launch an attack
first. When the Japanese commander received word of an American carrier in
the area—just before he was attacked by carrier-based torpedo planes—he
reconsidered a planned attack on Midway, reoriented his effort, and ordered
his aircraft rearmed for fleet action. Then, as his planes were being rearmed
and his combat air patrol aircraft were engaged in low-level intercepts of
American torpedo planes,
the dive-bomber element of
the disjointed American attack
(in figure 5, the second dot-
ted arrow) struck, catching
the Japanese carriers with
their decks full of planes and
bombs.11 What happened in
the next minutes ended the
Japanese attack on Midway
and was the turning point
in the Pacific War. In effect,
the sighting of one ship and
a tactically ineffective tor-
pedo-plane attack had collec-
tively, and fortuitously, a
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decisive impact on the enemy OODA cycle: they occurred at just the right time
and forced the Japanese to begin anew. The challenge for network-centric opera-
tions is to repeat this effect reliably, predictably, and at will. How do we do that?
If we compare the Japanese and American combat cycles at the time of the
torpedo attack, it becomes evident that the cycles were out of phase with each
other. Had they been in phase, American and Japanese strikes would have
passed each other in the air and struck empty decks on both sides, without the
disastrous consequences for the Japanese—but possibly dire ones for the
smaller force of American carriers. But thanks to its intelligence coup, the
American side completed its observation, orientation, and decision phases in
time for its air-strike “act” to hit the Japanese when they were most vulnerable
and before they could initiate a fleet action. The American success rested partly
on careful preparation—the intelligence, reconnaissance, and early launch of
aircraft—and in part on the serendipity of the poorly (in terms of the plan) co-
ordinated arrival of their strike elements over the target.
To emulate Midway, we must measure the enemy OODA cycle correctly and
then coordinate our actions to occur at exactly the right times. This requires
not only the “battlespace awareness” that in 1942 enabled the American fleet to
launch its strikes first but also knowledge of the enemy necessary to identify
and exploit critical junctures.12 We must then be able to sustain controlled,
high-tempo operations. There is a problem here: intelligence simply will not yield
such knowledge of the enemy reliably, consistently, or at all levels.13 How then
might network-centric operations enable us to bring about another Midway?
One solution is to multiply
the number of opportunities
to repeat the Midway seren-
dipity. The more frequent the
stimulus, the greater the chance
a strike will occur at the right
time to obtain the desired effect
on the enemy decision-making
process. Shortening the length
of our overall combat cycle (see
figure 6) would multiply the
number of impacts on an ad-
versary’s decision making over
a given period and increase the
likelihood of striking at the
“right time” to disrupt the
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adversary’s cycle. But as we have noted, the power-generation side of the combat cy-
cle can be compressed only so much.
Another approach would be to build on “self-synchronization” and “shared
situational awareness” to launch smaller, more numerous operations, each of
which could generate a stimulus sufficient to affect the adversary’s OODA cy-
cles.14 The length of the individual unit combat cycles might remain the same,
but they could be staggered, overlapped, so as to produce a rapid succession of
stimuli. This approach has an obvious limitation: the more we diminish the size
of our individual actions, the more vulnerable each will be to defeat in detail.
However, with better awareness and better knowledge of the enemy, we can hope
to anticipate enemy actions and optimize forces for disruptive effect or for
mutual support (see figure 7).
Finally, we could multiply the number of cycles but also compress the time
needed to execute each cycle. In essence, we would use our network-centric
capability to liberate individual forces to operate at their respective optimum
combat cycles and by so do-
ing increase the number of
OODA cycles we execute.
Ideally, the stimuli can be
made numerous enough to
overwhelm enemies with new
developments, forcing them
continually to revisit deci-
sions, redirect efforts, and
pause for observations, even
to the point that they cannot
ever take action.
This suggests an analogy
very different from that of
Midway. Instead of thrusting
a rapier into the OODA cycle
at precisely the critical time,
we could unleash something akin to a swarm of bees. Even if no single unit has a
decisive impact, the overall effect might be to leave the victim swinging help-
lessly at attackers coming from all directions, unable to mount any coherent de-
fense save retreat. In essence, we would provide so many stimuli that adversaries
could no longer act coherently but must constantly recycle: “Does the act that
just struck me invalidate the assumptions upon which my currently intended
course of action rests? Does it demand a redirection of my effort? Will an
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additional attack come, and will it force me into revisiting my plans yet again?”
The result would be lockout.
This “swarm”approach poses new challenges. How do we coordinate the swarm
so as to achieve concrete military objectives beyond simply interfering—
perhaps without success—in the enemy decision-making loop? How do we
know when to mass forces or effects so as to avoid their being destroyed one by
one? How do we assess the effectiveness of our efforts and then feed the results of
these assessments into the next round of “orient,” “decide,” and “act” phases?
Will enemies know they have been defeated and cease to resist, or simply con-
tinue to swat at the attacks until they can no longer do so—that is, continue a
blind attrition war? To be effective, the “swarm” would need to work toward a
unified set of military objectives, under a single commander’s intent, whereas to
achieve sufficiently brief cycle times, its individual elements must be largely
self-contained and self-coordinated. In short, our forces would need to become
self-synchronized and self-adaptive—but those are key capacities we hope to
draw from network-centric operations.
Exploiting Chaos
The principle of chaos in warfare is not new.15 Clausewitz talks in terms of ex-
ploiting the fog and friction of war to drive the enemy into a rout—that is, into a
state of chaos.16 Recent writings on “chaos theory” have drawn a comparison be-
tween the concept of chaos in physical systems and its application to warfare.17
The boundary region between chaos and order is particularly significant, be-
cause small inputs or changes in system parameters there can have very large im-
pacts, even causing entire systems to collapse. In military operations, this would
equate to creating situations in which relatively small applications of power at
the right time have highly disproportionate and potentially decisive impacts.
This is particularly significant for expeditionary warfare and forward presence,
in that it suggests that a relatively small forward force might exploit chaos to off-
set what it lacks in numbers.
How do we define this boundary region in militarily useful ways? A simple ap-
proach is to define the edge of chaos in terms of the intensity of the operations,
specifically the pace and the scale and scope of operations, which can be plotted
along the x and y axes of a coordinate scale. We can understand intuitively that the
more we increase the pace of our operations (x), the more difficult they will be to
manage. Similarly, the greater the scope and scale of our operations (y), the more
difficult they will be to control. By extension, we can surmise that at some point
along the x axis lies an operation so rapid that we cannot coordinate it, and that
somewhere on the y axis is an operation (such as a global thermonuclear war) of
such size or scope that we lose control of our forces; beyond either of these points
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we lapse into chaos ourselves
(see figure 8). These two
points represent transitions
from order into chaos. Figu-
ratively, then, a line drawn
between these two points is
the edge of chaos—it defines
the limit of our control, and
it contains all order-to-chaos
transition points.
In this context, chaos en-
compasses all military op-
erations that are so rapid or
of such scale as to be un-
controllable and that are,
therefore, unfocused and
incoherent, such as a rout on
a battlefield—“every man for himself.”18 The opposite is order—military oper-
ations whose scale, scope, and pace permit them to be controlled, coordinated,
and focused on given objectives. Historically, when armies and navies have met
in battle, at least one tactical objective has been to drive the enemy force from or-
der into chaos. How can we identify and exploit this operational boundary?
One factor is that the edge of chaos is not fixed. It changes constantly. As the
Nimitz demonstration underlined, a highly trained and organized force using
sophisticated equipment can operate safely at a pace and scale of operations that
would push a less well-trained and equipped force into chaos. Better equipment,
training, and organization, then, enable us to drive our transition points farther
out along the x and y axes and thereby define new edges of chaos. This also
means that the edge of chaos varies from one force to the next, as each comprises
different units, differently equipped, manned, trained, and organized. Opposing
forces in any battle are therefore likely to have their own, quite different, edges of
chaos. These two edges of chaos define three zones. Zone 1 (see figure 9) is the
zone of chaos—all the combinations of scale, scope, and pace that neither side
would be able to manage. Zone 2 defines a complex, asymmetric region in which
the better equipped and trained force can coordinate operations but the other
cannot. In Zone 3 is the realm in which both sides can operate comfortably—the
zone of order.
By definition, neither side can operate successfully in Zone 1, and neither
derives any advantage from operating in a way that permits its enemy an orderly
and focused response (Zone 3).19 In contrast, the boundary region, Zone 2, offers
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the disproportionate impacts
predicted by chaos theory. It is
a regime of inherent asymme-
try, in which the less capable
side can neither respond in
kind nor fail to respond (and
be pummeled into submission
or confined to preplanned ac-
tions, unresponsive to the situ-
ation).20 This can be carried
another step. If one side is con-
sistently able to operate beyond
the other’s edge of chaos, it can
induce a state of despair in
which further resistance is, or
at least appears to be, futile.
Focusing precisely on vulnerabilities most likely to drive the enemy into chaos can
accelerate this process.
SELF-SYNCHRONIZATION AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
This all leads us to self-synchronized operations, of which a good historical ex-
ample is the 1805 battle of Trafalgar, in which Admiral Horatio Nelson de-
stroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets. The crux of the action was
Nelson’s bold movement to break through the French-Spanish battle line in two
places and then concentrate his forces on bite-sized portions of it. The basis for
success in so risky an undertaking was what could be described as a “cerebral
network” among Nelson and his ship captains, his “band of brothers.” That net-
work had been formed by more than eight years of combat operations together;
Nelson was confident that all of his subordinates would perceive a developing
situation in the same way—that is, that they would have a shared situational
awareness.21 He was equally sure that his commanders not only understood his
intent but would exploit aggressively any opening in the enemy line accordingly
and carry out mutually supportive actions without further direction. For that
reason, Nelson could limit his final directive before the battle to the inspiring,
but otherwise not very helpful, reminder that “England expects every man to do
his duty.” Nothing more was needed. The commanders knew what to do.
This contrasted sharply with the situation of the opposing commander, Ad-
miral Villeneuve. His force was larger and in many ways technologically supe-
rior, but it lacked any semblance of the cerebral networking Nelson had forged.
The French ship captains and subordinate commanders had spent most of the
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Pace of Operations
Zone 1
Both Sides in Chaos
Zone 2
Complexity:
One Side in Chaos
One in Order
Zone 3
Both Sides in Order
Sc
op
e/
Sc
al
e 
of
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
Enemy Edge  of Chaos
Our  Edge  of Chaos
FIGURE 9
OPERATIONS ON THE EDGE OF CHAOS
74
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 27
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/27
war blockaded in port. They distrusted Villeneuve, even as Villeneuve distrusted
his own judgment. Added to this was the problem of coordinating with a Span-
ish fleet, with which the French had never before operated. The best Villeneuve
could do was to form his ships into a conventional eighteenth-century line of
battle, foreseeing an engagement in which two ordered, parallel battle lines
would pound each other until most of the ships of one side or the other struck
their colors, blew up, or sank. When Nelson refused battle on these terms and in-
stead broke through the French-Spanish line, the pace of operation that he
thereby forced on the French and Spanish immediately exceeded their ability to
cope and invalidated their numerical superiority. Villeneuve largely lost control
of his forces and with it the ability to fight a coherent battle. In such conditions
his ships, though they fought bravely, could only contribute to the general chaos;
a substantial proportion never entered the battle at all.
Network-centric operations can, after a fashion, replicate the cerebral network-
ing of Nelson’s band of brothers without the eight years of combat preparation and
without the slow tempo of battle at sea that facilitated situational awareness in the
early nineteenth century. However, there is a hitch: What would happen if one side’s
edge of chaos did not lie entirely on one side of the other’s but crossed it (figure 10),
producing a second asymmetric zone, in which the advantages were reversed?
This reversal points to a dangerously misleading assumption underlying much
thinking today about the “revolution of military affairs”: that the United States
will always be technologically superior and thus fight faster and better. In reality,
tempo of operations is not solely a function of technology; it is also a func-
tion of the centralization of command. One can choose to trade centralized
control for speed and scope of operations. This may forgo some of the ability to
mass effects on a specific ob-
jective, but if the effect sought
derives from the pace and
scope of the attacks rather
than from the amount of de-
struction, or from a cumula-
tive impact rather than specific
actions, then this trade-off
may be acceptable. In other
words, one could confront a
technologically superior en-
emy by creating a new asym-
metric zone in which small,
decentralized units could
operate successfully but in
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which an opponent using large formations under centralized control could
not respond coherently.
The importance of this fourth zone is even more evident if we plot the re-
spective edges of chaos on a graph with three axes (figure 11)—one for pace, one
for scale, and a separate orthogonal axis for scope. This presentation high-
lights two aspects of decentralization: forces can be broken into smaller,
self-synchronized units, and they can be dispersed over a wide area to make co-
ordinated and timely response
by the other side more difficult.
These points correspond rather
closely to Maoist theory of
guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas use
dispersed formations so small
that they cannot be targeted ef-
fectively by heavier government
forces. These bands then con-
duct many small raids, so rap-
idly that the raiders are gone
before opposing forces can be
brought to bear. Since the de-
sired effect, attrition of an op-
ponent’s will, depends more on
pace and scope than on damage
to specific targets, control can
remain highly decentralized. This was the essential problem the United States
confronted in Vietnam.
These examples imply a new understanding of chaos—that chaos need not
mean solely loss of control over one’s forces. It could also mean a situation
in which the size of forces and delays in generating and using them consis-
tently prevent one side from accomplishing its objectives. How do net-
work-centric operations address this low-tech asymmetry? One way is based on
the knowledge and situational awareness brought to bear by the network. If the
guerrillas’ actions can be anticipated or instantly detected and responded to,
much of what they gain by dispersing and decentralizing can be negated. In ef-
fect, networking permits the high-tech side to move its edge of chaos out from
the x and z axes of the diagram until decentralization no longer confers any ad-
vantage on the guerrillas. Also, whereas by decentralization guerrillas or urban
fighters opt for increasing the number and decreasing the size of their opera-
tions, a network-centric force might do the same—for example, by resorting to a
ground war of small units aided by superior situational awareness. Alternatively,
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it could increase its pace, using the network to manage high-speed, complex op-
erations. In each case, networking combined with self-synchronization enables
forces to operate as a “self-adjusting complex adaptive system” while retaining
the ability to mass superior effects at will.
A REALITY CHECK
As we gradually build a working concept of network-centric operations, we need
to bear in mind some commonsense caveats. Networking is not a universal solu-
tion to warfare problems, nor will it change the nature of war. Older forms of
warfare are likely to persist alongside the new. Speed will be critical to our suc-
cess, but numbers and endurance will still count. Situational awareness will
multiply our power, but knowing the enemy will be more important than ever.
Above all, intelligent adversaries will respond, and the more successful our
concept of network-centric operations becomes, the more asymmetrical their
responses are likely to be.
But it is not our objective in developing a working concept to provide all the
answers. It is simply to identify combinations of new thinking and new things
that offer better answers to our warfare needs, on as many levels of war as pos-
sible, and over as wide a portion of the spectrum of conflict as possible. The
measure of our success will be not the quality of the networking or the quantity
of firepower we can bring to bear but the effect that networking enables us to
have on our would-be enemies in peace and in war.
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of chaos” was far inside that of the Israelis.
Therefore, the Egyptians were forced to resort
to a scripted preemptive campaign. That gave
them an initial success in crossing the Suez
Canal but left them largely incapable of re-
sponding to Israeli counteraction.
21. The two fleets took more than three hours to
close. This allowed ample time for the
commanders to observe the enemy line and
any gaps in it that they might exploit. The ce-
rebral networking provided a common un-
derstanding of how such gaps might be
exploited and of how ships might provide
mutual support and exploit any further
opportunities.
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MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION
Time to Get Serious
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
In January 1929, the U.S. Navy undertook a major exercise known as FleetProblem IX, part of a series of exercises conducted by the service between
the two world wars. Despite the isolationist mood of America at the time, com-
pounded by tight budgets and arms control constraints, the Navy persisted in
conducting these exercises as, among other things, a means for determining the
influence upon sea power of continuing rapid advances in aviation technology.1
Fleet Problem IX took place off the coast of Panama. Present for the first
time in these fleet problems were two ships of radically new design—the air-
craft carriers USS Lexington (CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3). During the ex-
ercise, Vice Admiral William V. Pratt, commanding the attacking force,
authorized Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, commanding the Saratoga and a
light cruiser, to execute a high-speed run toward the
Panama Canal. Reeves then “attacked” the canal with
a seventy-plane strike force launched 140 miles from
the target.
Following Fleet Problem IX, Admiral Pratt observed,
“I believe that when we learn more of the possibilities of
the carrier we will come to an acceptance of Admiral
Reeves’ plan which provides for a very powerful and mo-
bile force . . . the nucleus of which is the carrier.”2 The fol-
lowing year, upon becoming Chief of Naval Operations,
Pratt directed that carriers be placed in offensive roles
in war games and fleet exercises. In such exercises,
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involving experimentation with new kinds of equipment, doctrine, and for-
mations, were sown seeds that brought forth the fast carrier task forces that
enabled the U.S. Navy to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy during World
War II.
Eight years after Fleet Problem IX, on the north German plain, a new and
very different formation appeared in exercises conducted by the German
army: the panzer division. The panzer division was a combined-arms forma-
tion possessing large numbers of fast tanks with extended ranges; it was cen-
tered on a doctrine that called for rapid, deep penetration as a means to
achieve quick victory. This represented a dramatic departure from Germany’s
World War I experience against its principal enemy, France. That conflict had
been dominated by slow-moving forces employing heavy firepower and wag-
ing a war of gradual attrition.
In the 1937 German maneuvers, after a sixty-mile approach march, the pan-
zer division went into the attack, forcing the enemy to commit its reserves. The
following day the panzer division not only broke through the enemy front but
penetrated deep into its rear. The enemy position quickly became untenable,
and the issue was essentially decided only four days into what had been planned
as a seven-day exercise. General Franz Halder, who witnessed the spectacle (and
who would become chief of the General Staff a year later), was stunned by the
“fluid mobility” of the panzer operations.3
Many other exercises were conducted during the 1920s and 1930s by the
German military. They included experiments not only in mechanized warfare
but with radio communications schemes and the use of aircraft to provide re-
connaissance and close air support for rapidly moving ground forces. These
exercises were indispensable in enabling the German high command to develop
a devastating new form of land warfare known as blitzkrieg—lightning war.
Today, the U.S. military finds itself in a circumstance somewhat similar to
those that confronted the two military services mentioned above. As in the
interwar era, rapidly progressing technologies have emerged, creating a military
revolution (“revolution in military affairs,” in Pentagonspeak) that will produce
dramatic changes in the instruments of war and how military operations are
conducted. But as with naval aviation and mechanized ground operations sev-
enty years ago, it is not yet clear how this revolution will play out.
THE RISK OF STAYING ON OUR CURRENT PATH:
POWER PROJECTION
Despite all the uncertainties the U.S. military must confront in preparing for the
future, two things seem certain. First, the incentive is high for would-be adver-
saries to present the American military with challenges very different from those
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that confronted U.S. forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Second, the diffusion of
military technologies and the rapid progression of military-related technologies
will offer such adversaries the means to achieve this goal. Their prospects are
particularly good with respect to traditional power-projection opera-
tions, which form the core of the current U.S. two “major theater war” de-
fense posture.
This “two war” posture is founded on the nation’s ability to project power
rapidly and decisively to threatened regions around the globe. The Defense De-
partment’s last Quadrennial Defense Review, conducted in 1997, concluded that
“it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able
to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in
overlapping time frames.”4 Along these lines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s vision
statement, Joint Vision 2010, declared that “power projection . . . will likely re-
main the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.”5
However, the U.S. military’s accustomed method of deploying and sustaining
air and ground forces at or through ports and airfields is almost certain to be
jeopardized by the growing proliferation of national and commercial satellite
services and of missile technology. Growing access to satellite services will allow
even rogue states to monitor U.S. deployments into forward bases and (unless
one makes heroic assumptions regarding the effectiveness of missile defenses)
hold them at risk through the employment of large numbers of ballistic and
cruise missiles. Senior U.S. military leaders have already voiced strong concern
over the nation’s ability to deal with such a contingency. General Ronald
Fogleman, when Air Force Chief of Staff, observed that
saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facili-
ties, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project U.S. forces into a dis-
puted theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor.
Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks might deter U.S. and coalition part-
ners from responding to aggression in the first instance.6
As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson expressed very similar
concerns when he declared,
Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and infor-
mation technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for
the forward deployment of our land-based forces.
I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target concentra-
tions of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. This is
more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an area-denial threat whose
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defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sus-
taining U.S. military power where it is needed.7
Perhaps most revealing, however, are the comments of a retired Indian briga-
dier general who observed that future access to forward bases
is by far the trickiest part of the American operational problem. This is the proverbial
“Achilles’ heel.” India needs to study the vulnerabilities and create covert bodies to
develop plans and execute operations to degrade these facilities in the run up to and
after commencement of hostilities. Scope exists for low cost options to significantly
reduce the combat potential of forces operating from these facilities.8
According to a recent Defense Science Board Study, development by a regional
power of this kind of anti-access capability by 2010 is certainly plausible, even
given the relatively severe resource constraints under which many third-world
militaries must operate.9 A commander in chief of U.S. forces in Korea has de-
clared that the problem of forward base access is not a problem for the U.S. mili-
tary of 2010 but one that exists in embryonic form in Korea today and will only
worsen over time.
As potential adversaries look for ways to deal with U.S. military preponder-
ance, they seem to have little inclination to create their own versions of the Iraqi
military as it existed at the time of the Gulf War. Iran, for example, seems far
more interested in fielding anti-access systems—such as ballistic and cruise mis-
siles, antiship cruise missiles, submarines, and advanced antiship mines—than
such military systems as tanks and combat aircraft that proved largely ineffective
for the Iraqis in 1991.
Assessing the emerging threats to U.S. power-projection forces, the National
Defense Panel unanimously agreed upon the need to “radically alter the way in
which we project power.”10 The panel concluded that the U.S. military must de-
velop the capability to execute the following missions (among others) within the
next decade: inserting and extracting forces in the absence of forward bases;
resupplying forward forces through airlift and sealift operations when access to
forward ports and airfields is at risk; seizing and controlling key terrain (includ-
ing urban areas) if friendly ground forces must operate dispersed; and achieving
air superiority against an enemy’s missile force.11
MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION: PAST AS PROLOGUE
In the coming years the U.S. military will likely encounter challenges very dif-
ferent from those it has faced in the past. There is enormous uncertainty, how-
ever, with respect to how it should position itself to deal with them. What
military systems, both existing and potential, will be needed? What prospective
operational concepts will prove effective, and which will not? Will new forms of
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military organization be required, analogous to the fast carrier task forces and
panzer divisions that transformed warfare in World War II? Will different kinds
of people possessing different skill sets than those in today’s force be needed?
These and other such questions require answers if America’s military is to play
its role in extending the post–Cold War era into a Long Peace.
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are difficult to come by. More-
over, barring a dramatic increase in projected defense budgets, the Defense De-
partment will have to prepare for these challenges with roughly the resources
that it has today, and perhaps less. Simply
put, the Pentagon cannot afford to
“think rich” about preparing for emerg-
ing challenges; instead, it must “think
smart.” It cannot build a military for ev-
ery prospective threat, nor can it afford
to proceed with a modernization program that is oriented to meeting today’s
challenges but will prove ineffective against those that are emerging.
Yet the Pentagon may be doing precisely that when it undertakes large-scale
production of a new armored combat system, aircraft, or class of ships without
a good understanding of how the new weapon will compete against tomorrow’s
threats. For example, with respect to power projection, how does the Air Force
plan to deploy its new F-22 fighters to forward bases against the kind of theater-
denial forces described by General Fogleman, or to employ the fighter to achieve
air superiority against an enemy’s missile force? How does the Army plan to de-
ploy and sustain its heavy, digitized divisions in the absence of forward-base ac-
cess? How does the Navy plan to move its carrier battle groups safely through
narrow straits so as to influence the battle ashore, given that the range of the
F/A-18E/F carrier-based aircraft it is buying is inferior to that of the A-6 attack
aircraft being replaced? Or does the U.S. military need to begin fielding very
different kinds of systems, emphasizing different performance characteristics
(such as extended-range, precision, and stealth), as outlined in the report of
the National Defense Panel?12 Experimentation—at both the joint and service
level—provides an indispensable means for answering these questions and, in so
doing, for determining the mix of new and legacy (that is, existing) systems re-
quired to operate effectively against future threats.
Military experimentation is one of the keys to defense planning in an era of
high uncertainty and rapid technological change. Experimentation with inno-
vative operational concepts that employ emerging military systems and radically
new force structures has historically been an essential ingredient to preserving,
or gaining, advantages in military capability. For example, the twenty-one
large-scale fleet problems undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s were crucial to
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developing the principles, doctrine, trained personnel, defense-industrial base,
and systems mix that enabled the fast carrier task forces to supplant the
battleship-dominated fleet during World War II. Similarly, the numerous field
exercises conducted by the German military in that same time frame were indis-
pensable prerequisites to the highly coordinated, mechanized air-land forces
and operations that achieved the rapid conquest of France.
THE NEED FOR MILITARY EXPERIMENTATION
Military experimentation at the operational level (at which military campaigns
are waged) confers several critical benefits, both for defense planners and for
those concerned with fiscal accountability.
Reducing Uncertainty as to How Best to Meet Emerging Threats. Take the prob-
lem of projecting power in the absence of forward bases. Joint experimentation
would permit military leaders to try out different operational concepts for de-
ploying forces into a theater, conducting extended-range precision strikes, de-
termining whether achieving secured access to forward bases is feasible, and
deciding how to sustain the operation for a period sufficient to accomplish its
objectives. Through such experiments commanders can develop a far superior
feel for what operational concepts might succeed in such a threat environment,
and for the force mix and systems needed to support such operations. Equally
important, experimentation enables military leaders to identify force elements
and modernization plans that are likely to diminish in value over time. This
proved to be the case with the blitzkrieg; experimentation enabled the German
military to work through the coordination problems associated with fast-moving
mechanized formations, other ground formations, and supporting air units.
Determining the Proper Mix of Emerging and Legacy Systems. Experimentation
also assists military organizations in determining what new systems and capa-
bilities will be required, what legacy systems and capabilities should be sus-
tained, and what combination of the two should be established. The Germans,
for instance, used a series of exercises to experiment with different panzer-divi-
sion designs. They found their initial organization was far too “tank heavy” in
proportion to the other elements, such as artillery and engineers; consequently,
the number of tanks was reduced by 50 percent, and the proportion of certain
supporting forces (such as engineers) was increased. Finally, many supporting
elements were motorized to enable them to support the tanks’ rapid advances
better. In short, these exercises proved critical to the Germans’ ability to deter-
mine the proper mix of new (panzer, airborne, radio communications, re-
connaissance and attack aircraft) and existing (artillery, engineers, logis-
tics) capabilities.
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Creating Options for the Future. Experimentation that identifies new forms of
military operations and new force elements can permit the military to exercise
those options quickly when the threat emerges. For example, in the early
1960s the U.S. Army conducted extensive experiments to assess the potential of
air-mobile and air-assault operations. These experiments gave the Army an im-
portant option when, in the summer of 1965, it was ordered to send large forces
to Vietnam. The first division selected for deployment was the newly formed 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Similarly, the U.S. Navy that entered World II
was, first and foremost, a battleship navy. However, through its Fleet Problems
the Navy created the option of carrier-based operations, a capability that it
pursued quickly following Pearl Harbor.
Complicating the Planning of Would-Be Enemies. Importantly, experimenta-
tion that enables the U.S. military to “buy options” can also complicate the plan-
ning of potential adversaries. For example, in the 1930s the Imperial Japanese
Navy had to plan counters against a U.S. Navy that was exploring a range of op-
tions for naval aviation, including both large (Saratoga and Lexington) and small
(USS Ranger [CV 4]) carriers, the use of seaplanes, airships, and land-based
aircraft, and proposals for a class of “flying-deck” (partial flight-deck) cruisers.
By compelling a would-be adversary to stretch resources thin in order to cover
all possible options, or to concede that there are options for which it cannot pre-
pare a counter, experimentation can play an important role in dissuading other
militaries from entering into a competition in the first place.
Avoiding Legacy-Force Lock-In. Experimentation through war games, simula-
tions, and field exercises provides a means of avoiding the purchase of large
numbers of legacy systems under the assumption that since they are important
today, they will remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, German mili-
tary exercises led many senior leaders to conclude that horse cavalry had a very
limited future.
Avoiding False Starts. Experiments can help military organizations avoid “buy-
ing in” too early during a period of transformational change in military capabili-
ties. The U.S. Navy’s first carrier designed from the keel up, the Ranger, was
commissioned in 1934. Although some Navy leaders had pressed for construc-
tion of five Ranger-class carriers, game analysis and fleet problems soon indi-
cated that the Ranger, at roughly fourteen thousand tons, was far too small to
meet many of the demands of future fleet operations. As it turned out, the
Essex-class ships that formed the backbone of the Navy’s fast carrier task forces
in World War II displaced nearly twice as much tonnage.
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Avoiding Dead Ends. Military systems or capabilities that appear promising,
even revolutionary, sometimes fail to live up to their promise. In this case, the is-
sue is not to avoid “buying in” too early; rather, it is to avoid buying in at all.
Again, the experience of the U.S. Navy during the development of naval aviation
in the interwar period provides an example of how rigorous experimentation
and operational exercises can help avoid accumulating military capabilities that
lead not to transformation but to dead ends. In 1930 the Navy’s Bureau of Aero-
nautics proposed the construction of eight ten-thousand-ton flying-deck cruis-
ers. The ships—half cruiser and half flight deck—were subjected to war game
experiments at the Naval War College and to some experiments with surrogates
in the fleet. The results painted a distinctly unfavorable picture of the hybrid
ship, and it sank beneath the Navy’s programmatic waves, never to be heard
from again.
Identifying and Solving Practical Problems. Planning exercises and war games
can go only so far in identifying new forms of operations and system require-
ments. As with many things, the devil is in the details. For example, war games
conducted at the Naval War College in the early 1920s indicated the importance
of maximizing the aircraft complements and sortie rates of carriers.13 It was not,
however, until a prototype, the USS Langley (CV 1), was available that the Navy
could determine precisely how this goal was to be achieved. Under then-Captain
Reeves, the Langley conducted a series of experiments that led to such innova-
tions as crash barriers and the deck park, which enabled the ship to more than
double its aircraft complement and dramatically increase its sortie rate. Simi-
larly, the German army’s field exercises and operations in the late 1930s enabled
it to solve critical issues with respect to fuel and spare parts for its panzer forma-
tions and to determine how the German air force, the Luftwaffe, could provide
highly mobile reconnaissance and fire (close air) support. Experiments like
these were essential to both militaries’ efforts to transform to dominate emerg-
ing conflict environments.
EXPERIMENTATION: TIME TO GET SERIOUS
How well is the Defense Department doing in its efforts to secure the benefits
of experimentation to support its transformation efforts? To answer this, we
must assess how well the Pentagon’s efforts match the characteristics of suc-
cessful experimentation efforts in earlier periods of military transformation.
To succeed, a Defense Department experimentation initiative must reflect the
following characteristics.
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Vigorous
Experiments must be conducted on a frequent basis, and funding, forces, and
equipment (including prototype equipment and surrogates) must be made
available to support them. Unfortunately, the Defense Department leadership’s
rhetoric asserting the need for military transformation and experimentation has
not been matched by the requisite urgency or resources.
For example, the establishment of Joint Forces Command for the purpose of
undertaking joint experimentation was not a Defense Department initiative.
Rather, it was the consequence of congressional leadership and the recommen-
dations of an independent panel of experts.14 The Pentagon’s budget for Joint
Forces Command’s experimentation efforts stands at a meager forty-one mil-
lion dollars for fiscal year 2000. The Clinton administration’s request for FY
2001 was for forty-nine million. Such funding levels are at least an order of mag-
nitude lower than what is required to conduct vigorous and sustained field ex-
periments at the operational level. In 1999, for example, one service, the Air
Force, spent more than sixty million dollars—over 50 percent more than the
Joint Forces Command’s entire budget for joint experimentation—on one exer-
cise. According to the general in charge of JFC’s experimentation efforts, the
command is able, owing to funding shortages, to explore only half the
warfighting concepts it has identified.15 The first major exercise, or “major joint
integrating experiment,” is not scheduled to occur until 2004, some six years af-
ter the command was charged with the responsibility for joint experimentation.
This is not to say that a vigorous program of experimentation would neces-
sarily involve enormous sums of money. To be sure, it would probably involve an
investment of several billion dollars a year. However, the investment would be
relatively modest—less than 1 percent of the defense budget—while the payoff,
in terms of improved military effectiveness and efficiency, through avoiding
such funding sinkholes noted above as premature lock-in, false starts, and dead
ends, promises to more than justify it.
In any event, the current Defense approach to experimentation stands in
stark contrast to the sense of urgency that has historically characterized success-
ful military revitalization. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude the
department’s effort to date represents a serious intention to exploit the potential
of experimentation to support and inform military transformation.
Enduring
Experimentation must be an enduring element of what the U.S. military does, as
thoroughly institutionalized as forward-presence operations and training activ-
ities. Here certain services deserve credit for attempting to develop long-term
approaches to experimentation. The Marine Corps, for example, has sustained a
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series of exercises and experiments under the rubric of SEA DRAGON, which
includes HUNTER WARRIOR, URBAN WARRIOR, and CAPABLE WARRIOR. The Marines
apparently intend to pursue these experiments on an enduring basis, as a means
for preparing to meet emerging challenges while looking for ways to exploit ad-
vances in technology to support future operations.
The Marines also have explored innovative ways to surmount the lack of em-
phasis and resources accorded to such enterprises by senior Defense Depart-
ment leadership. For example, they have identified urban control and eviction
operations as being key elements of the post-transformation operational envi-
ronment. They immediately confronted the fact that the “combat towns” on U.S.
bases, while excellent for training small units in basic tactics, do not offer the
complexity or the communications interferences that real cities do. The Na-
tional Defense Panel recommended that a Joint Urban Warfare Center be estab-
lished for training and experimentation in an urban environment, but the
Defense Department declined to act. Absent such a facility, the Marines have
tried to conduct small-scale exercises in actual urban areas. One of their more
innovative efforts addresses the problem of close air support. In the absence of a
true urban-warfare training facility, the Marines commissioned the construc-
tion of an Urban Close Air Support Facility at their air station in Yuma, Arizona,
comprising 167 buildings constructed from shipping and cluster-bomb con-
tainers. The buildings of this jerry-rigged urban landscape range in size from
one to five stories and are configured in various shapes. In cases such as this, it
appears that experimentation is being sustained almost in spite of senior De-
fense Department levels.
Comprehensive
Experimentation must take place at all levels (tactical, operational, and stra-
tegic) of warfare, and also among all principal organizations involved, to in-
clude all the services and, where appropriate, other governmental and
nongovernmental elements. As asserted above, such experimentation implies a
level of effort on the part of the Defense Department that simply does not as yet
exist. To date, experimentation has been heavily weighted toward the tactical
level of warfare. While such experimentation is desirable, it must be in-
formed by how military organizations believe they will have to act at the op-
erational level.
For example, a recent Joint Forces Command simulation involved attacks on
critical mobile targets, such as self-propelled ballistic and cruise missile launch-
ers. However, the specifics of how the military might accomplish this task are
greatly influenced by considerations at the operational (and strategic) level.
Consider, for example, how the experiment’s conduct would change under the
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assumption that forward bases were either unavailable or had been placed at un-
acceptable risk (perhaps by the very missile forces that were the target of U.S. op-
erations). In sum, experimentation that focuses on the tactical level of warfare
without the context of the situation at the operational level risks arriving at ir-
relevant or impractical solutions.
Focused
Experimentation must be aimed squarely at the post-transformation challenges
and opportunities at the operational level of warfare. While experimentation
must be comprehensive, history indicates that its principal focus should be
meeting challenges—or exploiting
opportunities—at the campaign level.
Furthermore, experimentation
must be directed at preparing for
the next war, not at becoming more
proficient at waging the last. As we have argued, if these factors are not taken into
consideration, experimentation, no matter how vigorous, well funded, and en-
during, may arrive at some very good solutions to the wrong problems. This is
all too often the case with current experimentation.
Again, consider the recent simulation conducted by Joint Forces Command
on engaging critical mobile targets. It assumed the availability of forward bases
to support such operations, as was the case during the “Great Scud Hunt” of the
Gulf War. Similarly, the Air Force’s Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 99 in-
volved the rapid forward deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to
fixed forward bases. This was done despite a growing chorus of military lead-
ers—including an Air Force Chief of Staff—and blue-ribbon expert advisory
groups cautioning that operating out of such bases will be a risky proposition
until enemy missile forces have been neutralized. Similarly, the Army, with its
emphasis on deploying a brigade to a forward base within ninety-six hours, may,
like the Air Force, find that its vision serves only to get itself to the enemy missile
ambush point (that is, a fixed forward base) more quickly.
On a brighter note, the Marines, through experiments like HUNTER WARRIOR,
are attempting in a small way to confront post-transformation challenges at the
operational level: “How do we sustain our forces in a world that will feature fewer
and fewer overseas land bases and where a large build-up of supplies and equip-
ment ashore may be impractical because of geographical, political, or threat con-
ditions?”16 The Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiment “Foxtrot,” which explored maritime
operational concepts in an area-denial threat environment, is a significant step in
the right direction. The Air Force has taken some positive, albeit small, initiatives
as well. In 1995–96 it sent three specially created AEFs to unimproved airfields in
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Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar. For its part, the Army has war-gamed the forward-basing
problem (although it has not yet conducted experiments based on the insights its
games produced regarding the anti-access challenge). These are modest steps, to be
sure, but ones that could be encouraged by a comprehensive Defense Department
effort to exploit experimentation in support of transformation.
Both Service-Level and Joint
The U.S. military plans to fight as a joint force, one that draws upon all the
services’ capabilities. This makes sense, as modern technology has enabled each
of the services to operate far outside its traditional battlespace—and into the
battlespaces of the other services. Joint experimentation should therefore en-
courage a spirited, though friendly, competition among the services to deter-
mine the proper mix of capabilities. To its credit, the Army has sought to expand
the major exercise on urban operations it planned for September 2000—now
known as the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment, or
MILLENIUM FORCE 2000—to include participation from the other three services
as well as the staff of Joint Forces Command. Once again, this represents a
bottom-up approach by the services, as opposed to top-down encouragement
from senior Defense Department leaders.
Certainly, there are operations or campaigns that one service may dominate,
such as antisubmarine warfare, long-range precision strike, and space control.
Here, service experimentation might assume primacy over joint experimenta-
tion. However, given current and projected technology trends, such cases at the
operational level will likely become increasingly rare.
Exploited in Developing Future Requirements
It goes almost without saying that the insights and lessons derived from experi-
mentation must be harvested if innovation and transformation are to succeed.
Focusing on post-transformation challenges and opportunities helps to ensure
that the military is addressing the right questions with respect to future warfare
and thus can get the right answers with respect to emerging requirements. These
insights mean little, however, unless they actually influence the way require-
ments are determined, budgets are shaped, resources are allocated, institutions
are adapted, and forces are developed.
At present it is unclear how this is to be accomplished. Even if one assumes a
robust level of service and joint experimentation focused on emerging chal-
lenges, it is not clear how the insights will be translated into new requirements.
As one senior general officer has put it, “You fund these things and do an experi-
ment and you find out great things, but then [do] you have to wait another two
years or so before you get it into the normal budget process?”17
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Indeed, in recent years both the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System and the Joint Chiefs’ Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(with its “joint warfighting capabilities assessments” approach) have seemed in-
capable of effecting significant changes in service budget shares or in program
focus, despite the declared determination of Secretary of Defense William S. Co-
hen to transform the U.S. military.18 Promising new capabilities or force ele-
ments—such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles, moving-target-indicator
satellites (such as Discoverer II), the arsenal ship, Strike Force, the Deep-Strike
Brigade, the STREETFIGHTER littoral operational concept, and the Trident SSBN
conversion to conventional missile carriers—have been terminated, delayed, or
jeopardized. Yet support for such programs as modernizing tactical air and
heavy divisions continues unabated, even though it is far from clear these
would fare well in an anti-access power-projection environment.
If the Defense Department is to meet emerging challenges in such a way as to
preserve the current level of national security, it will have to effect significant
changes in its approach to military experimentation; specifically, it will have to
increase dramatically the priority accorded to experimentation. At present, the
department’s effort is poorly focused and severely underfunded. The potential
gains to be expected from a properly directed and funded experimentation ef-
fort are clear. To see the payoff of successful military transformation, and, by ex-
tension, the importance of a well-designed program of experimentation, one
has only to look at how the blitzkrieg upset the military balance in Europe and
how the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task forces turned the tide in the Pacific during
World War II. The potential costs of continuing along the current path are clear
as well. They include investing in false starts and dead ends, arriving at the right
solutions to the wrong threats, and perhaps ultimately paying a price in jeopar-
dized security interests, national treasure wasted, and the lost lives of young
American men and women in uniform.
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TRANSFORMATION AND THE NAVY’S
TOUGH CHOICES AHEAD
What Are the Options for Policy Makers?
Ronald O’Rourke
After a decade of making painful choices and implementing wrenching changes,it now seems that policy makers face another set of potentially far-reaching
decisions concerning the future of the Navy. These new decisions, which are
driven in large part by a significant apparent mismatch between current programs
and potential resources, could significantly affect the structure and capabilities of
the Navy over the next twenty years or more. Some of the most significant of the
new choices concern the concept of military transformation: What does it mean
for the Navy? What might be involved in implementing it?
There are many ways to explore this issue. This article begins by focusing on
the balance between program goals and potentially avail-
able resources. It then presents four general options for
furure U.S. naval forces that arise from this balance. The
discussion concludes by examining possible elements of
a strategy for policy makers to implement the fourth and
least-defined of these options—the transformation of
U.S. naval forces in a manner more rapid and extensive
than now planned.
WHERE WE ARE: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
Policy makers cannot develop or assess options for fu-
ture naval forces until they first assess where the Navy
currently stands, and from a programs-versus-resources
perspective, the first thing to be said about the current
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situation is that the Navy’s
current programs collectively
appear to be significantly
larger than its budget.
Take, for example, just one
portion of that budget—the
shipbuilding account, which
is intended to support the
currently planned fleet of
about 310 ships. (This figure
includes fifty-five attack sub-
marines, up from fifty in the
1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review.) The shipbuilding
account currently provides
an average of about $7.9 bil-
lion per year for actual pro-
curement of new ships and
procures a mix of about 7.5
ships per year (see tables 1
and 2) . Increas ing the
ship-procurement rate to
about 8.7 ships per year—the
s teady-s ta te r a te for a
310-ship Navy—and adjust-
ing the mix of ships procured
to reflect the planned mix of
ships in the 310-ship plan
would require the shipbuild-
ing account to be increased by
about two billion dollars per
year. A bit less than four bil-
lion dollars in additional
funding per year would be
needed to achieve and main-
tain a procurement rate of
10.2 ships per year, which is
what would be needed after
fiscal year (FY) 2005 to work
off the backlog of deferred
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14
Funding level
for steady-state
8.7 ships/year
FY00–FY05
planned level
Funding level
for 10.2 ships/year
catch-up rate
Funding for 10.2
per year with ad-
justed catch-up mix
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
App. 10
7.9
App.11.7
App. 13
TABLE 1
ANNUAL FUNDING FOR SHIP PROCUREMENT
For 310-ship Navy, in bil. of $FY01
Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, November 2000
FY93–FY05
actual and
planned rate
Steady-state
rate
FY00–FY05
planned rate
FY06–FY27
catch-up rate
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
8.7
7.5
6.4
10.2
TABLE 2
SHIP PROCUREMENT FOR 310-SHIP NAVY
Average annual number procured
Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, November 2000
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ship procurement that has accumulated relative to the steady-state rate since fis-
cal 1993. About five billion dollars in additional funds per year might be needed
to adjust the mix of these 10.2 ships to compensate for the fact that the ships
procured since the early 1990s have included a less-than-proportionate share of
submarines, which are more expensive than most other types of ships.1
That would be two billion to five billion dollars in additional required fund-
ing per year—for just one of the Navy’s appropriation accounts. Other individ-
ual Navy accounts would not require nearly as much additional money to fund
fully, but it appears that several program areas could easily absorb increases of
from several hundred million dollars to more than a billion dollars a year if the
programs in these areas were to be more fully funded.
The “Procurement, Marine Corps” account, for example, has a steady-state
funding requirement of about $1.2 billion a year. The FY 2001 budget returns this
account to about that level, but because this account was funded at about one-half
of that level for several years, the Marine Corps states that it must now increase this
account to about $1.8 billion a year—an additional six hundred million dollars for
each of the next several years. Similar things could be said for the Navy’s aircraft
procurement, weapon procurement, and research and development (R&D) ac-
counts, and the accounts relating
to readiness, maintenance of real
property, and housing.
When one adds up the in-
creases for all these areas, in-
cluding shipbuilding, the total
funding differential could be ten
billion or more dollars per year,
depending on how robustly the
current programs of the Depart-
ment of the Navy (DoN) are
funded (table 3). A recent Con-
gressional Budget Office report
puts the figure at seventeen bil-
lion dollars per year.2 This con-
siderable difference between
what it would take to fund fully
the Navy’s programs and its
current budget “top line” is a
central feature of the Navy’s cur-
rent situation.
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., last
year published an updated analysis of what it calls the “coming train wreck” be-
tween defense program goals and available resources.3 The title of this analysis
has made the train-wreck metaphor a well-established phrase in debates over fu-
ture defense spending. This metaphor, however, may not be the best one, be-
cause it suggests that the conflict between programs and resources is still ahead,
that the services have not yet felt its effects, and that these effects, when they ar-
rive, will come all at once, in a cataclysmic way.
The conflict between program goals and available resources, however, is al-
ready with us. It has been growing incrementally for the last several years, and
the tensions that have built up over that time have already begun to outstrip the
Navy’s strategies to generate internal budget savings, as well as the service’s other
temporary coping measures.
As a result of the tension between program goals and available resources,
Navy programs have undergone a succession of cutbacks and reductions in re-
cent years. The cumulative effects of these reductions are difficult to discern un-
less one stands back and assesses them in their entirety—which sometimes can
be hard for military officers to do, since their career paths often move them from
one job to the next every two or three years. Rather than a train wreck, then, it
might be better to think of the effects of the imbalance between goals and resources
as akin to gradual oxygen deprivation: it happens slowly, its effects build up over
time, and the victim is likely not to be fully aware of what is happening. But in the
end, if not alleviated or at least well managed, it can be just as fatal as a train wreck.
A second feature of the Navy’s current situation is that in the midst of this
growing tension between programs and resources, there are proposals for in-
creasing the Navy’s force structure from the current 318 or so ships to about 360
ships, so that the fleet can better meet the demands being placed on it, particu-
larly for maintaining desired levels of forward deployments, without placing an
undue burden on the Navy’s personnel and equipment. Such an increase in force
structure would clearly require substantially more additional funding than
would be required to fund fully the current 310-ship program.
A third important feature of the Navy’s current situation is that since the mid-
dle of 1999 there has been an increased focus in debates over future U.S. defense
spending on the “revolution in military affairs” and on “defense transformation.”
The theme of transformation was featured prominently in the Defense Depart-
ment’s presentations of its proposed defense plan to Congress in early 2000, and in
statements on defense policy that year by both sides in the presidential campaign.
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WHERE WE MIGHT GO FROM HERE: FOUR GENERAL OPTIONS
Given this situation—the programs/resources imbalance, the proposals for in-
creasing force structure, and increased interest in defense transformation—four
general options for future U.S. naval forces can be sketched out:
• The first of these options would stay on today’s path: it would maintain
today’s collection of programs and today’s level of resources. It is, in effect,
the baseline option.
• The second option would maintain today’s programs but seek the
additional resources needed to fund them fully—the ten billion (or more)
additional dollars per year mentioned earlier.
• The third option is force-structure expansion toward a fleet of something like
360 ships. This option would maintain today’s collection of programs in
expanded form and would require an even larger amount of money to achieve.
• The fourth option is transformation, which would involve changing the
current mix of programs. It could be implemented at various resource
levels, but since it is not usually spoken of today in connection with large
net increases in total resources, it can be associated here with today’s levels
of resources or something a bit higher.
First Notional Option—Stay on the Current Path
Choosing the first option would mean continuing the various strategies now be-
ing pursued to generate internal budget savings that would in turn be applied to
currently underfunded priorities, including modernization. These include fa-
miliar measures like regionalization of bases and of maintenance; competitive
sourcing and privatization; “smart ship,” “smart work,” and “smart base” initia-
tives; and also acquisition reform measures, such as multiyear procurement,
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) procurement, and using cost as an inde-
pendent variable (CAIV) in the design of new systems.4 This approach would
also continue to balance, as well as possible, near-term readiness against lon-
ger-term modernization. It would seek to protect core procurement programs,
the readiness of deployed forces, and selected R&D efforts leading toward a
moderate, gradual evolution of the force.
In theory, the internal savings produced by this strategy might be enough to
finance an increase in procurement rates approaching steady-state replacement
levels. This plan, however, depends on certain key, and rather optimistic, as-
sumptions: that the money-saving strategies will be implemented as planned,
that they will generate the projected amounts of savings within a certain amount
of time, and that no unexpected needs for increased expenditures will
arise—that there will be no more financial shocks to the system.
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This strategy appears to be a fragile one in that its success requires all these
factors to work out as planners hope. The experience of the last several years, in
fact, suggests that there is a good chance that one or more of these assumptions
will not pan out. Some strategies for saving money may be only partially imple-
mented; some even of those that are fully implemented may not produce
hoped-for results; and unexpected financial demands could well arise.
If matters did not work out as planned, the result would be an intensification
of the challenges that the Navy now faces in trying to make ends meet. This strat-
egy carries a high risk of producing,
over time, a gradual erosion in force
structure, an erosion that would be-
gin when today’s ships begin to retire
in large numbers after 2010 and par-
ticularly after 2020. The fleet could
fall below the current level of about 318 ships, and then below three hundred
ships, as the consequences of fifteen or twenty years of deferred procurement
begin to manifest themselves. This would lead to a corresponding reduction in
the number of ships that could be deployed forward at any one time. Similar
effects would become manifest in aircraft inventories. In general, there would
be pressure on the Navy’s ability to maintain required levels of readiness, with
the burden for this task falling increasingly on the backs of Navy personnel.
Also, there would be limited or spotty modernization; in place of new designs
and new production, there would be significant reliance on modified designs,
upgrades, and service-life extensions.
With regard to the potential for reduced forward-deployed operations, the
nation could respond to such a state of affairs in a number of ways. It could
simply accept reduced levels of forward-deployed forces, which could require
choosing to maintain higher levels of presence in one region at the expense of
presence in another, reducing the number of ships sent to each region, or reduc-
ing the fraction of the year that ships are deployed to various regions.
Alternatively, the nation could seek to maintain higher levels of forward-
deployed naval forces by increasing the number of ships that are “forward
homeported” in overseas operating areas. This would raise all of the traditional
issues associated with forward-homeported ships, including the need for host-
nation acceptance; the possibility of host-nation restrictions on how the ships
are used; the risk of becoming excessively tied politically to one region at the ex-
pense of others; the issue of how and where these ships are to be maintained; and
the risk—the severity of which would depend on the host nation in-
volved—of being evicted and seeing calculations made on the assumption of
forward homeporting upset.
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Finally, the nation could respond by seeking greater efforts from allies and
friends in support of maintaining regional security. This option, however, would
depend not just on the willingness of those allies and friends to take on this
responsibility but on their capability to do so as well. For naval forces, capability
is a significant consideration, since U.S. naval forces include platforms and
systems (and resulting capabilities) that are rare in or absent from the naval
forces of U.S. allies and friends, including carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft,
nuclear-powered attack submarines, surface combatants with highly capable
area-air-defense systems, land-attack cruise missiles, and substantial amphibi-
ous assault forces.
Optimistically, this first option would result in a fleet of about the size of to-
day’s, with some amount of modernization. Less optimistically, the fleet would
have fewer ships than it does today, and the amount of modernization could be
meager. Either way, but particularly in the less optimistic scenario, this option
raises issues regarding both numerical and qualitative sufficiency for carrying
out potential missions fifteen or twenty years from now.
Second Notional Option: Fully Fund the Current Plan
Pursuing the second option—fully funding the currently planned 310-ship
force—would involve continuing the same money-saving measures described
under the first option while seeking the additional resources needed to fund to-
day’s collection of programs more completely. These additional resources could
come from an increase in the defense budget top line or an increase in the Navy’s
share of the top line.
It is not clear whether the next administration will support an increase in the
defense budget so large that the Department of the Navy’s proportionate share
of that increase would amount to ten (or more) billion dollars per year. While
both presidential campaigns spoke in favor of maintaining a strong defense, nei-
ther committed itself specifically to an increase of this size. Moreover, the new
administration will face numerous competing federal budget priorities, such
as shoring up Social Security; financing new domestic program initiatives in
areas such as education, health care, and the environment; granting tax reduc-
tion; and carrying out debt reduction. In light of these competing federal budget
priorities, substantial growth in the defense top line, while possible, is by no
means certain.
The alternative of increasing the Department of the Navy’s share of the De-
fense Department’s top line has been mentioned regularly for many years now.
The experience of the past several years, however, suggests that mutually offset-
ting forces in the Pentagon tend to make such shifts difficult to achieve. All the
services will likely ask the new administration for more funding, and all of them
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will bring well developed arguments to bear. In practice, each service’s efforts
have tended to cancel out those of the others.
If the division of the defense budget changes, moreover, it might not be in the
Navy’s favor. The Army is now pursuing a force transformation, and policy mak-
ers on Capitol Hill, at least, have reacted very supportively to this initiative. On
this basis, one might argue that the most likely beneficiary of a defense-budget
reallocation would be the Army rather than the Department of the Navy.
If the Navy were to obtain enough new money to fund fully today’s programs,
then compared to the first option, force structure would be more stable, there
would be less pressure on readiness, and there would be somewhat more mod-
ernization. Current levels of presence could be maintained, and there would be
less need for compensatory measures like forward homeporting or increased re-
liance on allies. Whether this force would be sufficient numerically and quali-
tatively for tomorrow’s forward requirements, however, would still be in ques-
tion. If the Navy did not succeed in obtaining all the additional needed re-
sources, the outcome would be more like that of the first option, and the
adequacy of the force numerically and qualitatively would be more problematic.
Third Notional Option: Expand the Force Structure
The third option of increasing the Navy’s force structure toward 360 ships and
maintaining today’s collection of programs in expanded form would be pursued
like the second, except that the amount of additional resources to be sought
would be substantially greater. The question of an increased defense top line or
an increased Department of the Navy share would arise again, but in more in-
tensified form.
This option offers a fairly wide array of potential outcomes, depending on
how much additional funding the Navy secured. If the Navy obtained most or all
of what it asks for, the Navy could over time build itself up toward the 360-ship
figure. Forward deployments could be expanded from present levels. Numerical
sufficiency would be less of an issue, or no problem at all, but qualitative suffi-
ciency might still be an open question, particularly if the new money were de-
voted primarily to acquisition of current systems rather than development of
new ones. If, however, the Department of the Navy did not receive a large in-
crease in resources, the outcome could be more like that of the second option or
the first, depending on the amount it did manage to obtain.
Fourth Notional Option: Transformation
The fourth notional option is transformation beyond that which is already re-
flected in the Department of the Navy’s plans. This option would involve alter-
ing today’s mix of programs and implementing this altered mix at a level of
funding about equal to or a bit higher than today’s level.
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In discussing this fourth option, it should be noted that, in debates over fu-
ture U.S. defense spending, the term “transformation” is currently being used in
two basic ways. The Defense Department and supporters of current defense
plans often use transformation to refer to measures to change U.S. military
forces that are already incorporated into the current Five-Year Defense Program,
and to such long-range Defense Department conceptual documents as Vision
2020. This is the kind of transformation to which the Defense Department re-
ferred when it presented its proposed fiscal 2001 budget to Congress in early
2000. For naval forces, these measures include, among other things, current
plans for implementing network-centric warfare in the fleet. It is an implicit fea-
ture of the three general options discussed above.
Those who believe present Defense Department efforts to implement trans-
formation are inadequate use the term transformation in a different way—to
refer to measures that would change U.S. military forces more rapidly or exten-
sively than now planned by the department. This is the kind of transformation
referred to under the fourth general option discussed here.
Although there has been much discussion of this more ambitious kind of
transformation since the early 1990s, and particularly over the last year or two, it
is still not clearly defined in terms of program content or cost. In relation to na-
val forces, it is typically characterized simply by citing specific proposals, such as
STREETFIGHTER, the Arsenal Ship, or the conversion of Trident ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs) to an SSGN configuration, carrying cruise missiles.
In general, however, it might be fair to say that this kind of transformation
can be contrasted from the first kind—the kind reflected in the other three
options—as involving different platforms and systems, different operational
concepts, and a greater emphasis on long-term investments (as opposed to
nearer-term programs). Its advocates argue that this kind of transformation is a
means to produce, for a given amount of resources, a force more effective against
future threats than one that would result from funding and implementing to-
day’s collection of programs.
THE FOURTH OPTION: IMPLEMENTING TRANSFORMATION
A major question facing policy makers and others who support or are interested in
this kind of transformation is how to make it happen. What measures, in other
words, could policy makers consider taking (or encouraging others to take) to im-
plement this second kind of transformation? The following are some candidate
measures that might form the core of a strategy for transforming U.S. naval forces.
Signaling. One measure to consider in beginning a transformation process
would be to make clear to people both outside and inside the naval community
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that transformation has become an important Department of the Navy priority,
even the top priority. Signaling to outsiders is important in terms of winning
support for any effort, particularly from Congress. The support that the U.S.
Army received in congressional markups of the fiscal 2001 defense budget for its
own transformation program is a good example. Signaling to members of the
naval community would be equally important, because it would alert them to
the facts that they may need to alter the focus of their efforts and that the current
distribution of resources may change.
RDT&E. A second item would be to expand research, development, testing, and
evaluation efforts so as to include a greater emphasis on “clean-sheet” designs
and prototyping. This is likely to require a substantial increase in the RDT&E
account—even more than what would be needed to fund more fully current
research and development programs—particularly for developing new designs
and building and testing prototypes. Instead of adding perhaps several hundred
million or a billion dollars to the Navy’s RDT&E account (as under the second
option discussed earlier), pursuing a transformation strategy might involve
adding some multiple of this amount—perhaps two or three times as much.
Experimentation. A third need—one that is often mentioned in connection
with transformation—is greater use of experimentation. This could include the
establishment of standing experimental forces to supplement the experimenta-
tion that can be carried out by general-purpose forces.
* * * * * * *
These first three items come quickly to mind and are frequently mentioned in
discussions of transformation strategies. There are additional measures, how-
ever, that can be considered, some of which are less frequently mentioned.
Reassurance. One of these would be to reassure platform communities (that is,
the major sectors of the service closely involved with either surface ships, sub-
marines, or aircraft) as well as program managers and contractors that transfor-
mation does not represent a mortal threat to their organizational well-being.
Institutions, like individuals, tend to prefer stability and continuity over insta-
bility and discontinuity. Transformation carries with it the prospect of the latter
and thus tends to elicit defensive reactions from people and organizations. The
likelihood of swift and vigorous defensive reactions may well have been in-
creased by several years of defense downsizing, which has encouraged institu-
tions and individuals to focus more intensely on self-preservation. Years of
program cutbacks and cancellations have encouraged a strong inclination to-
ward “circling the wagons” and defending programs and priorities that have sur-
vived earlier reductions.
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If transformation is to succeed, incentives would need to be changed so that
individuals would know that they can succeed and advance in a transformative
environment, and so that businesses would be confident of maintaining their
profitability. Program managers’ success should not be measured solely by their
ability to carry forward procurement programs that were designed years ago if
those programs are no longer appropriate, but rather on their ability to recog-
nize where change may be needed and to move quickly to restructure the efforts.
Keeping NCW in Perspective. A fifth potential initiative would be not only to
emphasize network-centric warfare but set it in context, in terms of its place in
the intended transformation. Much excitement has been generated by network-
centric warfare, and for good reason. But in the midst of this enthusiasm, there is
a potential for simply equating transformation with network-centric warfare
and letting it go at that. That would be a mistake, for although network-centric
warfare is essential to transformation, a comprehensive transformation would
involve other changes as well.
Right now, the Navy is essentially superimposing network-centric capabilities
onto its existing force architecture. This will clearly increase Navy capabilities;
but network-centric warfare, which fundamentally alters the relationships be-
tween different elements of a force, makes possible wholly new naval force archi-
tectures that can differ from today’s fleet design. Indeed, exploiting the full
potential of network-centric warfare may actually demand a change in the current
force architecture. Simply applying it as a veneer over today’s force architecture
will limit the benefits it produces.
At a time when funds for the development and procurement of new designs
are limited, there is a temptation to use network-centric warfare as a rationale
for not investing in platforms and systems that could contribute to a new and
different force architecture. Misapplying the concept of NCW in this manner
would result in missed opportunities. Network-centric warfare will help a great
deal, but transformation does not begin and end there.
Force Architectures. The Navy does not show much evidence, at least to outside
observers, of having done very much work for years in the area of alternative force
architectures. The last completed major effort that was publicized outside the
Navy may have been a project conducted by Captain Clark “Corky”Graham at the
Naval Surface Warfare Center at Carderock, Maryland, in 1989–92. This architec-
ture focused on a large, modular ship that went by various names, including
“carrier dock multimission” and “carrier of large objects,” the objects being such
things as aircraft, smaller scout/fighter ships, and amphibious forces.5
Instead of alternative force architectures, the focus in recent years appears to
have been primarily on designing new platforms and systems for the current
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fleet concept. But with the Navy becoming ever more networked, and with the ca-
pabilities of individual platforms increasingly becoming functions of their
places in that network, the need
for paying more attention to the
design of the overall force is be-
coming increasingly urgent. Just
as the designer of a ship should
seek to optimize the total ship (rather than its individual systems or compo-
nents), the need now appears to be to optimize the architecture of the entire
naval force rather than simply the designs of the individual platforms that
make it up.
There are several new platform and system concepts now on the table, but
their merits and limitations will be less and less easy to identify and evaluate
except in the context of a larger force architecture. If the focus remains on
designing individual new platforms without parallel work on revised architec-
tures, the result is likely to be a perpetuation of the current architecture, produc-
ing only next-generation versions of today’s platforms and allowing change only
through linear descent—stovepipe evolution, if you will.
It might turn out that a further elaboration of today’s force architecture is the
right approach to meeting tomorrow’s operational needs. But this cannot be
known with any confidence if the issue is not explored, and there is little evi-
dence of such exploration in recent years. One hears references to a future “sys-
tem of systems,” but the tendency is to consider this metasystem as a by-product
of individual platform and program development—something that will emerge
and evolve passively, from the bottom up. Such an approach could overlook
many of the opportunities that a more consciously designed “system of systems”
could offer for increasing fleet capabilities. To achieve not just any system of sys-
tems but the best one will require not just bottom-up evolution but top-down
concept generation as well.
One current example of focusing on optimizing the entire force architecture
and approaching fleet modernization from the top down is the U.S. Coast
Guard’s DEEPWATER acquisition project. This project, which aims at replacing a
large portion of the Coast Guard’s current deep-water-capable assets, is deliber-
ately seeking to avoid a simple one-for-one replacement of cutter classes and
aircraft types. Instead, it focuses on identifying the most cost-effective force
architecture—that is, the optimum combination of surface platforms, air plat-
forms, C4ISR* systems, and logistics systems—that technology now permits. The
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program would then procure the elements of this architecture in an inte-
grated fashion.
This is an ambitious project for the Coast Guard, and that service faces several
challenges in implementing it successfully. Parts of what the Coast Guard is
attempting may not be appropriate or practical for the Navy to consider. Even
so, it is worth examining for the lessons it can provide for thinking about future
naval force architectures and for achieving them.
What might a transformed naval force architecture include? Elements that
are frequently mentioned include a greater reliance on unmanned vehicles
(including autonomous vehicles), increased use of distributed sensor networks,
and new kinds of ships.
The possibilities for ships are quite diverse. In comparison to current designs,
they could have larger and more varied payloads; they could be much more
modular; they could be significantly
smaller, or significantly larger; they
could have much higher maximum
speeds; and they could take advantage
of nontraditional hull forms. They
could be hybrid ships, mixing, say, the
functions of an aircraft carrier and surface combatant, or a surface combatant
and an amphibious ship. They could be “mother ships,” deploying large num-
bers of smaller ships and unmanned platforms; they could be mobile offshore
bases rather than ships at all. They could be derived from commercial designs.
All these things have been proposed at one time or another.
An effective strategy to develop alternative force architectures might have
three primary aspects. First, it could involve parallel efforts by multiple groups.
Alternative force architectures could take various shapes, and the most promising
candidates are likely to be discovered more quickly if a number of groups try
independently to find them. These groups could be recruited from a variety of
settings—the fleet, the platform communities, government laboratories, indus-
try, universities, and think tanks. Each kind of group would have different
strengths and limitations. For example, a group whose members are drawn from
one of the Navy’s platform communities might create architectures that ex-
panded the capabilities of that platform in ways that other groups might not
think of; on the other hand, however, it would understandably be disinclined to
propose an architecture that downplayed or eliminated that platform.
Similarly, an industry group might have a better understanding of how to
apply cutting-edge technologies, particularly from the commercial arena, to cre-
ate new force architectures. It might be less bound by force-design traditions
than people working within Navy offices, and it would be likely to have a keener
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appreciation for producibility considerations. But a group whose members were
drawn from the “widget” industry could not be expected to advance an architec-
ture, whatever its merits, that did not require widgets.
A second potential element of an effort to generate alternative naval force ar-
chitectures would be a greater use of simulation-based design as applied to the
entire force rather than individual ships. The nation cannot afford to build new
architectures for experimental purposes, and the Navy could sift through the
many possibilities more quickly through intensive modeling and assessment.
Lastly, developing new force architectures should not be thought of as a
one-time exercise but as a continuing effort, so that it can incorporate new de-
velopments and the contributions of new participants.
Operational Concepts. The need for new operational concepts is frequently dis-
cussed in connection with transformation. Much of this discussion concerns
proposed operational concepts for warfighting and crisis response operations,
and this part of the discussion does not need to be further elaborated here. The
discussion of new operational concepts, however, arguably should not stop with
warfighting and crisis-response operations, because it can also include consid-
eration of new concepts for how to maintain normal forward-deployment and
presence operations. A key goal here would be to identify concepts that can re-
duce the Navy’s current “station-keeping multipliers”—the numbers of ships of
given kinds needed to keep one such ship on station in an overseas operating
area. These multipliers are considerably higher than people often assume. Al-
though it has often been asserted with conviction over the years, even by admirals,
that it takes three Navy ships to keep one on station, the actual station-keeping
multipliers for Navy ships are in fact more like five to one, or six to one for ships
homeported in the continental United States—the exact numbers depending on
the category of ship in question, the specific overseas operating area involved,
and (for deployments to the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region) whether the
ship is homeported on the East or West Coast.6
In the post–Cold War era, these station-keeping multipliers have been used
extensively to justify Navy force levels. Indeed, for several years now the Navy’s
force-structure requirements have been based primarily on the number of ships
necessary to maintain established levels of presence overseas, and only second-
arily on warfighting needs.
Although these station-keeping multipliers are effective force-level justifiers,
they also reflect a high operational-cycle “overhead”—the fact that the Navy
must procure a large number of expensive platforms to keep a fraction of them
deployed on station at any one time. Reducing the multiplier might permit a
smaller number of ships to maintain a given level of presence. Frequently
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mentioned strategies for accomplishing this include double-crewing ships and
scheduling long-duration deployments coupled with crew rotation, as was en-
visaged for the Arsenal Ship. Even after taking into account the additional costs
of such measures—for additional crews, more shore-based training facilities, and
shorter ship-service lives—this approach might produce net savings that could
be devoted to research and development or acquisition.
Measures like these to reduce station-keeping multipliers could be applied
only insofar as they did not leave the fleet with insufficient forces for warfighting.
They also raise serious issues con-
cerning maintenance, training, and
crews’ sense of “ownership” of the
ships they serve on—which can con-
tribute to the efforts they make on
behalf of their ships. These issues are
by no means trivial and may prove difficult to resolve. But that should not dis-
qualify them from consideration as potential components of transformation.
The Acquisition System. If much of this is to be accomplished, significant
changes might need to be made to the Defense Department acquisition system,
particularly in terms of how proposed systems are evaluated and justified. One
potential change would be to reduce the emphasis the system puts on replacing
specific capabilities that are now being provided by systems approaching retire-
ment age. This approach encourages decisions in favor of replacing older sys-
tems with new-generation versions of the same things—a replacement-in-kind
strategy that leads to force modernization by linear descent and to a conse-
quent perpetuation of the current force architecture. Instead, the acquisition
system could be broadened to accept justification of proposed systems in terms
of how they make sense within a future force architecture, irrespective of
whether they exactly replace the capabilities of systems being retired, and even if
they would result in overlaps of capabilities with other systems that are still years
away from retirement.
If transformation is to involve greater use of prototypes, then the acquisi-
tion system might need to be changed so that the large up-front design costs
associated with developing prototypes can be justified more in terms of their
demonstrative (as opposed to purely operational) benefits. In addition, if trans-
formation would mean frequent design changes during production, and frequent
modification or restructuring of programs, then the acquisition system would
need to be changed so that the assessed cost-effectiveness of proposed systems is
not dependent on completing lengthy production runs of stable designs.
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Finally, if transformation were to include increased use of experimentation,
the acquisition system arguably should be changed to reduce its current emphasis
on avoiding test failures at all costs on the grounds that such failures are inher-
ently wasteful. This potential kind of waste should be compared to the more
subtle forms of waste that can result when the emphasis on avoiding test failures
at all costs slows down the replacement of inappropriate or cost-ineffective sys-
tems. Just as the Navy is trying to move away from the “zero-defect” mentality in
its personnel policies, so too might it consider, in a transformative era, moving
away from an acquisition system with a zero-defects orientation. The Navy (and
the Defense Department generally) would need to recognize that if transforma-
tion is the goal, an absence of mistakes can be evidence of insufficient effort.
The current acquisition system can be viewed as, among other things, a huge
system for avoiding errors and apportioning the blame when something goes
wrong. A transformed acquisition system would encourage people to take risks
when appropriate and protect them from blame or criticism for errors that re-
sult from honest efforts to discover something new.
Agile Manufacturing. Lastly, industry, in coordination with government efforts
to change the acquisition system, can assist in the transformation process by al-
tering its business model so that its operations are no longer built so much
around the concept of executing long production runs of stable designs. Under
this new model, profitability in the future would be derived more principally
from research and development work, prototyping, and short production runs
or longer runs with frequent changes in design. These activities would need to be
viewed by industry as a significant and stable source of profits. The idea of oper-
ating profitably on the basis of short production runs of frequently changing
designs is established in certain commercial industries that must contend with
rapid changes in product technology or with frequent shifts in consumer prefer-
ences. The practices adopted by these commercial firms may be able to provide
lessons in how to accomplish the same thing in defense production.
Moving toward this new business model, which might be called “agile man-
ufacturing,” would likely involve the adoption of new production capabilities and
processes. Defense firms have already made significant strides in adopting new
production capabilities and processes in areas such as “lean” manufacturing
(which involves, among other things, the avoidance of tools and jigs that are
suitable for producing only one kind of item) and “flexible” manufacturing
(which includes systems that can produce various components in small quan-
tities in response to user demands for individual spare parts). Agile manufac-
turing would build on these improvements to put prototyping, limited
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production runs, and rapidly changing designs more at the center of a firm’s
business operations.
These are not the only elements that might be included in a successful transfor-
mation strategy, but a strategy that lacked elements like these would be less likely
to achieve its goals. Policy makers in the new administration and the 107th Con-
gress may consider what a transformed naval force might look like and whether
it would be better than the force that might result from pursuing the three alter-
native options discussed earlier. Their views on these issues will no doubt vary,
but the Navy and the nation will likely benefit from the debate.
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THE CONFEDERATE NAVAL BUILDUP
Could More Have Been Accomplished?
David G. Surdam
The Union navy’s control of the American waters was a decisive element inthe outcome of the Civil War. The Federal government’s naval superiority
allowed it to project power along thousands of miles of coastline and rivers, sub-
sist large armies in Virginia, and slowly strangle the southern economy by sty-
mieing imports of European and northern manufactures and foodstuffs, as well
as of exports of southern staples, primarily raw cotton.
The infant Confederate government quickly established a naval organization.
Jefferson Davis chose Stephen Mallory as Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Mallory
confronted an unenviable task. The seceding states possessed no vessels capable
of fighting against the best frigates in the Federal navy, nor did those states
possess most of the necessary raw materials and industries needed to build
modern warships.
Despite the Confederacy’s handicaps in creating a navy, its embryonic fleet
came tantalizingly close to upsetting the Federal navy’s superiority in March and
April of 1862. The Confederate ironclad Virginia temporarily terrorized a for-
midable Union fleet in Hampton Roads during March. The Virginia’s success
panicked some of Lincoln’s cabinet members; fortunately for the North, the USS
Monitor arrived before the Virginia could wreak further
havoc upon the fleet. The Monitor neutralized the Vir-
ginia, and the Federal fleet in the Chesapeake was never
again seriously challenged. A month later, despite fears
that the Confederates would have three ironclads wait-
ing for then-Captain David Farragut’s fleet, the Federal
fleet captured New Orleans before the two largest Con-
federate ironclads became fully operational. Had the two
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large ironclads, the Louisiana and the Mississippi, been ready, the attack on New
Orleans might have had a different ending. Even the Arkansas, an uncompleted
warship, created consternation in two Union fleets on the Mississippi in
mid-1862. Thereafter, Confederate naval efforts would continue to be insuffi-
cient and too late.
Could the Confederate government have fielded an even stronger navy, a
navy strong enough to at least break the blockade? Did the Confederate navy
make the best use of its time and resources? What were the important issues
facing Mallory and the Confederacy in creating their navy? Did Mallory and
the Confederate government make decisions that retarded the buildup of the
Confederate navy?
THE CONFEDERATE NAVAL BUILDUP: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
In April 1861, the North had forty-two commissioned warships; the Confeder-
acy had none.1 Although the South began the war without a navy, the initial dis-
parity in naval forces was not necessarily decisive. With only forty-two warships,
the northern navy was not large enough to implement an effective blockade of
every significant Confederate port. Nor did the North possess warships to con-
trol the western rivers. The Confederacy’s initial lack of a navy was further miti-
gated by three other factors. First, Union naval superiority would take time to
manifest itself; the North would have to recall its existing naval warships from
distant stations, and to implement its blockade, it would need to buy and build
blockading vessels. Second, naval technology had been changing rapidly during
the late antebellum period. Contemporary advances, particularly the idea of
protecting warships with iron armor, could have rendered most of the Union
vessels obsolete in the face of a Confederate navy built from scratch and immedi-
ately exploiting the latest technology. Secretary Mallory understood the oppor-
tunity presented by the new technology, especially the importance of ironclad
vessels. He realized that the South could not compete in building standard
wooden vessels, so he opted for a southern navy based upon ironclad vessels.
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity.
Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent
all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire Navy. . . . If to
cope with them upon the sea we follow their example and build wooden ships, we
shall have to construct several at one time; for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to her
comparatively numerous steam frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compen-
sated by invulnerability; and thus not only does economy but naval success
dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood, with-
out regard to first cost.2
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Finally, Mallory’s hopes for gaining naval superiority via ironclad vessels
received a boost from the initial hesitance of his opposite number, Secretary of
the Navy Gideon Welles, to build ironclads. Welles obtained funding to build
ironclads for the Union navy only in the summer of 1861. After appointing a
board of naval officers to examine the various plans for ironclads, he settled on
three designs; the actual construction of the famous Monitor started only in late
October. Welles’s hesitation in beginning an ironclad construction program
may now seem unfathomable, but in fact the navy’s experiences with ironclads
urged caution; the United States had commissioned the building of an iron-armored
vessel in 1852, but after a $500,000 expenditure it had had nothing to show for
the money. Thus, Welles decided to let Congress make the initial push for
ironclads. Welles was also motivated by the knowledge that many radical Repub-
licans disliked him and would be eager to expose any mistakes. Even after a panel
of naval architects approved some prototype vessels, including John Ericsson’s
Monitor, Welles moved cautiously. Naval officer David Dixon Porter explained
Welles’s hesitation: “It would have been a bold man, indeed, who, as Secretary of
the Navy, would have taken the responsibility of building any number of untried
‘Monitors’ without something to justify him in doing so.”3
With the various delays facing the Union in assembling its naval might, the
Confederacy was granted a grace period of several months in which to build its
own navy. If the Confederacy had acted quickly to build several ironclads, its
navy might have seized control of large expanses of American waters.
The South possessed at least a limited shipbuilding capacity. Although
the antebellum southern shipbuilding efforts were dwarfed by northern ship-
building, the South was not starting from scratch: the eighth U.S. census listed
thirty-three southern “Ship and Boat Building” establishments, with 546 work-
ers.4 The Confederacy was blessed with two major shipbuilding facilities: Nor-
folk and New Orleans. When the Federals abandoned Norfolk in 1861, they
failed to destroy the large Gosport Navy Yard completely, making possible the
resurrection and transformation of the frigate USS Merrimack into the CSS Vir-
ginia. Norfolk contained a large amount of ordnance and was also fairly close to
the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond (a firm with a history of building naval
guns and that would now produce iron plating). The naval ordnance at Norfolk
was critical. The Confederates distributed it among various ports; the guns en-
abled the Confederates to hold some of the ports against the wooden vessels
blockading them.
New Orleans had facilities to build ships, too; unfortunately for the nascent
Confederate navy, the vessels produced in antebellum New Orleans had been
primarily river craft, and it is unlikely that any warships or ocean steamers had
been constructed there.5 Despite the city’s inexperience at building warships, the
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fact that it nearly completed two ironclads before Farragut’s fleet captured the
city was testimony to its shipbuilding potential. Memphis was another early site
of ironclad building. Two ironclads were laid down there, but these were unfin-
ished when the Federal fleet took the city. One of the ironclads was destroyed,
but the other, the Arkansas, was moved to the Yazoo River.
For all these reasons, Mallory did not believe that the South could immedi-
ately build a warship capable of sailing along the coast and engaging the Federal
warships, but he was hopeful that it would eventually be able to construct
high-quality steam frigates.6
Besides its limited shipbuilding facilities, the Confederate navy faced other
difficulties. Domestically manufactured iron products were destined to be in
short supply. While there were considerable pig-iron deposits in the South,
many of them were located in remote areas; the few southern iron mills had typi-
cally received their ore from Pennsyl-
vania. The South possessed some
large iron mills (notably Tredegar in
Richmond), but the region had always
imported much of its railroad iron. P.
V. Daniel, an official of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad,
estimated that almost fifty thousand tons of rails were needed annually just to
maintain the southern railroads. He declared at the time that the existing iron
mills in the South were capable of supplying less than half of that figure, let alone
provide iron plate for armoring warships. According to the report of the secre-
tary of the treasury for the year ending June 30, 1860, southern ports received
sixty-five thousand tons of railroad iron; almost all of the imported rail iron was
from Great Britain.7 At the outset of the war, Mallory sent a naval officer to
Tennessee and Georgia to see whether any rolling mills could roll iron plating;
the officer reported that outside of Kentucky, none of the existing southern mills
were capable of rolling the two-inch plates needed to armor warships. Mallory
pressed the Confederate Congress to create incentives to get iron mills to adapt
their machinery to produce such plates.8
Propulsion was also a problem, since the South’s ability to produce boilers
and machinery was limited. The eighth census listed 115 southern establish-
ments that manufactured steam engines and associated goods; these establish-
ments employed 4,570 workers. Southern steam engine manufacturers constituted
about 10 percent of the total U.S. capacity, but most of these southern shops
were capable of producing machinery only for small vessels. Even the machine
shop at the Norfolk navy yard was inadequate; Mallory informed Jefferson Davis
that this shop was incapable of producing heavy steam engines and that Tennes-
see possessed the only machine shop capable of doing such work.9 However,
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there were several establishments in New Orleans equipped to produce machin-
ery, if they were given time to adapt to the needs of warships.
These domestic sources were insufficient to meet the navy’s needs. The pro-
duction of iron plating was hampered by a shortage of iron ore, the need to
adapt rolling mills for rolling two-inch plate, and competition for the iron from
railroads and other military needs. So strapped were the rolling mills for raw
iron that even with virtual monopolization by the military of southern output,
the available ore was insufficient to meet the navy’s needs for iron plating. The
shortage of raw iron offset the efforts to convert rolling mills in Atlanta and
Richmond to produce plating. During 1864, Mallory would report that the loss
of Atlanta further exacerbated the shortage of iron plating and that although the
remaining mills in Richmond were “capable of rolling any quantity, . . . the mate-
rial [iron ore was] not on hand, and the amount now necessary to complete the
vessels already built would be equal to 4,230 tons.” Because of the paucity of iron
to make two-inch plates, T-rails from railroad iron were used; the T-rails were
not as protective as the two-inch plate. Even such humble items as nails and bolts
were in short supply.10
Because of inadequate domestic production of shipboard machinery and
equipment, Mallory struggled to obtain such commodities from other sources.
Although some iron, steel, boilerplate, and machinery was smuggled through the
blockade, the flow was meager and uncertain. The Navy Department in Rich-
mond purchased existing steamers and stripped them of their machinery for use
in warships. In addition, Mallory hoped that the Confederate commerce raiders
would capture steamers and that their machinery, especially propellers, could be
stripped. The shortages and the inability to transport rapidly iron and machinery
within the Confederacy delayed construction of warships, and such delays were
often decisive.11 Completion of the Mississippi was to be delayed while a Rich-
mond firm shipped a propeller shaft (recovered from a vessel that had been
burned) across the Confederacy to New Orleans and while railroad iron was col-
lected for the armor. The vessel was not completed in time to contest Farragut’s at-
tack on New Orleans and had to be destroyed to prevent its capture.12
The shortages of supplies were accompanied by shortages of skilled labor.
Many of the skilled laborers in the South on the eve of the Civil War were trans-
planted northerners or foreigners; the outbreak of hostilities depleted the skilled
labor pool, as most of the northerners and foreigners left the South. In addition,
many of the indigenous skilled workers volunteered for the military, and others
were later conscripted. A more benign conscription policy, coupled with better
recruiting incentives, might have either kept more indigenous skilled work-
ers in the necessary industries or attracted foreign skilled labor. The loss of a
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competent ironmaster (who managed the furnaces) could reduce the efficiency
of a plant by a third.13
Perhaps the most important scarcity impeding the Confederate naval buildup
was that of time. Historian William Still, Jr. concludes, “One other factor cannot
be ignored—time. Materials needed to complete vessels were delayed because
facilities were destroyed or had to be moved in the face of advancing enemy
forces. Time and time again uncompleted ironclads and wooden gunboats had
to be destroyed to prevent their
capture.” The Confederates ran out
of time at New Orleans and Mem-
phis; the cities were captured be-
fore the ironclads necessary for their
defense could be completed. The loss of these cities, as well as Norfolk, forced
delays while craft under construction there were transferred to other, more
remote, locations. Shortages of material and labor created other delays.
In addition, the southern shipbuilders needed time to learn how to construct
warships and ordnance. Prior to the war, the builders of the Mississippi, the Tifts,
had never constructed a ship, much less a warship. Confederate captain John K.
Mitchell would later testify, “The facts show that the [war] vessels could be
constructed [in New Orleans]. However, the work was unusual at that point
[1861–62], and the mechanics engaged in it undertook to do what they were not
accustomed to do, and the consequence was they took more time than they
probably otherwise would.”14 Confederate naval construction would have pro-
duced better results if left unmolested; the Union forces, primarily through the
blockade and the capture of key ports, denied the South the time it needed to
build a strong navy.
The Confederacy, then, faced significant disadvantages in building a strong
navy using domestic resources. Indeed, relying upon domestic resources was
probably the worst way for the Confederates to obtain a strong navy.
Besides not producing enough ironclads to defend southern rivers and ports,
the South also failed to build ironclads capable of offensive operations in coastal
waters. Because of their deficient machinery and haphazard design, the Confed-
eracy’s domestically built ironclads were generally not seaworthy enough to op-
erate in coastal waters, much less on “blue water.” Mallory decided that only
vessels purchased or built in Europe could attack northern blockaders.
To achieve his goal of ironclad superiority, Mallory immediately sent a Con-
federate agent to Europe to purchase armored vessels. Mallory evinced an in-
terest in a French armored vessel, Gloire, in the spring of 1861. Mallory reckoned
that the Gloire had cost the French government less than two million dollars,
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and although that was double the cost of a similar wooden warship, he was con-
vinced of the vessel’s worth:
This certainly seems to be a large price to pay for a six-gun [rifled eighty-pounder
Armstrongs] ship, when we reflect that the finest wooden screw frigates that float,
carrying 40 guns of the heaviest caliber, cost but half this amount. But no compari-
son of their relative values can be instituted, inasmuch as the most formidable
wooden frigate would be powerless in a contest with such a ship; and the employ-
ment of ironclad ships by one naval power must compel every other to have them,
without regard to cost, or to occupy a position of known and admitted inferiority
upon the sea.15
Mallory proved persuasive, and the Confederate government authorized two
million dollars for purchasing ironclad warships. Unfortunately for the South,
Europe did not immediately sell any iron-armored vessels. Indeed, one may marvel
at Mallory’s brazenness in presuming that France would relinquish a ship that
promised to give it naval superiority over the British.16 The Confederacy contin-
ued to attempt to obtain iron-armored vessels from Europe after the failure to
purchase the Gloire. Agents were instructed to have iron warships built instead
of attempting to buy existing ones. These vessels were to be built with their own-
erships, as well as purposes, cloaked in ambiguity. Historian Warren Spencer de-
scribed the procedures of one Confederate agent, Commander James Bulloch:
Bulloch contracted as an individual for an unarmed ship to be delivered in Liverpool. It
was, in his words, a “purely commercial transaction” and the Lairds never knew from
Bulloch that he was acting for the Confederate government. . . . Furthermore, Bulloch
reserved the right to make changes in the structure “as experience during the progress
of the work may suggest.” This stipulation was a concession to the ever-changing tech-
nology of ironclad ship architecture and allowed Bulloch to take advantage of any new
developments that might emerge within the next several months.17
Two rams and another iron warship were to form the nucleus of a Confederate
fleet designed to sweep away the blockaders and challenge northern supremacy
in American waters. At one point, the Confederacy had ten warships of varying
size and armor under contract.18 Two Confederate naval officers, Bulloch and
Commodore Samuel Barron, hoped to engage the Union fleet with the vessels
being built in Europe.
Their hopes may have been overly optimistic. The two rams that were built
under Bulloch’s direct supervision (known as the “Laird rams”) were originally
intended to be able to navigate inland waters as well as the Atlantic. Therefore,
they had shallow drafts and rode low in the water; while they were more seawor-
thy than many of the northern ironclads, their weatherly qualities were dubious.
Indeed, after the rams were “sold” to the British in order to forestall outright
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confiscation, they were primarily used for harbor defense and not for cruising
the high seas.
An ironclad built under Confederate commander James North’s auspices was
larger than the Laird rams, thereby rendering it unable to participate in shallow-water
actions.19 Moreover, even though the vessel was intended to be an oceangoing
vessel, its seaworthiness was poor, as its eventual owner, the Danish navy, found
in its maiden cruise. Spencer concludes,
Had James North managed by some miracle to get [the warship] to sea, his luck and
the ship’s undesirable qualities probably would have brought disaster to the Southern
cause and probably would have covered his name not with glory but with ignominy.
It was his good luck and the South’s good fortune, then, to have been caught in the
squeeze of the British-tightened neutrality . . . and to have sold the vessel to the
Danes. In this way only the Danes were the losers.20
Spencer concludes that while the rams, in conjunction with the other vessels
being constructed in Europe (had all successfully traversed the Atlantic), would
have been “exceedingly troublesome” to the Federal navy, the likelihood of their
controlling the American waters was small.21
Confederate efforts to obtain European-built warships were also plagued by
financial difficulties. As early as July 1861, Mallory was complaining about the
lack of funds. The Laird rams were priced at a little less than a hundred thousand
pounds each, while North’s larger warship was roughly double that. The depre-
ciating Confederate currency made payment more difficult, and Commander
North had to request ever-larger sums.22
However, the Confederate navy had never been given munificent funds to
work with. During the first eighteen months of the war, the Confederate govern-
ment spent $347,272,958, of which only $14,605,777 went to the navy. The Navy
Department did not even have direct access to what little money it was allocated;
it had to apply to the Treasury Department for its funds, which incurred delay
and inconvenience.23 The generosity of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, a British
financial firm, was vital to James Bulloch in his initial purchases in Britain; the
firm extended credit to enable Bulloch to begin obtaining commerce cruisers
and naval supplies in June 1861. While some British shipbuilders were also will-
ing to grant the Confederacy credit, eventually the shortage of funds proved an
embarrassment for Bulloch; James North, too, complained about the lack of
funds. Despite the sympathy of certain British businessmen for the Confederacy,
the lack of funds early in the war probably prevented the Confederacy from get-
ting more commerce raiders and even some warships.24
The Confederate navy’s attempts to get European-built warships, then,
were largely futile. Aside from some commerce raiders and one ironclad
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warship, the CSS Stonewall (which never reached a Confederate port by the end
of the war), the Confederacy was unable to augment its naval power with
European-built warships.
The Confederacy failed, narrowly in several instances, to wrest even tempo-
rary control of important American waters, despite vigorous efforts to obtain a
strong navy. For various reasons, the Confederacy was forced to rely upon do-
mestic resources in building its navy during the crucial first year of the war. In
many cases, the Confederate efforts simply ran out
of time, as the lack of iron plating, machinery,
skilled labor, and other resources delayed construc-
tion of what could have been formidable warships.
Indeed, time may have been the key resource for
the Confederacy. The autumn of 1861 was the best
chance for the Confederacy to gain effective con-
trol of southern waters: only three Union
“timberclads” patrolled the western rivers, and the
blockade was only beginning to become effective.
But early in 1862, a new factor emerged to suppress
the Confederate chances of gaining maritime su-
periority: the Union navy.
The Union fleet helped stunt the embryonic
Confederate force. By blockading the mouth of the Mississippi River, the Feder-
als forced the New Orleans shipbuilders to transport iron and machinery from
Virginia and the eastern Confederacy by rail; the rickety Confederate railroad
proved inadequate for the task. Also, the blockade depressed southern revenue
from exports of raw cotton and raised import costs, thereby stymieing pur-
chases and imports of iron plating and machinery. Thus, the Federal navy’s
blockade became a form of self-preservation, as a weak effort would have eased
the South’s difficulties in constructing or obtaining a strong navy and then
sweeping away the blockaders. The stronger the Federal blockade, the more dif-
ficult for the Confederacy to contest Union sea power, specifically the blockade.
In addition, the Federal navy’s capture of New Orleans and Memphis eliminated
two key Confederate shipbuilding centers.
Despite Mallory’s strenuous efforts, which came close to succeeding, did the
Confederates and Mallory make the best use of their resources, especially that of
time? Could they have done better, and if so, why did they not?
WHY THE CONFEDERACY FAILED TO OBTAIN A STRONGER NAVY
The Confederacy ran out of time to build a stronger navy. It was also forced to
rely upon inadequate domestic resources when its attempts to get warships from
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Europe failed. This section examines some of the crucial decisions that affected
the Confederate naval buildup. It concludes with what might have been a solu-
tion to the fatal delay in obtaining warships.
Most of the deep South seceded in early 1861. Several weeks elapsed before
the Fort Sumter episode triggered the war. Although the Confederate govern-
ment was beginning to organize, the young country might have immediately
started to acquire a navy. The Confederates could have claimed that acquiring
warships was not a hostile action but simply the action of an independent coun-
try seeking to protect its ports and waters.25 An early acquisition of European-built
warships might also have avoided the neutrality issue raised after the war began,
as prior to Fort Sumter the Confederates could have more freely contracted with
European shipbuilders to construct warships than they could afterward. The
Confederates might have opted to purchase and import naval supplies such as
machinery and iron plating before the war and its attendant blockade. Did the
Confederates make good use of the prewar period?
Mallory wasted little time in attempting to obtain steamers for the nascent
Confederate navy. In March 1861, he submitted estimates of the cost of ten
coastal defense steamers ($1,100,000 for all ten vessels). In late March and early
April, he dispatched agents to Canada, the northern states, and throughout the
Confederacy to purchase steamers that could be converted to warships. In early
May, Mallory dispatched James Bulloch to Great Britain; Bulloch’s mission was
to obtain six steam vessels for commerce raiding. At the same time, Mallory sent
James North to Europe to purchase ironclad warships. The Confederate Con-
gress accepted Mallory’s estimate of costs for the vessels and authorized a mil-
lion dollars for the commerce raiders and two million dollars for the warships.
North reported lack of success, but Mallory ordered him to redouble his efforts
throughout the fall of 1861 and early 1862. Bulloch, too, was initially unsuccess-
ful in purchasing any ironclads in England;26 however, in February 1862, Mallory’s
hopes for obtaining European-built ironclads rose. He reported to Davis that
very recent information . . . induces the belief that one such vessel may now be con-
tracted for in France and one in England, but I have not been able to ascertain at
what cost or within what time they could be completed or whether we would be per-
mitted to fit the vessels out in any European port. Upon this subject a special agent
was sent to England recently.27
In early 1862, North reported to Mallory that “anything can be done here for
money,” but he continued to be slothful in obtaining warships. Finally, he re-
ported that he had arranged for a large ironclad warship for £200,000. Mallory
and Davis requested funds for North and Bulloch’s proposed ironclads; the Con-
gress approved the money in April 1862.28
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Clearly, then, Mallory displayed energy in attempting to obtain warships. De-
spite his energy, the results were disappointing. Were some of the Confederate
government’s efforts, and his own, misguided?29 The decisions early in the war to
launch privateers and commerce raiders, to enact a cotton embargo, and to rely
upon European-built warships were crucial to Confederate naval success or fail-
ure. These decisions were fraught with uncertainty.
Privateering and commerce raiding were supposed to disrupt the northern
economy and draw Federal warships from their blockading duties, weakening
the blockade. Jefferson Davis’s decision to rely upon privateering, and later com-
merce raiders, was based partly upon the Confederate belief that European pow-
ers would intervene. The Confederates thought that European intervention
would come soon, reducing the need for a strong Confederate navy.
Privateering failed, because the European nations’ interpretations of neu-
trality laws forbade bringing captured prizes to neutral ports. With the Federal
blockade making it difficult to deliver prizes to southern ports, the privateers
had nowhere to take their prizes and to reap the financial rewards.30 When the
privateering program collapsed, Mallory promoted a “Provisional Navy,” com-
prising Confederate naval officers and warships, that would prey upon northern
shipping. Although privateering and commerce raiding succeeded in driving
many northern shippers to transfer their registries, the northern economy was
not unduly disrupted, nor did the Federals detach many ships from blockade
duties in pursuit of the commerce raiders. The failure of the privateers and
commerce raiders to draw off blockading vessels was due to a dichotomy be-
tween vessels suitable for
blockading in the shallow
coastal waters and those
suitable for “blue water”
endeavors, such as pursu-
ing commerce raiders. The
blue-water warships were
generally unsuited for blockade duty, so the indirect approach represented by
the privateers and commerce raiders failed to raise the blockade.31
Privateering and commerce raiding, however, had three deleterious effects
upon Confederate naval strength. First, privateering and commerce raiding
antagonized many Europeans, particularly members of commercial and ship-
ping classes. Bulloch reported that “the feeling everywhere in Europe is strongly
against the simple destruction of private property at sea . . . and the cruise of the
[cruiser] Sumter . . . has tended to incite some feeling against us among the com-
mercial classes of Europe.”32
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The British, recalling the depredations of American raiders during the Revo-
lutionary War and the War of 1812, were especially cool toward commerce raid-
ing. Second, given the limited funds and time available to Confederate agents,
expenditures upon the flamboyant commerce raiders meant less purchasing
power and time for obtaining regular warships or naval supplies. Third, the
northern outcry regarding the depredations of British-built commerce raiders
eventually caused the British, and later the French, to tighten their interpreta-
tions of their responsibilities as neutrals. By the time the Confederates suc-
ceeded in making contracts for armored warships, the tightened neutrality
enforcement prevented them from getting them to sea.
Though it boosted morale within the Confederacy and discomfited northern
shippers, the policy of relying upon privateers and commerce raiders exacted a
high price in terms of a Confederate naval buildup. The financial resources,
time, and energy spent in obtaining raiders would have been better spent in ob-
taining naval construction supplies or European-built warships that could have
engaged Union warships.
Another decision confronted the Confederacy in autumn 1861. The South
considered its price-setting power in the market for raw cotton a strong strategic
weapon. How best to use raw cotton to secure southern goals, however, was a
daunting question. Southerners had long boasted that by withholding “King
Cotton” they could drive the European powers and the North to their knees;
therefore, many believed an embargo was the best way to use raw cotton as a
strategic weapon. However, the South might have been mistaken about King
Cotton’s real power. In retrospect, the unofficial embargo of late 1861 appears to
have been the wrong choice, especially in that it did not inspire European inter-
vention. In some ways, late 1861 proved decisive in this respect: the Confederacy
needed to establish credit in Europe at that point, and cotton was the fledgling
nation’s best asset.
Although some historians believe that 1861–62 would have been a poor time
for Southerners, staying in the world raw-cotton market, to have used their col-
lective price-setting power (by continuing to export cotton, albeit in smaller
quantities—but for higher prices), an examination of that market casts doubts
on this thesis.33 The Confederate government might have obtained cotton via
purchase or loans and shipped as much as it could through the still-developing
blockade. The Confederacy’s enhanced purchasing power would have enabled it
to purchase greater amounts of war materiel and to ship such supplies through
the still relatively weak blockade, at lower transportation costs than were in-
curred later in the war. Thus, the Confederacy could have entered the second
year of the war in a stronger position than it actually did, having embargoed ex-
ports of raw cotton. While this scenario presupposes that shipping would have
1 1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
122
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 27
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/27
become available to transport cotton, the loss of northern shipping might have
been offset by foreign vessels responding to rising freights.
Moreover, encouraging foreign shippers to pick up raw cotton carried an ex-
tra benefit: constant harassment or detention by Union warships of foreign mer-
chantmen might have created a pressure for those governments to act. Further,
the export of large amounts of raw cotton would have undermined the Union’s
assertion that its blockade was effective, and an erosion in the perceived effec-
tiveness of the Union blockade might have swayed the Europeans toward inter-
vention, or at least repudiation of the blockade’s legality. Another compelling
reason for not implementing an embargo was that a potential shortage of raw
cotton could be better used as a standing threat; as it was, the embargo gradually
forced the British to learn to survive without southern raw cotton, and the value
of any such potential threat dissipated. The Southerners might have been better
off keeping the British and French manufacturers in a state of fearful ignorance
of the ramifications of a possible cutoff. By shipping raw cotton, the Confeder-
acy would have put the onus of any shortage upon the North. The Confederates
could have pointed to the Union’s blockade as the cause of European economic
dislocation. Finally, a free trade policy would have created better feelings be-
tween the Confederacy and the Europeans.
Therefore, the informal embargo on the export of raw cotton hobbled the
southern economy, incurred the anger of Europeans, and did not induce inter-
vention. Once the northern blockade became stringent, the Southerners’ oppor-
tunity to exploit price-setting power in the world market for King Cotton
slipped away. The Confederacy and its naval buildup would have been better off
without the embargo.
As we have briefly noted, shifting European interpretations of neutrality laws
confounded the Confederates. Aside from some commerce raiders, only one of
the European-built warships earmarked for the Confederacy ever sailed under
the Stars and Bars, because the Europeans developed a narrow interpretation of
their neutrality responsibilities.34 Mallory had instructed his agents to be scru-
pulous in observing European neutrality. International law seemingly allowed
neutrals to build seagoing vessels for belligerents as long as the vessels were not
armed in the neutrals’ ports; Mallory relied upon this interpretation. Unfortu-
nately for his efforts to purchase warships, the British (and later the French)
eventually decided to interpret their neutrality as covering any vessel that could
reasonably be used as a warship, even if not armed in that country.
As early as April 1862, Bulloch warned Mallory about the changing British at-
titudes, but the Confederate authorities were slow in recognizing the shift.
Bulloch wrote, “The British government seems to be more determined than ever
to preserve its neutrality, and the chances of getting a vessel to sea in anything
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like fighting condition are next to impossible.”35 Mallory preferred to believe
that the escape of the British-built commerce raiders was a truer indication of
British interpretation of their neutrality obligations. Certainly, the Confederates
received mixed signals from their diplomatic and naval personnel. Several ex-
pressed their belief in early 1862 that recognition or at least an easing of the neu-
trality laws was imminent.36 Based on these reports, Mallory renewed the efforts
to purchase European-built warships.
While Mallory’s decision did not result in success, it was an understandable
one. European-built warships promised to be better than any Confederate-built
vessel. In addition, given Europe’s comparative advantage in building warships,
less time would probably have been needed to acquire European vessels than to
build them. Gambling upon European assistance may have been prudent, espe-
cially early in the war.
As the war continued, however, the prospects that the Europeans would
recognize the Confederacy—or even connive at building warships for the Con-
federates—depended upon their estimations of eventual Confederate military
success. By quickly acquiring European-built warships, the Confederacy might
have forestalled Union naval victories, strengthened its bid for recognition, and
increased the Europeans’ willingness to supply additional warships. Because the
Confederacy suffered major defeats in the western theater during early 1862, Eu-
ropean enthusiasm for intervention and recognition diminished, and the Euro-
peans were more willing to tighten their neutrality rules when pressed by
Washington. Ultimately, European recognition of Confederate independence
and tacit permission for warships to sail from their ports proved elusive.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the recurrent hopes of purchasing ironclads
in Europe may have delayed the eventual decision to build ironclads domesti-
cally; the two ironclads at New Orleans were authorized only in September 1861,
after the attempts to purchase European-built warships failed.37 In retrospect,
the Confederates might have been better off not basing their actions on the hope
of European recognition and intervention. This view is borne out by the assess-
ment by Judah Benjamin, the Confederate secretary of state, of the value of
Louis Napoleon’s professions of friendship with the Confederacy:
The Emperor of the French, after having himself suggested and promised acquies-
cence in the attempt of this Government to obtain vessels of war by purchase or con-
tract in France, after encouraging us in the loss of invaluable time and of the service
of some of our best naval officers, as well as in expenditure of large sums obtained at
painful sacrifice, has broken his faith, has deprived us of our vessels when on the eve
of completion, and has thus inflicted on us an injury and rendered to our enemies
services which establish his claim to any concessions that he may desire from them.38
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Given the difficulties faced by Confederate builders in the South and Confed-
erate naval officers in Europe in securing sufficient warships for the Confeder-
acy, was there another way to build Confederate naval strength? Bulloch advised
that the shipbuilding efforts in Europe should be suspended in favor of domestic
shipbuilding. He suggested that the South, with its ample timber resources, im-
port iron plates from Europe: “Vessels [should] be laid down at once, at the vari-
ous ports in the Confederacy where timber is abundant, then by sending over
scale drawings or working plans of their decks and sides, the iron plates, rivets,
bolts, etc., could be made here, marked, and shipped to arrive as soon as the ves-
sels would be ready to receive them.”39
Europe, of course, possessed greater capabilities for manufacturing iron
plates than did the South. In addition, Mallory knew as early as May 1861 that
the Confederacy would have difficulty producing them. The imported iron
plates would have enabled the Confederacy to quicken the pace of shipbuilding,
while conserving the scarce iron held in the Confederacy. The Confederates
could have also more easily imported shipboard machinery earlier in the war.
Further, the plan would have eased the dilemma posed by British and French
neutrality (inherent in obtaining warships from Europe), as the importation of
iron and machinery was less controversial than the purchase of entire warships.
The shipping of iron plates and machinery would have also avoided the diffi-
culty of making European-built iron-armored vessels seaworthy enough to nav-
igate the Atlantic and yet shallow enough in draft for coastal waters.40 Finally,
Bulloch’s original plan would have precluded the disappointments suffered by
the Confederacy when their ships were seized by British and French authorities
under neutrality rulings.
Thus, even as late as fall 1861, given sufficient purchasing power and the abil-
ity to import rolled iron and machinery through the still-developing blockade,
the Confederacy could have obtained more materials to alleviate the shortages
and to build enough ships domestically to contest the Union navy’s control of
the American waters. The key would have been to obtain the iron plating and
machinery both to speed construction of the Virginia and other ironclads and to
improve these vessels’ quality.
While, even with foreign help, the Confederacy was unlikely to win a pro-
longed ironclad arms race with the North, it could have hoped to gain at least
some localized superiority by early 1862; such an advantage might have per-
sisted through mid-1862 and have created sufficient consternation further to
discomfit the fragile northern political coalition. In retrospect, Bulloch’s plan to
ship iron plates and machinery looks astute; it could have improved the Confed-
erate navy, especially had the attempt been made early in the war before the
Union navy’s blockade became stringent.
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FORESIGHT, SKILL, AND A LITTLE LUCK
The Confederate States of America failed to field a navy strong enough to gain
superiority on the American waters; specifically, the South never completed
enough ironclads to wrest control of the American waterways. The domestically
built ironclad was not a total strategic failure: the presence of the ironclad Ten-
nessee in Mobile Bay delayed Admiral Farragut’s attack until northern ironclads
could leave their posts in the Atlantic; the ironclads in Charleston, Wilmington
(North Carolina), and Savannah—including the CSS Atlanta, Chicora, North
Carolina, Palmetto State, and Raleigh—also helped delay Federal attacks, keep-
ing these ports open for Confederate blockade runners.41 Still, both the domestic
building and foreign purchasing endeavors failed to net enough warships.
The reasons for the failures are not hard to discern: insufficient domestic re-
sources; inadequate financial clout in Europe; tightening interpretations of
neutrality by European powers; and perhaps a lack of vision by Confederate
leaders. Many of these deficiencies can be traced to a set of decisions. First, the
Confederate leaders’ acquiescence in the informal embargo on raw cotton hurt
southern purchasing power. Second, the initial reliance upon privateering and
commerce raiding gave the Confederacy little advantage and diverted the Con-
federate navy’s energy and resources from obtaining ironclad warships; also, the
purchase of European-built commerce raiders contributed to the Europeans’
tightening of neutrality rules so as to prevent the Confederacy from obtaining
ironclad warships. Third, the early decision to rely upon European-built war-
ships proved wasteful in terms of time, energy, and
purchasing power, and the unrealized hopes for such
warships may have delayed domestic construction of
ironclads. Fourth, the delay in importing naval sup-
plies during late 1861 before the blockade became
fully effective forced the Confederate navy to rely
upon the South’s inadequate domestic resources.
The first three decisions certainly rested upon the
perception that quick European recognition and in-
tervention were likely. While this perception proved
erroneous, it was not necessarily unreasonable. Some
historians believe that the Confederates were on the verge of gaining European
recognition or intervention (by mediation perhaps); if so, even a moderately
stronger Confederate navy might have precluded certain key Federal victories in
spring 1862 and triggered such intervention or recognition.
Nonetheless, there was an opportunity for the South during the fall and win-
ter of 1861–62 to export more cotton before the blockade became too effective.
The South’s increased purchasing power could have enabled it both to obtain
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sufficient iron plating and machinery to build rapidly several ironclads and to
reduce the disruption to its economy caused by the Federal blockade. The pur-
chase of European-built warships was more feasible earlier in the war as well,
before the British and French governments tightened their policies on building
vessels destined to become warships for belligerents. Concentrating upon regu-
lar warships, particularly ironclads, rather than commerce raiders early on
might have been more fruitful too. The prospects for a strong Confederate navy
depended upon correct divinations by Davis and Mallory of European attitudes.
Immediately and energetically pursuing ironclads or other warships in Europe,
if such an opportunity arose, and promptly importing iron plating and machin-
ery to bolster domestic construction, may have involved too much prescience to
ask of any leader, much less those involved in creating a new country and navy.
Even had Davis and Mallory succeeded in their endeavors, we need to ask
whether the Federals could have matched and forestalled them. Clearly, had
Welles and Lincoln immediately implemented an ironclad construction pro-
gram in early April or May 1861, the North might have rapidly built several and
swamped the fledgling Confederate navy. As we have seen, though, Welles had
reason to proceed cautiously. Indeed, although the Federals were aware in late
1861 of Confederate ironclad-building efforts at Memphis, New Orleans, and
Norfolk, they reacted only belatedly and in a limited way: only three ironclads
were begun by the Federal navy. The major buildup occurred after the Virginia
and the Monitor showed their worth. If the Northerners lacked an immediate ca-
pacity to roll the requisite iron plating, they would have had an easier time pur-
chasing and importing English-produced iron plating than the Confederates
did. Certainly anything the Confederacy could do in the way of industry or over-
seas trade, the North could have done better. As it was, the North gave the Con-
federacy a head start, albeit a brief one, in procuring ironclads.
The Federal failure to destroy thoroughly the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk
was another significant mistake. The naval ordnance enabled the Confederates to
arm and defend their seacoast and inland ports, hindering the Federal navy’s
blockade and its attempts to capture those ports. The partially destroyed Merrimack
at Norfolk, of course, was a godsend for the nascent Confederate navy, as was the
shipyard’s huge dry dock. Had the Confederates been denied these assets, their at-
tempts to obtain a strong navy would have been further impaired.
Finally, the Union navy and army might have more aggressively attempted to
capture key Confederate ports earlier in the war. Such endeavors were some-
times delayed while troops were scraped together from parsimonious army
commanders. As we have seen, the capture of New Orleans, Memphis, and Nor-
folk severely reduced the Confederacy’s ability to build warships domestically or
export staple products to Europe.
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Union naval superiority proved decisive in the war, but the North came peril-
ously close to forfeiting, at least temporarily, its advantage. Mallory reacted
creditably, by attempting to build a strong Confederate navy, but Jefferson Davis
might have been more aggressive in pushing the Confederate Congress to sup-
port his secretary’s efforts.42 Still, if Davis and Mallory depended too much upon
the hope of European intervention or connivance in supplying warships for the
Confederacy, their error was, as we have seen, based upon not-unreasonable
foundations. The delay and ultimate failure in obtaining European-produced
iron plating and machinery was a less excusable mistake, for Mallory knew early
in the war that the Confederacy was deficient in its ability to produce such com-
modities. Still, while it is possible that Mallory and Davis could have done better
in building the Confederate navy, it also seems possible that other leaders in
their places could have done much worse. A strong Confederate navy was not a
chimera, but it would have required extraordinary foresight and skill, and per-
haps not a little luck, to transform into reality.
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SET AND DRIFT
NAVAL FORCE IN THE NEW CENTURY
Joseph A. Gattuso, Jr., and Lori J. Tanner
It is 1890.1 The United States is flexing its broad, young shoulders, strengthened
by an infusion of new immigrants, new technologies, and by American political
leadership that represents the growing nation’s outward-looking perspective.
The United States desires to play on the world stage along with the great imperial
nations. However, naval leadership has a different viewpoint. It is content with
its small, coastal, commerce-raiding, Jeffersonian fleet. Then along comes a reti-
cent, unlikable naval captain of middling reputation who captures the nation’s
imagination with his plan for a navy that will do battle at sea upon the great
world stage. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power perfectly matches the
nation’s vision of itself. What about the naval hierarchy? They exile Mahan to
sea, noting in his fitness report that naval officers should not concern themselves
with writing books. As it turns out, the Navy’s leadership will be dragged kicking
and screaming into the twentieth century, down the path Mahan predicted.
It is 1922. The United States has fought the war to end all wars. The political
leadership, again representing the nation’s view of the world, evinces a desire to
retrench, to pull back from international involvement. The Navy, however,
imagines a forward-leaning, internationally involved nation, with fleets of bat-
tleships leading the way. Its views are so mismatched with those of the govern-
ment that the political leadership effectively excludes the Navy from meaningful
participation in the Washington Naval Treaty—an event that would have signifi-
cant implications for the Navy’s force structure in the next world war.
It is 1947. U.S. political leadership has one picture of how it wants to project
power, and once again the Navy has another. The admirals revolt—with predict-
able consequences. The Navy loses a significant portion of its leadership as the
world enters the Cold War, and it suffers a loss of political clout and a degraded
reputation among the American public.
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It is 1970. The nation is in the throes of sweeping change. The Navy struggles
to match its missions to the international environment, but for the first time it
encounters the “gasoline fuel in the diesel engine” dilemma. Its organizational
structure is ill matched to social input and ill prepared for the rapid shift in the
political foundations of the country. It sputters and becomes a hollow force.
What do all these periods have in common? Just this—that the Navy’s picture
of the world, or what Edward Rhodes calls its “cultural-cognitive framework,”
did not match that of the political leadership. This mismatch, whenever it oc-
curs, has disastrous consequences for the Navy and the public it serves. The
United States is now approaching a similar period in history. This time, however,
the problem is shaping up to be not only a strategic mismatch but one of tech-
nology and organizational structure as well. In light of these three critical fault
lines, the Navy’s perch at the dawn of the new century is a precarious one.
THE STRATEGIC MISMATCH
The Navy operated in a Cold War international system from 1947 until the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989. Most strategic observers agree that globalization (to
varying degrees) is now the emerging international system. We have seen global-
ization before, but never with the pervasiveness or intensity of today. To form a
clear picture of the ramifications of globalization for military organizations,
compare the Cold War international system of well defined geographic bound-
aries to globalization’s rabid need to eliminate borders. The fundamental oper-
ating paradigm (at least for the West) of the Cold War–constrained capitalism
was embodied in two words—“Stop communism”—while the fundamental op-
erating premise of globalism is to spread democratic, free market capitalism.
The Cold War put a premium on separatism, maintaining the status quo, stabil-
ity, and tradition; the key character traits of a globalistic international system are
speed, innovation, chaos, and “churn.” The Cold War had its own ideologies, de-
mographics, technologies, and politics that formed particular domestic policies,
foreign relations, economic policies, and military structures. Militaries of the
Cold War period were noted for their weight, mass, technology, and firepower;
their fundamental raison d’être was pure and simple—destruction. Globaliza-
tion has its own ideologies, demographics, technologies, and politics, which
form different domestic and foreign relations frameworks, technologies, and
economic policies.
But wait—we still have a Cold War military structure, with the same
raison d’être.
There is a lethal tension within globalism that will determine the roles and
missions of future forces. Those who consider economic prosperity the best
hope for global stability will bring immense pressure to bear to ensure
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unimpeded access to economic markets on a global scale. But others consider
family, tribe, race, religion, or the environment to be inviolate values. The
global economy, indigenous cultures, the environment, and international
crime are “globally sovereign issues” that threaten the entire planet if not prop-
erly addressed.2 Watch for the phrase “The New Security Agenda,” which em-
bodies this new philosophy.
In the past, the successful nations were those who best tailored force structures
to meet political objectives. There has always been a duality in conflict: due to
the very nature of divergent political objectives and the unlikelihood of fright-
ening global consequences should one ideology meet its demise, someone would
win, and usually someone would lose. However, this period of globalization is
different. The future global community will have to tailor its forces to meet new,
worldwide political objectives. The planet is just about filled up, and globalism
puts a dangerous twist on the old zero-sum political game. For perhaps the first
time in history, mankind will dis-
cover that if any one ideology wins,
everyone might lose. If the global
economist succeeds in overpowering
the environment, no one will have a
place to live. If the environmentalist
succeeds in imposing excessive controls, the poor in many nations may remain
poor, and without jobs they will destroy the environment so they can eat.3 If the
monoculturalistic steamroller of globalism sweeps away even one culture,
somewhere on the globe, it may take only one disgruntled idealist to cause mas-
sive human destruction or ruin environmental resources. If issues of national
sovereignty impede the fight against international crime, that crime may soon
erode all nations. If issues of national sovereignty become licenses to commit
crimes against humanity, rampant global conflict may result as neighbors get
nervous and intervene militarily, igniting a worldwide domino effect—in the
global village, everyone is your neighbor.
Typically it has always been one side against another, but in a global vil-
lage, there is only one side. What, then, should forces that are designed to
look after security and defense be about? More to the point, what defines “se-
curity and defense”?
Within the United States there is one common thread to that definition, one
thing the American public will not suffer—a threat to its personal prosperity. In
America and much of the world, that is what the public will fight for, and it is
certainly what it votes for. Thus the question of roles and missions for future
forces must occur within a framework that has little to do with any issue of na-
tional sovereignty (observe the presidential candidacy polls in 2000 for Mr. Pat
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Buchanan). America has a global economy that is currently generating the great-
est economic boom in its history. Purely national interests no longer define the
American public’s emerging desires; securing what it wants will mean securing
the global economy. There’s the rub.
The global economy might best be described as “biological imperialism.”
There is no central point of control. One and a half trillion dollars move around
the world every twenty-four hours, driven by the interests of a wide range of
global investors. These investors vote every minute, not every four years. Gov-
ernments are finding their internal freedoms and political latitude restricted as
they are compelled to establish certain economic or political policies to stay
plugged into the massive flow of investment capital. If they do stay plugged in,
they get rich; if they do not, they get poor—very quickly. This biologically impe-
rial globalistic economy grows on the opportunities it chaotically creates by and
for itself.
Empires have three basic needs: expansion, trade, and security. In today’s in-
terconnected world, the global economy will demand the same. Why? Wherever
in history an economic system has sprung up and flourished, shortly thereafter a
military force has appeared to secure that system. Therefore, in a global econ-
omy, one expects that a military force (perhaps not a global force, but most likely
one with globalistic priorities rather than national ones) will appear to protect it.
The missions of a future global force can be found in three straightforward
goals. First, a naval force for the future will be required to further the expansion
of the global economy, most probably by creating or fostering, wherever it goes
and in whatever it does, an environment conducive to globalization. Second, sea
power (on the sea or not) will be needed to ensure the openness of trade every-
where around the globe; it is a global economy primarily because goods can be
shipped anywhere in the world by water, at insignificant cost. Third, ensuring
free trade will mean ensuring communications. Force may be needed to disrupt
or deny systems or infrastructures—not blow them up, since someone will have
to pay to replace what gets blown up, and in our connected global economy that
means anyone who has any investments whatsoever in any country. Sea power
may also be required to “stand up” an on-scene, ad hoc financial system to main-
tain a crisis region’s economy, or to ensure the fair and humanitarian application
of embargoes and sanctions.
Security for such an economy will require a vastly different approach than
our current one envisions or permits. Force in the new century must secure
globally sovereign issues, which will mean much more than what we now think of
as things military. It means a force connected to global expertise in economics,
politics, the environment, culture, civic infrastructure, science and technology,
and, not to forget, defense.
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The strategic environment of nations determines the nature and demands of
their national security requirements—nations being essentially the “customers”
for any forces charged with their security. The old international system (the old
customer, collectively) demanded a certain type of military force. Well, the cus-
tomers are changing, and they want different things. Somalia, Kosovo, and East
Timor are pregnant with significance for those responsible for force structure.
The convocation of nations in a global society no longer wants forces that will
blow up things and wreak economic, environmental, and political havoc with
neighbors.4 Just like any other customer, nations will get what they need where
they can. America has no monopoly in this market; in fact, its current defense
product does not appear to be shaping up to meet this emerging need.5
THE TECHNOLOGY MISMATCH
The weapon systems in today’s military were conceived, designed, and devel-
oped during the industrial age. They no longer match the networked world. In
network environments, mass of any kind tends to become a target. The econom-
ics of leveraging dumb power will drive those who depend upon high-cost,
cumbersomely complex technology right into the fiscal dirt.6 Aircraft carriers
are today’s battleships—national treasures that may become too valuable to risk
when some Osama Bin Laden figures out (soon) how to do them in, with any
one of a number of asymmetric strategies. More probably, the carrier will be-
come obsolete because of its aircraft. Weapon systems today that shoot down
manned aircraft are dependent upon technologies that are advancing much
faster than the aircraft themselves. Precision guided weapons—which are what
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems are—depend upon computer, sensor,
network, miniaturization, and communications technologies. Aircraft depend
upon material and propulsion technologies, and their greatest limitation is the
need for a human-friendly environment.
Which group of technologies is progressing faster? One day soon, in a cul-
tural battle, someone will no longer wish to put up with arrogant Western over-
flights. Some nation or group will buy a few “sons of SA-10” that can be fired by
connectivity between cell phones, laptops, and a department-store telescope.
The United States will launch a few F/A-18E aircraft (remarkably procured on
time, on budget, and under weight), with their (equally remarkable) joint stand-
off weapon or joint direct-attack munitions, to blow up a bridge, probably, and
not one of them will come back. U.S. air forces of every service have already con-
ceded air superiority to certain SAM systems. Who do we think will get better
faster?7 The United States is making a few well-armored knights, and they will
face a forest full of peasants with longbows.
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Cruise missiles will replace manned aircraft and sink the ships that carry
them. This is both good and bad news for the DD 21 crowd. Yes, the advocates of
that advanced new destroyer program will probably see the strike role migrate to
their platform, because foreign adversaries will have SAM systems that manned
aircraft cannot approach (after some “Pearl Harbor” event for manned aircraft).
Unfortunately, those adversaries will probably also invest in surface-to-surface
missiles as capable as the air variety; those big floating pieces of metal, no matter
how high-tech, snazzy, or expensive, will be in dangerous waters.
It is interesting to note that unmanned aircraft, smaller than current surface-
to-air missiles, will take over the role of manned aircraft in the same way that air-
craft usurped that of the battleship.8 The future for big metal ships is less clear,
but it may be along the same lines.
The U.S. Navy recognized in the 1920s that it needed to develop new aviation
technology. It assigned Admiral William Moffett the task of developing not only
the technology but the organiza-
tional structure, doctrine, and cul-
ture that would enable the new
technology to come to fruition. So
far, naval aviation has not shown the
foresight that once enabled its own heritage. Unmanned airborne vehicles
(UAVs) and unmanned combat airborne vehicles (UCAVs) are now accurately
described as “redheaded stepchildren” in the bottom-line pecking order of
funding. The danger here is that carriers and their aircraft constitute a senile
weapon system, rapidly approaching obsolescence. Over fifty years ago, U.S. na-
val aviation was ready with a powerful, and young but eager force, when the
“Gun Club”—the battleship admirals—woke up to find their champions in the
mud at Pearl Harbor. It is not so with the UCAV world. The gap between the se-
nility of U.S. naval aviation’s force structure and the vitality of unmanned
forces is dangerously large. Given the U.S. industrial-age acquisition system, the
Navy’s shortsightedness may very well degrade national security.
Missions designed to secure sovereign interests will demand much that manned
aircraft are unable to do. Aircraft will need to stay airborne for days on end, go-
ing where perhaps manned aircraft cannot, to places where we do not wish to
risk human lives. Today naval aviation’s power is largely limited to the single
venue of the aircraft carrier, and even that niche is rapidly dwindling as cruise
missiles take a bigger chunk of the market. UAVs and UCAVs would enable a
new force to gather information from, and act through, many more platforms.
Since a force designed to secure global interests must act globally, and since no
nation will have the resources to build the number of carriers the new century
will require, the answer must be to use something else. Money spent furthering
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manned aircraft technologies and programs—the CVNX (proposed
Nimitz-class carrier replacement) being one of them—is like polishing cannon-
balls so they will fly a little farther.
Current U.S. efforts in the direction of network-centric warfare (NCW) are
worth mention. I am reminded of two technicians standing in a room full of
completely integrated nuts, bolts, screws, and parts. “Well,” says one, “we’ve fi-
nally made everything connect to everything else.” “That’s right,” says the other,
“but what do we build now?” The Navy’s current approach to NCW is properly
described as platform-centric; there is a focus on the platform, not the quality of
the network. The Navy’s expertise resident in its networks is based entirely on
Cold War mentality—a hope to do the same things faster and more precisely by
tying the players together with computers.9 The Navy must recognize that the
expertise residing within a network is more important than the design of the
network’s nodes, and that the appropriate type of expertise is dependent upon
the customer’s needs. The Navy would be well advised to meet those needs be-
fore the customer goes elsewhere, and it should not look in its wake to do so.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE MISMATCH
Networks are the new world. Today’s U.S. industrial-age military places priori-
ties on things that information-age constituents just “don’t get” or even want
to. The current exodus of personnel from the military has nothing (and every-
thing) to do with pay, time away from home, operational tempo, or any other rea-
son we read about. The fundamental cause for the mass exit is that the military’s
industrial-age structure is now recruiting people who were raised in the digital
age and possess a completely different structure of values. In the networked
world, information—and therefore loyalty and dedication—diffuses. The re-
sults now being seen in personnel retention, budgetary pressures, maintenance
and parts levels, and operational performance should not be a surprise. The
Navy is using gasoline to run its diesel engine. The solution is simple but
hard—get a new engine that will match the available fuel.
Networked environments put a premium on innovation. Contrary to the
opinion voiced at the top levels, the majority of the Navy perceives that innova-
tion is discouraged within the organization, not encouraged. This might be ex-
plained by the fact that what passes for innovation in today’s Navy would have
been laudable in yesterday’s Cold War structure (the current naval leadership’s
“cultural-cognitive framework”) but to the digital worker-bees in the trenches,
the efforts are so meager compared to what the new environment demands as to
be laughable. Think about it. Who makes up and then runs current innovation ef-
forts, lieutenants or admirals? Who is in charge of formulating and then reporting
the lessons? Any organization rooted in maintaining tradition and the status quo
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will have a short life in the new world. If its leadership cannot keep up, then the or-
ganization, however skilled, dedicated, innovative, or self-sacrificing, will die.
Networked environments demand speed—speed of responsiveness, speed
of innovation, speed of organizational reactions. The Navy’s organizational
speed—the speed with which it creates new organizational structures; con-
ceives, designs, develops, and acquires new weapon systems; or reacts to the
external cultural-cognitive framework of national or global leaders—is
dangerously out of synch with that of other institutions. Even more dangerous
is the tendency to use current organizational structures and solutions to bring
a b o u t r a d i c a l , r e vo l u t i o n a r y
change. It is dangerous for two rea-
sons. One, it gives the organization’s
leaders the impression that they are
“doing something,” which causes
complacency; two, assets expended on “doing something” are assets that could
have been used along more productive, more innovative vectors. To survive the
vast disruption caused by the shifting foundations of our new world, organiza-
tions must deconstruct and then remake themselves into something new that
may not resemble the originals at all. Fatal to most organizations in such a situa-
tion is the fact that those who are most adept at maintaining the status quo are
the last ones to spearhead creative deconstruction and reconstruction efforts.
“Fair-haired,” fast-track players need not apply; get the trouble-making maver-
icks. If the Navy hesitates, if it draws back or just “commissions a study” to con-
sider what to do, the pace of events will overwhelm it, like so many other
organizations stuck in the past. It will be too late.
FORCE IN THE NEW CENTURY
The requirement to secure sovereign issues globally, and in combination with
the particular dynamics of the networked world, will extrude a new type of
force. Such a force will focus not on destruction but on proficiency in gathering,
analyzing, and acting on information within appropriate time frames. This is
the type of force the Navy needs to integrate. Rather than operations based on
geographic or finite temporal objectives (relics of an industrial-age, militaristic
mind-set), such a force will be required continuously to generate information
and provide options for exercising global political leadership in every social di-
mension. Rather than consuming information for the purpose of destruction, a
force that secures globally sovereign issues must produce information centered
around its defining role of securing the global economy, and it must do so with-
out violating other people’s basic cultural, religious, ethnic, or traditional val-
ues. Human nature will always require arbitration of violence—the need to
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kill people and break things will not go away. Still, force in the new century
will require a different primary role. It must focus on the nonviolent man-
agement of conflict.
The new force must have unparalleled connectivity with every dimension in
society. Global security will demand forces to keep in close touch with the finest
expertise on the planet. Economics, politics, the environment, culture, civic in-
frastructure, science and technology, and defense are social dimensions that de-
fine the scope and breadth of this new force—this is what network-centric
warfare should really be about. Naval forces should focus on building networks
into every social dimension. We may be tempted to say that the “Navy after
Next” will meet these needs. Unfortunately, however, the world is moving at a
speed that makes such an approach negligent at best, fatal at worst; the United
States must create the “Navy after Next” now. If it does not, someone else will.
Someone else may create a navy that, whether or not it can compete with the
United States, will be able to assume the role of securing emerging globally sov-
ereign issues—and that will have disastrous consequences for the United States,
and for its navy.
Lastly, there is the issue of time. Behold the dichotomy of the age: a world that
lives and moves at the speed of light finds its survival dependent upon solutions
that span decades. Technology shrinks moral horizons (Einstein was a pretty
sharp guy). Powerful technology shrinks them faster. Security for the global citi-
zen will require that those horizons be restored, enlarged, and invigorated. Only
a force that is proficient in every dimension of society can bear upon the world’s
moral horizons. It is in this way that today’s Navy (not the Navy after Next)
should approach its roles and missions. Networked to all the dimensions of hu-
man society, the Navy should conceive, design, and institute processes, maintain
a presence, and act with a responsibility and a conception of time that extend
across generations.
N O T E S
1. This historical sequence, as well as a full dis-
cussion of the concept of a “cultural-cognitive
framework,” may be found in Edward
Rhodes, “Constructing Power: Cultural
Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in
the 1890s,” in The Politics of Strategic Adjust-
ment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, eds. Pe-
ter Trubowitz, Emily Goldman, and Edward
Rhodes (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1999), pp. 29ff.
2. Note the difference between “globally sover-
eign issues” and issues of “global sover-
eignty.” The former identifies a variety of
issues with separate but equal authority or
importance to the survival of the global citi-
zenry. The latter describes a single entity—a
single, overriding source of authority that
embraces all other issues.
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3. Most of the drastic environmental damage in
the world today occurs in poverty-ridden
areas.
4. Macedonia, a pro-Western nation in the Bal-
kans, now finds its economy in shambles be-
cause the economy of its major trading
partner, Serbia, has been severely impaired.
There is concern over the destruction of facil-
ities that causes environmental damage in the
region that spreads to allies nearby. Also
there is, and will always be, concern about
causing mass casualties among neighbors
who will have to live next to the victimized
area after the destructive force returns home.
5. The European Union plans to establish its
own defense force. See, for example, The
Economist, 4 December 1999, p. 18, and The
World in 2000, a special offprint from the of-
fices of The Economist, 1999, p. 54.
6. “Dumb power” is best illustrated by a true
story. There was an Australian cattle rancher
with fifty thousand square acres. He could
put up a very expensive UAV that monitors
everything—it has a sensor for every conceiv-
able spectrum—but he could afford only one
of them. Another option was to place in the
horn of every animal a five-cent chip that
would report the animal’s position. He could
also put a chip in every water tank to report if
it was empty or full. He could put a chip at
every gate to report if it was open or closed.
In this way, he could get a very clear picture
of his operation. This is leveraging dumb
power. Find this story and other explanations
like it in Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: The
New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and
the Economic World (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1994).
7. This is a scenario in a context most tradition-
alists will understand. A more likely option,
however, will be for the opponents simply to
hire someone to shoot the aircrews’ spouses
and children in their homes.
8. It is interesting to note the parallel. Once
upon a time, the Gun Club was willing to let
aircraft scout. The airplane could not do much
else. Today, naval aviation is kind enough to let
UAVs scout for it—reconnaissance missions
and such. It cannot do much else—or can it?
9. A cursory reading of the history of informa-
tion technology in the commercial sector for
the last thirty years would quickly deflate this
false hope. Automating old processes never
works.
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LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY
Carnes Lord
Winston Churchill once said that most strategic failures in war are due to the
“total absence of one directing mind and commanding willpower.” During
World War II, Churchill was determined to be that one directing mind, taking
for himself a new cabinet portfolio for defense as well as the office of prime min-
ister. Difficult as it may be to resist the ideas of one of the greatest leaders of the
twentieth century, there are many today who will be skeptical of such a claim.
The literature of contemporary international relations (for all its hard-fought
differences) is united when considering leadership as secondary in importance
to military or political success. Realists believe the most important factor to be
the unique strategic logic of each situation that imposes itself on world leaders.
Liberals emphasize it is the power of institutions that shape ideas. Constructivists
point to cultural and historical factors, or to the dynamics of collective psychology.1
In the narrower sphere of military affairs, the picture is not very different. For
example, in Military Misfortunes (1991), Eliot Cohen and John Gooch criticize
the tendency to blame strategic failure on the commander (the “man in the
dock”) and emphasize instead the central role of dysfunctional military organi-
zation.2 (Debunking leadership in the academic studies of war is hardly new.)
The distinguished British historian Michael Howard, in his well known paper
on “the forgotten dimensions of strategy,” for example, argues that the logis-
tics, technological, and social dimensions of military success have been system-
atically neglected and undervalued when compared to the operational dimension,
in large part because of the myth of glamour of the commander in the field.3
In professional military studies, the great captains of history continue to hold
a place of honor, and military education maintains its traditional concern with
practical leadership issues. Yet even in today’s military,
the standing of leadership is becoming increasingly pre-
carious. For many, the revolution in military affairs
(RMA) validates Howard’s emphasis on the techno-
logical dimension of strategy rather than the opera-
tional. Though rarely directly saying so, proponents of
the RMA presume that leadership will inevitably be-
come irrelevant as technology increasingly takes over
that function.
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The Gulf War is of particular interest here. In spite of much subsequent
self-congratulation over the allied flanking maneuver that broke the Iraqi Re-
publican Guards, what was most impressive and decisive in sober retrospect
for the allied victory happened in the dimensions of logistics and technology,
not in operations. Indeed, it could be argued that the war’s outcome fore-
shadowed for future wars how unimportant operational art and military
leadership are becoming.
But did it? Let us look more closely at the Gulf War. The failure of the flanking
maneuver to close the ring on the Republican Guards clearly reflected a failure of
operational art and leadership at senior command levels, which greatly impacted
the war’s strategic outcome. Also, at the level of political-military decision mak-
ing, a series of errors compounded this failure. The premature halt of the
ground war for ill-considered public relations reasons, the signaling of the U.S.
intent to withdraw from Iraq without a quid pro quo, the abandonment of the
Kurds and Shiites, and more generally, the obvious absence of any serious plan-
ning for the war’s endgame—all helped turn a stunning feat of arms into some-
thing considerably less than a strategic victory.4
Even a cursory review of the recent record of American military actions sug-
gests that this state of affairs is not the exception. From Lebanon and Somalia to
Bosnia and Kosovo, American political and military leadership has too often
been operationally inadequate and unsure, internally divided, and shortsighted
in its strategic decision making.
Rarely has the world sensed in Amer-
ican councils the presence of “one
directing mind and commanding
willpower.” At the same time, there
are few signs that the military-tech-
nical revolution is easing the requirements for leadership at senior command
levels. Recent U.S. military actions in Iraq, as well as in Kosovo, point to the futil-
ity of RMA-style precision bombing, absent appropriate operational concepts
and serious thought about strategic outcomes. Technology cannot substitute
for an appreciation of the logic of war; the responsibility of senior military
leaders becomes that much greater when the logic of war is lacking in civilian
decision makers. It is not even clear that the dynamics of the contemporary
battlefield are reducing the scope of command authority. A good case can be
made that the evolving technologies are at least as likely to recentralize control at
relatively senior echelons.5
What exactly is the relationship between strategy and leadership? Searching
for a productive way to come to grips with this large question, one could do
worse than consult ancient history. The word “strategy” is derived from the
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classical Greek, strategia, which does not mean strategy as we define it but “gener-
alship,” or “leadership of the army,” or more literally, “leading out the people in
arms.” (In contrast, “tactics” refers to drawing up an army in battle formation.)
Several points can be made here. First, strategy is not only a military function;
the ancient Greeks saw little distinction between military and political leader-
ship.6 Second, strategy is less about operational maneuver than about motivat-
ing and disciplining citizen-soldiers. In classical Greece, to borrow Howard’s
terms once more, the key to strategy was not the operational, logistic, or techno-
logical dimension but the social dimension. This is apparent in Thucydides’ fa-
mous account of the Peloponnesian War. His history is short on details of mili-
tary operations (not to speak of logistics or technology), but he has taken great
pains to record speeches made by generals and politicians designed to encourage
troops in the field or to persuade citizens at home to support particular policies
or courses of action. Third and finally, it is noteworthy that the Greeks also did
not distinguish between strategy and diplomacy. In an age that lacked estab-
lished diplomatic services, generals abroad necessarily played the ambassador’s
role, making friends and influencing people as they marched.
Obviously war is infinitely more complicated and technical now than it was
2,500 years ago—because of the reason just discussed, because of its sheer scale,
and because it requires a much higher level of organization, teamwork, and dis-
cipline. However, none of this obviates the need for leadership. In fact, today
leadership is all the more important.
In contemporary states, leadership is a vital strategic function for two rea-
sons. First, it is essential to control and correct astrategic tendencies of modern
military organizations; and second, it plays a key role in countering the astrategic
tendencies of modern governments and societies.
Cohen and Gooch are certainly right to pinpoint organizational dysfunction
as a prime cause of strategic failure. Organizational routines, service rivalries,
the dominance of managerial perspectives, etc., often make contemporary de-
fense establishments highly resistant to strategic rationality. The United States
recognizes these problems and has made major changes in its defense organiza-
tion (the Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation of 1986) that center on strength-
ening the leadership role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recent U.S.
history has shown, however, that such problems call for continuing leadership
from outside the ranks of the military as well.7 The tendency for military estab-
lishments to develop a strong corporate identity and outlook is also well known.
Therefore, informed and vigorous civilian leadership is essential, not only to en-
sure basic civilian control but also to maintain a genuinely strategic perspective
and to facilitate broader cooperation between military organizations and other
elements of the bureaucracy in common strategic enterprises.
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Perhaps less well known is the requirement for strong leadership as a counter-
weight to the astrategic tendencies of contemporary government and society,
particularly in the United States. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it almost two
hundred years ago in his great work Democracy in America, “Democracy finds it
difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan
and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles. It has little capac-
ity for combining measures in secret and patiently waiting for the result. Such
qualities are more likely to belong to
a single man or an aristocracy. But
these are just the qualities which, in
the long run, make a nation prevail.”8
Planning, coordination, secrecy, and
patience tend to be in short supply in
ordinary democratic politics, and it
is the particular burden of the democratic leader to provide or facilitate them.
More important, the democratic leader, whether political or military, has the
equally difficult task of reconciling these requirements with the openness and
accountability of a democratic government. (This is where the classical model of
strategy or generalship may have some further relevance.)
Central to democratic leadership, particularly in time of war, is the task of
persuasion, motivation, and inspiration. In a modern bureaucratic state, this
task extends beyond the public to the legions of soldiers and civilians on which
the government must depend for the implementation of its policies. In order to
perform effectively, leaders (especially, though not only, political leaders) argu-
ably need four qualities: an understanding of their country and its history; an
understanding of the strategic environment they face, and of their actual and
potential adversaries; a vision of the future; and an ability to communicate.
Churchill’s possession of all four qualities explains why he was the great leader
that he was.9
However, the example of Churchill is likely to discourage as much as inspire,
or else strike us as simply irrelevant. After all, the present strategic environment
is very different from that of Churchill’s. It is one thing to call for “one directing
mind and commanding willpower” to lead a nation in total war, but quite an-
other to apply it during an era of ambiguous threats and politically constrained
military operations. Under such circumstances, what may be required is not so
much a leader but rather someone who is skilled at crafting compromise and
consensus at home and abroad.
Churchill’s dictum points out several important problems that currently
confront U.S. leaders. One is the pluralism in national security policy making,
the result of the constitutional structure of the American government, as well as
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certain developments of the last three decades that have strengthened the policy
role of Congress. (Let it be said here that there is much left to do. Reforming the
internal structures of Congress, rationalizing legislative authorities for various
executive branch national security activities [the War Powers Act and perhaps
even the National Security Act of 1947, for example], and repairing execu-
tive-legislative relations could have large payoffs for American policy. Although
such steps are often dismissed as hopeless, it is far from clear why. The relatively
benign international environment of the present offers a good opportunity to
address these sorts of legal and institutional issues.)10
Another is the uncertain relationship between military and civilian authority
within the executive branch. Although the alarmists have recently gained
ground, when discussing U.S. civil-military relations today one should be con-
cerned with the growing estrangement and lack of communication between the
military and its civilian leaders, and with the continuing difficulties that the U.S.
government as a whole encounters in
articulating coherent doctrine for
the use of force and in applying force
with strategic effect.11 While part of
the problem is philosophical, much is a reflection of the clash between military
and civilian cultures and their failures to craft new organizational solutions to
the novel challenges of contemporary limited warfare and operations other
than war. It is, therefore, a prime leadership issue, on both sides.
Finally, a few remarks may be in order concerning the personal dimension of
leadership. It is often said that leaders are born and not made; there is no doubt
of this. On the other hand, it is also a convenient excuse for not thinking very
hard about how one finds, recruits, trains, and manages the careers of potential
leaders. In particular, it is an excuse for ignoring the central but too often ne-
glected issue of the intellectual (as distinct from the personality-based) require-
ments of leadership. In the business world, there has long been a tendency to
separate leadership from substantive knowledge of a particular business sector
or kind of enterprise, though the limitations of such an approach are by now
frequently acknowledged. While perhaps not as pronounced, this tendency can
also be seen in the political world and in government itself. What exactly do our
leaders need to know to be strategically effective? We have only to pose this ques-
tion to realize that an Ivy League education today gives little consideration to the
subject; even a professional military education offers no guarantee.
A further point: good leaders do not necessarily make good strategists, and
good strategists are not always effective leaders. The qualities that Churchill listed
are more typically scattered among several individuals. From this perspective, the
management of personnel and decision-making systems, both civilian and
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military, must be seen as an integral aspect of strategic leadership. Leaders should
be more attentive to the individual talents and character of their subordinates and
to the dynamics of team organizations, be they personal staff or interagency com-
mittees. Leaders must also be quick to recognize ineffective performance and
deal with it decisively. This, of course, was one of Churchill’s great gifts. It is not
apparent that these matters should be handled any differently today.12
All this is easily summarized: leadership itself is today the truly forgotten di-
mension of strategy.
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IN MY VIEW
COLD WAR GAMES
Sir:
I graduated from the Naval Command Course (NCC) at the U.S. Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1965. On my return to India, I reported at Na-
val Headquarters New Delhi for an appointment at sea. As a matter of protocol
and having undergone training abroad, I was required to call on the Chief of the
Naval Staff (our CNO) to apprise him of my assessment of the NCC course. I
briefly narrated the curriculum, concluding that it was a wholesome course pro-
moting understanding amongst the international naval community. After care-
fully listening, the Chief shot a straight question back at me: “Do you believe this
training in the USA is of any value to the Indian Navy or a prop to your personal
career?” I was taken aback a bit, but collecting my wits, I replied that such an ex-
posure as in the NCC should help one to contribute to the interests of the Navy
in the long run, and that my career was only a side issue. He gave an enigmatic
smile. To date I have not been able to figure out whether the Chief thought that I
believed in what I said.
It was exactly six years after the NCC experience, in 1971, that I had the privi-
lege of commanding the only aircraft carrier of the Indian Navy, INS Vikrant.
The tension between India and Pakistan was building up. The USA/Soviet
Union cold war was at its height, with the famous U.S. tilt against India. A good
deal is on record as to how the nuclear carrier task force led by USS Enterprise
(the “Big E”) was sailed from the Far East to create a presence in the Bay of Ben-
gal to influence the outcome of the Indo-Pakistani conflict.
INS Vikrant Task Force, comprising the carrier and three antiaircraft/anti-
submarine frigates, was deployed in the Bay of Bengal with a directive to estab-
lish a Zone of Command to ensure that there was no outside interference from
the sea with the advancing Indian Army in the erstwhile East Pakistan (now Ban-
gladesh). In the execution of its aim the Indian Task Force had in a short time
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captured about forty foreign and Pakistani ships attempting to break the
blockade to reach East Pakistan ports, carrying reinforcements and supplies
for the beleaguered Pakistani Army. By 12th December, 1971, the fighting on
land had entered the final phase in favour of the Indian Army. INS Vikrant
was on patrol north of Andaman Islands blocking the approaches to
Chittagong when, on 15th December, late in the evening, the BBC announced
the entry of the “Big E” task force in the Bay of Bengal. The broadcast added
that the U.S. task force was to make for Chittagong to evacuate the stranded
American citizens.
This was a bolt from the blue. I conjured up a situation of a direct confronta-
tion. I waited for instructions from the Naval Headquarters but none arrived. It
was later at night that I decided to proceed south anyway, to intercept the “Big E”
before she could enter the war zone. It was near midnight when the Midshipman
on Watch approached me on the bridge and sought permission to ask a ques-
tion. I nodded, and he said, “Sir, what would you do when you sight the ‘Big E’?”
This question was no doubt uppermost on my mind, but without any hesitation
I replied, “You do not have to worry, young man. America is a friendly country,
so I would wish the captain of the ‘Big E’ a good morning and ask him what I
could do for him.” The midshipman was not convinced and added, “What if the
‘Big E’ opened fire against us?” I replied, “I have been educated in the Naval War
College, and I understand the American psychology well. If the ‘Big E’ attacks us,
Abraham Lincoln would be turning in his grave.”
Throughout that night Vikrant continued her sortie south, and our air recce
covered an area to a depth of five hundred miles. There was no sign of the U.S.
task force, so in the absence of any instruction from the Naval Headquarters I
turned back north to rejoin my patrol area. As the day dawned, BBC broadcast
amplified its earlier report: that having entered the Bay of Bengal from the
Malacca Straits, the U.S. task force had proceeded west instead of going north to
Chittagong. On reflection I felt that my reactions in the warlike situation proved
the value of my tenure at the NCC.
As a postscript to this anecdote, soon after the victory of the Indian Armed
Forces, one of the foreign celebrities that visited India was the renowned naval
leader Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, chief of the Soviet Navy. During his visit to Bom-
bay he came onboard Vikrant. I had known the admiral well earlier during my ten-
ure in Moscow as the Indian naval attaché. The admiral congratulated me and
asked, “Were you worried about a battle against the American carrier?” He an-
swered himself: “Well, you had no reason to be worried, as I had a Soviet nuclear
submarine trailing the American task force all the way into the Indian Ocean.”
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I thought to myself, it is not easy to convert a cold war into a hot war. Cold war
is brinkmanship and only posturing. When the chips are down, you do not play
cat and mouse games but come prepared to hit hard to vanquish your adversary.
SWARAJ PARKASH
Vice Admiral, Indian Navy (Ret.)
NCC class of 1965
SHOOTING UP THE WORLD
Sir:
In “The Military Response to Terrorism” [NWCR, Summer 2000, pp. 13–39],
Captain Mark Kosnik makes the argument that military force is useful and
modifies the behavior of terrorist groups. The attack on the USS Cole proves him
wrong. We have enemies. We cannot shoot up the world—Panama, Grenada,
Somalia, Kosovo (where we unlawfully interfered in a civil war and made it
worse), Afghanistan, Libya (where we demolished an apparently innocent pill
factory, and where we targeted the leader and killed his daughter)—and not
have enemies. By what right (and for what purpose) do we establish a no-fly
zone over a sovereign nation?
The misuse of military force is costly—in treasure, in readiness, in otherwise
unnecessary defensive measures, and in the establishment of enemies.
H. F. ROMMEL
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
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Lieutenant Colonel McMaster is a former professor of
history at the U.S. Military Academy and the author of
Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies
That Led to Vietnam (1997).
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REVIEW ESSAY
THE GI GENERATION AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Lieutenant Colonel H. R. McMaster, U. S. Army
Kaiser, David. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the
Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2000. 566pp. $29.95
Twenty-five years after the fall of Saigon, it seems doubtful that historians will
ever achieve consensus on America’s experience in Vietnam. In recent years,
newly available evidence has reinvigorated the debate over how and why Viet-
nam became an American war. David Kaiser, a professor of strategy and policy at
the Naval War College, has produced the most recent examination of that ques-
tion. In American Tragedy, Kaiser devotes the first nine chapters to the Kennedy
years. The last seven chapters cover the period from November 1963 (John Ken-
nedy’s assassination) to July 1965, when Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson,
made a series of decisions that led to an American war in Vietnam.
Kaiser, an accomplished historian of Europe and the author of many books,
describes his latest work as “the most thorough and best documented account of
America’s decision to go to war in Vietnam.” Indeed, Kaiser’s book is well re-
searched, and he draws heavily on recently declassified memoranda, tapes of
telephone conversations, and minutes of meetings. Vietnam specialists and stu-
dents of the war will benefit from both Kaiser’s evidence and his provocative in-
terpretation of how Kennedy and Johnson confronted the complex military and
political challenges of Vietnam.
Somewhat disconnected from the evidence, however, is Kaiser’s generational
explanation for Lyndon Johnson’s decisions. He asserts that LBJ and his advi-
sors, as members of the “GI generation,” possessed “relentless optimism” and a
firm belief that American power could solve the problem of Vietnam just as it
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had solved the problem of Nazi and Japanese aggression in World War II. He
portrays Kennedy as an exception to the generational rule, implying strongly that
JFK, had he lived, would have steered the United States away from war in Vietnam.
In his first chapter, Kaiser argues that President Dwight Eisenhower laid the in-
tellectual foundation and policy precedent for an American war in Southeast Asia.
Kaiser states that Kennedy acted as a moderating influence against intervention
after he inherited from Eisenhower a deteriorating situation in Laos and Vietnam.
He portrays Kennedy as a “brilliant natural diplomat,” “more sensitive to the dan-
gers of rash action than the contemporaries he chose as his leading subordinates.”
While Kaiser emphasizes Kennedy’s decision against a potentially disastrous
intervention in Laos in 1961, Kennedy’s foreign policy record and the legacy of
his Vietnam decisions cut against the argument. Kennedy’s greatest foreign pol-
icy disaster, the Bay of Pigs, receives little attention, and Kaiser describes Ken-
nedy’s embarrassing encounter with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 as
merely a “difficult experience.” Although Kennedy did disapprove a recommen-
dation to send American combat units to South Vietnam in 1961, he dramati-
cally increased the American advisor effort there, from eight hundred at the time
of his inauguration to 16,500 in November 1963.
Kaiser does not examine fully the most significant decision Kennedy made
about Vietnam—to instigate and support a coup that led to the overthrow of the
South Vietnamese government and the assassination of President Ngo Dinh
Diem and his brother Nhu. Kaiser argues that “without question, the two men
most responsible for the overthrow of the Diem government” were Diem and
Nhu themselves. The Kennedy administration, however, permitted the CIA and
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to engineer the coup and thereby saddled the
United States with responsibility for the successor regime. The coup exacerbated
political instability in South Vietnam and presented Vietnamese communists
with an opportunity to exploit. Kaiser praises Kennedy for his “detachment, cu-
riosity, and quick intelligence,” but the president’s failure to provide direction
and to make a clear decision about the coup revealed a remarkable degree of ne-
glect, indecisiveness, and an absolute failure to consider long-term consequences.
Kaiser contrasts Kennedy’s and Johnson’s approach to Vietnam and argues
that LBJ took “a much more straightforward approach” than Kennedy to the
containment of communism. Kennedy, however, was a reflexive anticommu-
nist; in the late 1940s, then-Congressman Kennedy befriended and allied him-
self with America’s most avid “Red” hunter, Senator Joseph McCarthy. Much
of the evidence that Kaiser presents to demonstrate LBJ’s “straightforward
approach” comes from public statements that Johnson used as president to
portray himself as a tough and determined leader in the realm of foreign pol-
icy. Those statements, however, were wholly inconsistent with LBJ’s reluctance
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even to discuss Vietnam policy with his advisors. Any comparison between ad-
ministrations in connection with Vietnam is likely to be fraught with diffi-
culty. The situation in Southeast Asia changed dramatically over time, and it
depended much less upon who occupied the White House than on the political
and military interaction between Vietnamese communists and South Viet-
namese loyal to the Saigon government.
How each administration coped with the changing situation in Vietnam de-
pended upon many factors, including its appreciation of the situation; individ-
ual character and experience; national, institutional, and individual interests;
relationships among the president’s advisers and their relative influence; and
perceptions of potential short and long-term consequences of competing courses
of action. While the evidence Kaiser presents illuminates many of these factors,
he relies overwhelmingly on the generational explanation. Under the author’s
construct, the war seems inevitable, and those who shaped the course of the war
escape responsibility—their generation made them do it.
Kaiser argues that the GI generation’s faith in America’s ability to prevail
generated overconfidence and impelled LBJ and his advisers toward war. How-
ever, as early as May 1964, Johnson told his national security adviser, McGeorge
Bundy, “[It] looks to me that we’re getting into another Korea. It just worries the
hell out of me. I don’t see what we can ever hope to get out of this.” Vietnam was,
Johnson exclaimed, “the biggest damn mess that I ever saw.” The president’s lack
of confidence and a pessimism that bordered on defeatism among many of his
advisers in both the Defense Department and the White House brings into ques-
tion the usefulness of generational determinism to explain America’s military
escalation in Vietnam. The paradox represented by Johnson’s premonition of
disaster and his subsequent decisions that moved the United States closer to war
stemmed from factors more specific and complex than a generational proclivity,
including Johnson’s preoccupation with domestic priorities, his character, and
the character of his principal advisers, as well as advisory relationships within
the administration.
Kaiser’s research led him to devote more attention than have most historians
to the critical decisions of 1964—decisions that placed the United States firmly
on the path toward a gradual escalation of American intervention in Vietnam.
While his emphasis on those early decisions is appropriate, the evidence does
not support the author’s conclusion that they reveal a firm commitment on the
part of the president to preserve an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam.
America’s objectives in Vietnam remained ambiguous and ill defined during the
entire period of escalation. Lyndon Johnson was preoccupied with preserving
the consensus on Vietnam and preventing a debate that might affect his domes-
tic priorities. He was determined to tell both those opposed to a greater military
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commitment and those who advocated resolute military action what they wanted
to hear. It was a consensus built on a fragile foundation of lies and obfuscation.
Kaiser points out the fundamental dishonesty of Johnson’s approach, but he
does not examine fully the consequences. Those who did not tell the president
what he wanted to hear were relegated to positions of little influence. Over time,
it became difficult for the president to distinguish the administration’s propa-
ganda from reality in Vietnam. Johnson considered alternatives to a slow mili-
tary escalation only to preserve the façade of debate and consultation. Lies to
Congress permitted his administration to circumvent the Constitution—be-
havior that not only was undemocratic but also removed an important correc-
tive to what was an unwise policy. The war was not inevitable; it was made
possible by the Johnson administration’s dissembling.
Despite the sometimes tenuous connection between Kaiser’s conclusions
and the evidence he presents, the author deserves credit for doing thorough re-
search and for advancing a provocative argument. Indeed, Kaiser’s genera-
tional interpretation of how and why Vietnam became an American war is
not without explanatory power; it is worthy of serious attention. Students of
the war will benefit from comparing Kaiser’s arguments to those of such histo-
rians as Lloyd Gardner and Michael Hunt, who place less emphasis on gener-
ational proclivities and a greater emphasis on America’s Cold War ideology of
containing communism.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Cambone, Stephen A. A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1998. 262pp. $23.95
Stephen Cambone is the director of research
at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University.
A former senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
Cambone is obviously well qualified to
undertake work that focuses on a pro-
posed reorganization of the National Se-
curity Council (NSC). Cambone
approaches his work with vigor and an
insider’s knowledge of the workings of
the U.S. government’s highest national-
security entity. He also extensively uses
the knowledge and expertise of two col-
leagues, Patrick J. Garrity of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Alistair
J. K. Shepard of the University of
Aberdeen, Scotland. They have included
valuable appendices for students of na-
tional security affairs on the major inter-
ests and issues that surround national
security policy development, as well as a
historical synopsis of the various national
security councils used by past presidents
and how the institution has evolved.
Cambone has included a compendium of
important presidential directives.
Cambone’s principal argument is that it
is time—now that the end of the Cold
War is nearly a decade in the past—to re-
evaluate the National Security Act of
1947 and the institutions created by that
watershed law. Moreover, Cambone asks
his readers to consider what, if any, insti-
tutional changes should be implemented
to ensure that the United States is prop-
erly prepared for national security policy
planning in the post–Cold War era. He
is attempting, by his own admission,
to conduct an organization-and-pro-
cess approach to the question of revising
the 1947 National Security Act; he is
largely successful.
Cambone boils down the present-day
debate over national security policy making
to two essential features. He identifies
one side as the issues faction and the
other as the interests faction. “Issues” ad-
vocates emphasize such things as reli-
gion, ethnicity, and human rights. These
national security analysts focus on the
need for countries to conform to interna-
tional laws and norms. They emphasize
the protection of the rights of individuals
against the power of the state. They rely
heavily on international agreement to
settle problems. The “interest” faction,
on the other hand, is less concerned with
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the legal authority of the international
community and more interested in the
construction of a system that manages risk
to the United States as a sovereign state.
However, Cambone argues that the real
problem is that neither “issues” nor “in-
terests” elements within national-secu-
rity policy-making circles can agree on
an overarching concept for, or defini-
tion of, the nation’s security. The au-
thor’s answer is to suggest a new model
for national security decision making
that eschews the Cold War mentality and
methodology for policy making and takes
into account the new paradigms of the
post–Cold War era.
Cambone reviews how past national se-
curity policy was developed. He then
proposes a reorganization of the NSC into
five directorates: crisis management, re-
gional affairs, home defense affairs, fi-
nance and trade, and science and
technology. A “dual-hatted” cabinet secre-
tary would head these directorates. In
this way, the president’s control over na-
tional security policy development would
be strengthened.
While his suggestions for improvement
are well thought out and well intentioned,
his proposals may prove nearly impossi-
ble to implement. First and foremost, such
a proposed reorganization would need
strong political support on Capitol Hill.
A new National Security Act would likely
entail a tremendous amount of debate, as
senators and congressmen attempt to in-
fluence the legislation. One need only re-
call the highly rancorous and largely
unhealthy debate over service roles and
missions following the passage of the
1947 law to understand what might occur
if a new national security law were passed
along the lines that Cambone suggests.
This is not to say that the United States
should not consider a new law; Cambone
simply needs to be aware that national
security policy has never been, and most
likely never will be, entirely devoid of
politics.
Nonetheless, Cambone’s model for a new
NSC is a logical one. Efficient and ele-
gant, if implemented it would maximize
the president’s power to influence the
creation and accomplishment of national
security policy—something that the NSC
and the national security advisor are sup-
posed to facilitate. Further, it would
make maximum use of the entire execu-
tive branch of government and take the
pressure off an understaffed and
ill-equipped White House to oversee na-
tional security policy, development, and
implementation. Yet the suggestion of a
dual-hatted cabinet secretary as head of a
national security “directorate” could prove
disastrous. Cambone ignores Washing-
ton’s deeply entrenched organizational
bureaucracies and their tendency to “so-
cialize” appointed cabinet officials into
their own particular cultures. It has long
been axiomatic in the nation’s capital
that the president’s worst political and
bureaucratic enemies can reside in his
own cabinet; in 1867 such a situation
nearly drove an unpopular president
(Andrew Johnson) from office. To make
matters worse, most cabinet officials have
rather short tenures in office. Thus the
Washington bureaucracy knows full well
that these political appointees will be
moving on sooner or later; it waits them
out. Finally, presidential cabinet officials
are usually chosen not for their expertise
but for political expediency. Therefore, it
is very likely that the person who would
serve as a “directorate” chair might be
thoroughly unqualified for such a posi-
tion of responsibility. Although the
way that national security policy is
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developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER
Naval War College
O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95
Over the past several years, the U.S. mil-
itary has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to inno-
vate in response to a prospective revolu-
tion in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some stud-
ies, such as the congressionally man-
dated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new or-
ganizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not con-
vinced. In his view, most calls for trans-
formation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future re-
search and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily elec-
tronic (sensors, computers, and communi-
cations), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no im-
minent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to de-
tect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the bat-
tlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of trans-
formation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the mili-
tary should be transforming itself into.
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O’Hanlon’s general projections of future
technologies appear reasonable. Yet the
reader would be more assured of the au-
thor’s conclusions if his technical evalua-
tions did not rely so heavily upon articles
in newspapers and popular periodicals.
One can be justifiably skeptical that infor-
mation drawn from Army Times, Defense
News, or even Aviation Week & Space
Technology fully reflects the broad range
of scientific research and development
throughout government, industry, and aca-
demia, both in the United States and
abroad. Likewise, O’Hanlon’s general dis-
missal of the future military challenges
posed by China, Russia, and North Korea
is somewhat cavalier. It would have been
useful had O’Hanlon made clear his per-
sonal qualifications to provide an author-
itative evaluation of such a wide range of
technology projections and foreign military
developments. He states that he presented
his findings to “a number of weapons sci-
entists and technology experts,” but he
does not identify them or indicate
whether they agreed with his conclusions.
O’Hanlon uses his projections of future
technology as the basis for a moderniza-
tion strategy that is intended to promote
“defense innovation” without increasing
the defense budget. He proposes major
reductions, up to two-thirds in such “ex-
pensive next generation platforms” as the
F-22 and F/A-18E/F, in order to fund im-
provements to existing systems and a
broad range of initiatives in research, de-
velopment, and experimentation. How-
ever, most of his recommendations tend
to be as vague as the assumptions he is
challenging. For instance, O’Hanlon ap-
proves of the acquisition of “new fleets
of unmanned aerial vehicles,” because it
“appear[s] generally sensible.” He states
that up to two billion dollars a year might
be needed to outfit combat units with
“internet capabilities” but does not make
clear whether he is referring to the com-
mercial Internet, classified information
networks, or some other type of equip-
ment-interoperability initiative. Likewise,
he makes a broad plea for the military to
“avoid service parochialism and foster
jointness” but does not elaborate on how
best to balance the advantages of organiza-
tional unity (as distinguished from systems
interoperability) against the important con-
tribution of interservice competition to the
process of military innovation.
O’Hanlon’s basic thesis is certainly valid.
As he points out, the fact that none of the
military services has actually committed
to major changes in its force structures,
operational concepts, or organizations is
evidence in itself that proponents of in-
novation have yet to articulate a compel-
ling argument for a very different U.S.
military. This book is far from the final
word on military technology and trans-
formation, but it may serve to stimulate
the proponents of major change to en-
gage in a more detailed debate.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and Da-
vid R. Segal, eds. The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces after the Cold War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2000. 286pp. $45
Ask a soldier or military analyst to de-
scribe the “postmodern military,” and
you are likely to get an answer that includes
high technology, precision weapons, infor-
mation operations, and possibly (espe-
cially if he or she is associated with the
Navy) network-centric warfare. Much of
the recent literature on military affairs
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concentrates on these technology issues, and
an observer might be forgiven for believing
that such operational and technical differ-
ences are what separate twenty-first-century
military forces from their predecessors.
This collection of essays describing the cur-
rent state of military affairs in the United
States and twelve other Western-oriented
democracies takes a very different and wel-
come approach. The editors, well known
authorities in the fields of military sociol-
ogy and civil-military relations, examine
the nature of post–Cold War militaries
from the point of view of how military
forces are organized and how they relate
to civilian society.
Some of the issues raised will be familiar
to anyone who has followed the debate in
recent years over a possible crisis in
civil-military relations in America. This
book, however, goes well beyond that is-
sue to posit a general model of how mili-
taries in Western democracies are
changing in the post–Cold War world.
As distinct from the “modern” military
organization, which the authors trace
from the French Revolution to the end of
World War II, and the “Late Modern”
military that prevailed from 1945 to the
end of the Cold War, the “postmodern”
military is described as one in which mil-
itary forces undergo a loosening of ties
with the nation-state. Postmodern mili-
tary forces are characterized by an ero-
sion of traditional martial values, a
decrease in their sense of an identity sep-
arate from civil society, and a change of
purpose from fighting wars to nontradi-
tional missions, often involving, or
authorized by, international and multi-
national entities. Kosovo is described as
“the first Postmodern war,” while the
Gulf War, involving a conventional mili-
tary invasion and state against state
conflict, is seen as a “throwback” to the
late-modern (Cold War) era.
On the basis primarily of the American
experience, the editors describe trends in
postmodern militaries, including several
hot-button topics. What are the missions
of militaries today? What is the relation-
ship between the military and the media,
and what is the public attitude toward
the military? How fully are women and
homosexuals to be incorporated?
The virtue of this book is that it is not
just another rehash of the arguments
concerning familiar issues. The essays, all
by prominent sociologists, review how
well militaries in Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom re-
flect the postmodern model. The essays
thus provide useful overviews of how
those countries are adapting to many of
the same forces that are shaping the
American military. They may provide
cautionary lessons for military officials
and decision makers in the United States
by underscoring, for instance, how terri-
bly wrong things can go in “military op-
erations other than war.”
In one extreme example of modern mili-
tary disaster, the Dutch military still has
not fully recovered from the failure of the
Dutch 3d Air Mobile Battalion to defend
the “safe area” of Srebrenica, Bosnia, in
1995. Bosnian Serb forces massacred
thousands of Bosnian Muslims after the
Dutch battalion allowed itself to be dis-
armed. At the other extreme, members of
the Canadian Airborne Regiment de-
ployed to Somalia in 1993 were later
found to have tortured and murdered at
least one Somali youth who had tried to in-
filtrate their camp to steal. Investigations
revealed other abuses by the regiment, and
eventually it was disbanded.
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These examples underscore the challenges
involved in postmodern military missions,
and they may support the arguments of
those who believe it is dangerous, if not
impossible, to expect war-fighting troops
to conduct “other than war” missions.
The limitation of this collection of essays
is that it does not address the militaries
of greatest interest to American military
officers—those of potential adversaries to
the United States. Because the editors are
specifically proposing a theoretical model
of how Western, democratic militaries are
adjusting to a world with a dramatically
reduced conventional threat, the reader
must look elsewhere to discover whether
or not such nations as China are experi-
encing the same trends.
Yet there is a great deal here to challenge
those worried about the state of America’s
military today, especially concerning social
issues. One of the most interesting insights
concerns the levels of integration of
women and homosexuals in the American
military, compared with the other countries
surveyed. The case studies show that the
United States is farther along than most
in integrating women but lags behind the
postmodern norm in allowing open ho-
mosexuals into its ranks.
The essay on Israel, for example, points
out that the common perception of the
“woman warrior” in the Israeli Defense
Force is a myth. Although many women
played active fighting roles in the Israeli
war of independence, women today are
less fully integrated into the IDF than in
most other Western militaries.
On the subject of homosexuals, the success
of Canada is cited as a possible guide for
other nations. Homosexuals have been
able to serve openly in the Canadian Forces
since 1992, and the removal of previous
restrictions is described as having had
“virtually no negative impact” on such
matters as recruitment, retention, and
morale. It is not clear if the Canadian ex-
perience is directly applicable to the United
States, but the book suggests that perhaps
it is. One of the editors writes that “if the
full acceptance of openly homosexual service
members is only a matter of time, given the
increased tolerance for diversity of sexual
orientation among the general population,
it would be advisable for policy makers in
countries where this is true to move beyond
wishful thinking or abhorrence and con-
sider how such a transition can be made
with minimal negative impact on group
cohesion and military effectiveness.”
Of course, case studies from other coun-
tries may do little to persuade those who
have already made up their minds. The
decision of Canadian Forces authorities
in 1998 to approve financial support for
a service member’s sex-change opera-
tion, for example, may provide ammu-
nition for both sides in that particular
debate. Whether or not the Canadian
example is one to be feared or ap-
plauded, it does suggest how important
it is to study closely the development of
the postmodern military.
ERIK DAHL
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Feiveson, Harold A., ed., The Nuclear Turning Point:
A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and Dealerting of Nuclear
Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1999. 460 pp. $52.95
Ah, ecstasy! A benign world for the next
two decades. Power politics disappear.
America leads the drawdown, with Russia
following to achieve parity with China,
Britain, and France at about two hundred
nuclear weapons. Worldwide nuclear
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verification becomes practically perfect.
Permanent members of the UN Security
Council agreeably limit their vetoes. It is
all here in this book, the product of the
“Deep Cuts Study Group.”
The authors make no secret of their ad-
vocacy for drastic nuclear weapons re-
ductions by the United States and Rus-
sia, the dealerting or deactivating of all
weapons to preclude launch on warning,
and announcements of no-first-use poli-
cies. The thesis depends on extraordinary
verification beyond today’s technology,
open sharing of weapons storage data,
ironclad control of fissile material, and
an effective worldwide security system.
An actual nuclear war with Russia is
considered unthinkable, despite signifi-
cant nuclear capability in that country;
although Russia now makes no bones
about its dependence on nuclear weap-
ons, the authors believe intentions can
change. The authors reject nuclear su-
premacy and deterrence for the un-
known of utopian equality.
On the other hand, this book espouses a
number of valid premises. “Military and
political objectives should be achieved
without use of nuclear weapons, if at all
possible.” The Russian early-warning sys-
tem has deteriorated since the breakup of
the Soviet Union (hence recent U.S.
overtures to share data). Any national
missile defense system must be tested ex-
tensively against a host of decoys before
the United States can certify its technical
effectiveness. As a result of conventional
weaknesses, Russia has placed great reli-
ance on nuclear weapons in its military
strategy. The Russian government has
been unable to negotiate effectively on
the issue during the past few years; signif-
icant problems remain in the transpar-
ency of weapons systems between Russia
and the United States, and fissile material
stockpiles are hard to verify.
However, if you are looking for a balanced
blueprint for the sizing, alert status, and
verification of nuclear forces during the
next two decades, you will not find it
here. There are several bothersome as-
pects. The authors cite Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
chide the nuclear powers for failure to
pursue more rapid reductions despite
enormous changes in the 1990s. Except
for one footnote on page 34, the authors
fail to address the full provisions of
Article VI, which calls for not only “ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and . . . nuclear disarmament” but
also “a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” With interna-
tional initiatives not in fact leading to
“general and complete disarmament,”
and with potential aggressors armed as
they are today, the nuclear nations have
no incentive to seek the reductions
envisioned.
The authors place great stress on the
premise that Russian command and con-
trol has dangerously deteriorated. In fact,
the system seems to have functioned the
way it was designed in the incident of the
1995 rocket launch from northern Nor-
way. Assertions by the Russian defense
minister indicate this fear is groundless.
A “no first use” declaration concerning
nuclear weapons by the United States is
not in its national interest. The United
States reacts to specific circumstances. It
need not specify how it would respond to
aggression, particularly involving weapons
of mass destruction. Aggressors should
realize that the United States considers
nuclear weapons an absolute last resort,
but aggressors should not be certain how
the nation will respond, or be offered a
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protective declaratory policy. Current
U.S. security assurances, including the “no
first use” negative-security assurance of
1978 concerning the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, serve its interests well.
Low numbers of nuclear weapons would
affect the international security environ-
ment and American presidential policies.
First, a limit of two hundred nuclear
weapons almost certainly would necessi-
tate targeting population centers rather
than military facilities. Such a strategy vio-
lates international law. Second, the United
States must understand the impact such a
reduction would have on allies to whom it
extends nuclear protection. These countries
can and likely would develop nuclear weap-
ons on their own; proliferation as a result
of destroyed confidence in American nu-
clear deterrence is not in the nation’s best
interest. Third, other powers may conclude
that they can and should make the invest-
ment in nuclear weapons to match the
United States. Today, they have little
chance of succeeding.
The authors harp on the “hair trigger”
readiness (alert) status of U.S. nuclear
weapons without explanation that
launch on warning is only one presiden-
tial option. The United States has al-
ready removed strategic bombers and
dual-capable aircraft from alert,
detargeted ballistic missiles, removed
nuclear capability from carriers and sur-
face ships, and improved technical
means to ensure against unauthorized
firing or use of nuclear weapons. Russia
has taken similar measures to dealert se-
lected forces. However, none of these
measures are unequivocally verifiable.
There are no magic wands for foolproof
verification. Moreover, in a dealerted
world, a crisis could trigger the most
precipitous, dangerous arms race to
realert that the world has ever
seen—highly destabilizing and poten-
tially disastrous.
Finally, the real issue is not just numbers
of nuclear weapons, “no first use,” alert
status, or verification but the preservation
of the peace between international entities
that might resort to warfare if the calculus
did not involve nuclear weapons. From
1600 to 1945, wartime casualties of civil-
ian and military personnel generally var-
ied between 1 to 2 percent of the world’s
population (2.6 percent in World War II).
After 1945 the casualty percentage
dropped significantly, and since about
1953 has consistently remained near 0.1
percent. Nuclear weapons have been a key
aspect of the preservation of peace be-
tween superpowers for the last five de-
cades. The United States must fully
understand the impact on American lead-
ership of any new arrangement before it
trashes what has proven to benefit world
democracy and freedom.
HANK CHILES
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy
Gray, Colin S., The Second Nuclear Age. Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 193pp. $45
Readers of Colin Gray’s earlier works
will not be disappointed by this new
book, nor will his critics be surprised by
his conclusions.
Gray argues that the end of the Cold War
does not mean that nuclear weapons can
be eliminated or forgotten. This book is
indeed valuable for noting, and taking to
task, the wide variety of academic trends
and fashions that have drawn such opti-
mistic conclusions since the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.
Gray ably points to the many ways in
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which nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction will continue to cast
a shadow over international relations,
even if no single superpower confronts
the United States as a possible enemy.
Gray certainly claims to be in step with
rapidly changing events, while caution-
ing us against the missteps of others.
Even while he asserts that the role of nu-
clear weapons will be substantially dif-
ferent in light of all that has happened in
the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
Gray, by stressing a second nuclear age,
emphasizes that such weapons will still
be very important.
However, one suspects that most of the
advice offered here, now that the Cold
War is over, is not really so different from
the advice the author was offering during
the Cold War, advice that did not have
much influence on policy. Gray states
that anti-missile defense is necessary, not
merely desirable. Yet was not his message
earlier that such defenses were desirable,
almost to the point of being necessary?
Gray says that deterrence is not always
reliable—the same message he often ad-
vanced with regard to the Soviet Union.
He notes that the American advantage in
conventional weapons, in conjunction
with the enthusiasm over a “revolution in
military affairs,” may be transitory and illu-
sory; however, during the Cold War he be-
lieved that the advantage in conventional
warfare rested with Moscow.
Gray scoffs at the analyses that em-
phasize preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, suggesting in-
stead that such proliferation may be
inevitable—a condition rather than a
problem. But in the old days of the
Cold War, Gray was ready to argue
that one should not make too much
of the Soviet-American cooperation
in pushing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty; such a joint interest was not
nearly so important as the issues that di-
vided Washington and Moscow—and
they were dire.
In short, Colin Gray’s book may be
right on many of the points it raises,
but it is misleading to advertise it as
heralding something so new as a “sec-
ond” nuclear age.
As always, Gray displays a broad aware-
ness of the contemporary literature, set
against a deep familiarity with history.
But notwithstanding Gray’s critical anal-
ysis of the foibles of those who prema-
turely think that any “nuclear age” has
come to an end, his own prose at times
comes across as wordy and convoluted,
and his message has not changed.
In sum, the book might amount to what
could have been said as well in one of the
author’s journal articles.
GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland
Bracken, Paul. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian
Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age. New
York: HarperCollins, 1999. 186pp. $25
The incorporation of Asia into the West-
ern-dominated international system is
critical for the United States. At present,
the United States is reacting to events in
Asia instead of shaping them. This is the
fundamental message of Fire in the East,
an important book by Paul Bracken of
Yale University.
Asia, extending from Israel to North Ko-
rea, has become increasingly visible since
the end of the (primarily Eurocentric)
Cold War. Discussions of Asian strength,
however, have been flawed. Japan has
struggled economically for ten years, and
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it still lacks political and military power.
The intent of Chinese modernization and
its impact on the world community re-
main subjects of controversy. The 1998
“Asian Flu” wracked the economies of
the infamous “Little Tigers,” thereby di-
minishing their statures.
Because globalization and nationalism
provide the means and desire to develop
nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, and the ballistic missiles to de-
liver them, rising Asian power is increas-
ingly important. As Bracken contends,
globalization is about economics, not
politics, yet it increases national military
potential by providing multiple, inex-
pensive sources of weapons and military
technologies. Consequently, prolifera-
tion in a globalized economy is a
long-term process linked to rising global
scientific and technological prowess. Add
to this existing national security motiva-
tions for the development of these ca-
pabilities, and it is evident how and why
Asian military power will grow.
These trends are particularly important
because they constitute a second nuclear
age. Recent evidence abounds; for in-
stance, in the wake of the Gulf War it was
discovered just how close Iraq had been
to completing a deliverable nuclear
weapon. Iranian missile and nuclear am-
bitions are clear, punctuated by a me-
dium-range ballistic missile test in 1998.
The governments of Pakistan and India
conducted flight tests of similar missiles
in April 1998 and May 1999, respectively,
and each country detonated nuclear
weapons in May 1998. China is actively
modernizing both its nuclear capabilities
and ballistic missiles, manifested by an
August 1999 flight test of a mobile inter-
continental ballistic missile. Much has
been written about the nuclear potential
of North Korea, which continues to
develop and test ballistic missiles, most
notably in August 1998.
Bracken maintains that these trends
portend the decline of Western military
dominance, in part because Asia and the
West are moving in different directions.
For example, nationalism, considered by
the United States to be an anachronism,
remains a powerful force in Asia. In an-
other case of strategic divergence, Bracken
highlights different approaches to warfare.
The U.S. prefers long-range, stealthy, and
precise conventional attacks that allow
conflict that is quick and bloodless (with
respect to Americans), with less collateral
harm to noncombatants and civilian re-
sources. In the East, indiscriminate weap-
ons and ballistic missiles encourage more
destructive and decisive options.
American policy may encourage the
growth of Asian political-military power.
By preferring an antiseptic form of future
war and by not preparing for casualties,
the United States leaves itself vulnerable
to, and provides incentive for, a nation
that has a greater will to visit destruction
upon its adversaries. This has the further
result of straining the foundations of
deterrence. In the first nuclear age,
the United States sought to deter one
opponent, the Western-oriented and
largely risk-averse Soviet Union. Now,
the United States must deter multiple
powers whose values, belief systems, and
strategic-cultural orientations differ
greatly from those of the United States.
This is not merely an academic point.
Although deterrence during the Cold
War was dangerous, the Cold War never
turned hot. The perils of the second nu-
clear age, however, have already been
evinced: the Iraqi obstinacy in 1990 that
led to war; the crisis-filled nuclear nego-
tiations with North Korea between 1992
and 1994; the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis
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with China; and the 1998 Indian and Pa-
kistani nuclear tests. These events illus-
trate a dynamic that pits increased Asian
assertiveness against U.S. desire for the
status quo.
Bracken argues these points persuasively.
Historically, these kinds of systemic
transformations have been the most
dangerous. In the fifth century B.C.,
Thucydides asserted that the Peloponnesian
War had begun due to Spartan fear of
rising Athenian power. Thus, a greater
discussion of how to integrate such di-
verse, assertive, and armed Asian nations
would have been interesting.
It could be objected that Bracken incor-
rectly treats many dissimilar nations, gov-
ernments, and cultures as if they were the
same. Simply stated, it makes a difference
what kind of government is in power. In
addition, other variables are not ac-
counted for, such as the disintegration of
the Iranian theocracy (less than twenty-five
years ago Iran was our staunchest ally in
the Middle East). In North Korea, whether
a “soft landing” or a more violent collapse
occurs could fundamentally influence re-
gional transformation. Last, the effect of
potentially severe ethnic problems in China
is not addressed.
Despite these shortcomings, Bracken deals
convincingly with important topics.
Footnotes are not to be found, and his
bibliography is limited given the breadth
of the subject, but he has integrated in-
formation from a variety of fields. Defense
and foreign policy students and practitioners
alike should read Fire in the East.
PHILIP L. RITCHESON
Falls Church, Virginia
Lilley, James R., and David Shambaugh, eds. China’s
Military Faces the Future. New York: M. E. Sharpe,
1999. 356pp. $29.95
This collection of high-quality essays by
some of the leading experts on the Chinese
military is the product of the 1997 Seventh
Annual Conference on the People’s Liber-
ation Army (PLA), sponsored by the
American Enterprise Institute. The au-
thors, although inspired by different secu-
rity and threat perceptions, present sober,
straightforward, and reasonable assess-
ments of PLA efforts to modernise itself in
the 1990s and of its prospects for the im-
mediate future. Evidence drawn from the
essays shows that the PLA is increasingly
modern, confident, and assertive but that
it has not yet developed sophisticated the-
ories and technologies comparable to
those of the United States or relevant to
fighting an American-style, high-tech lim-
ited war, or any war beyond its borders.
The provocative variations on this theme,
shaped by starkly different—seemingly
contradictory, yet ultimately reinforc-
ing—dynamics of Chinese and East Asian
politics, are instrumental in defining the
evolution and nature of the PLA.
This perceptive, informative, and well
written book is divided into four sections:
on the “New High Command,” “Doctrine,
Strategy, and Weapons,” the “Support
Base,” and “China’s Northeast Asian Se-
curity Environment.” Each section has its
strengths. After a careful but critical ex-
amination of biographical materials on
new military leaders, the first provides
unusual insight into the PLA’s inner circle
of decision making by identifying two
fundamental changes in civil-military re-
lations in the post-Deng era. First, none
of the top party leaders has any military
background or connections, whereas none
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of the senior military commanders and
political commissars has any experience
in party politics. Second, professionalism
and corporatism prevail in the PLA. This
distinct disconnection between the party
and the PLA challenges the traditional
mind-set of the “interlocking directorate
of the party and the military,” namely,
that the party is the army, while the army
is the party.
The second section gives readers a serious
but enjoyable discussion of doctrinal,
strategic, and weaponry issues reflecting
different schools of thought among
scholars and analysts. One school holds
that the PLA would no longer squander
human life by sending waves of peasants
against Western firepower as Mao Zedong
once did. Advocates of this way of think-
ing argue that high-tech weapons have
become the PLA’s new hallmark but that
it has a long way to go before it achieves
the level of operational capability and
technological sophistication its leadership
desires. The fatal weakness lies in its
strategy, doctrine, and weapons, which
remain thirty to forty years behind those
of the United States. The other school of
thought insists that the PLA is in fact not
so far behind the United States. Data of-
fered here (the excellent bibliography in
Chinese and the appendix) is empirical
proof that the PLA actively studies the
revolution in military affairs and is ap-
plying its lessons, developing sophisti-
cated weapons, and acquiring advanced
combat systems for asymmetric warfare.
The modernized PLA could likely
threaten the vital interests of the United
States and its East Asian allies in the
near future. Whether or not these con-
cerns are justified, there is little doubt
that the PLA is catching up with its re-
gional counterparts.
The third section offers a professionally
knowledgeable overview and analysis of
the PLA’s budget, logistics, and technol-
ogy, detailing some “contradictions” in-
herent in the support system. For example,
the PLA’s modest defence budget is, at
least for now, qualitatively different from
those of industrialized countries; its es-
sence is different, and its implications are
different. For whatever reasons, the
PLA has remained integrated within a
larger socioeconomic composite that is
able to provide unlimited resources for
soldiers and to focus procurement pri-
orities on items suitable for conflict
scenarios with Taiwan.
A more troublesome issue, and one cen-
tral to PLA logistics, is a continued debate
on centralization and decentralization.
Lack of consensus and resources often
forces the central command to encourage
units to find their own ways to survive
economically or to upgrade their weap-
ons and equipment, even while it tries to
create a unified, reliable, and effective
support system.
The PLA’s most vulnerable aspect
remains its technological obsolescence.
Even though the PLA closely watches de-
velopments in military technologies,
progress in its key technologies is very
slow, and technical difficulties make its
military modernisation programs less
than ideal. The resulting inconsistent
policies and uneven development may
eventually neutralize the effectiveness of
its future operations.
The final section examines regional secu-
rity issues with respect to the Korean
Peninsula and Japan, areas of deep con-
cern in Washington at a time when
America’s presence there is already
stretched thin. The analysis shows that
China’s approach to Korea is rational.
The most visible factor is that Beijing
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does not want Pyongyang to collapse, po-
litically or economically; at the same
time, Beijing is pessimistic about the re-
unification of North and South Korea.
Similarly, emerging nationalism in China
and in Japan, and military modernisation
in both nations, strengthen their threat
perceptions. A confrontation between
these two regional powers is possible, but
a military one would appear to be highly
unlikely in the near future. In short, re-
gional stability and security hang on the
joint efforts of all regional powers.
The book has two major flaws concern-
ing PLA capabilities. First, the authors of
these essays rely exclusively on their dis-
tinct assessments of PLA material power
and terms of reference, and these leave
unrecognized the role of Chinese spiri-
tual power—that is, political indoctrina-
tion and nationalism—and of the incalcu-
lable advantages to the Chinese of fight-
ing a war, whether high-tech or low-tech,
on their homeland. Second, naval readers
will regret the lack of an in-depth study
of the Chinese navy. Also, there is no
mention of recent developments in di-
vesting the PLA of commercial enter-
prises, implementing the regulations of
joint operations, or in introducing a joint
support system.
All in all, the book is not only highly rec-
ommended for students of PLA studies
but will undoubtedly also interest readers
who have a general concern for Chinese
and East Asian security.
JIANXIANG BI
Kanata, Ontario, Canada
Kim, Duk-ki. Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia:
Geostrategic Goals, Policies and Prospects. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2000. 261pp. $57.50
The growing economic, strategic, and
cultural importance of Asia calls for a
U.S. foreign policy attuned to the
unique environment of this diverse area.
As this economic dreadnought emerges
from the fog of uneven treaties, wars,
and cultural misunderstanding, U.S.
politico-military thinkers must recog-
nize the pressures of history and geog-
raphy that will dislodge any policy not
firmly anchored in Asian realities.
Northeast Asia in particular, with its in-
creasing importance in world trade, its
potential for undersea resource develop-
ment, archipelagic territorial disputes, and
the possibility of environmental catastro-
phe caused by its rapid industrialization
and nuclear-waste dumping at sea, is vital
to U.S. geostrategic interests. These fac-
tors, coupled with historical regional ani-
mosities, a diminishing Russian and U.S.
military presence, a naval arms buildup,
and the associated ability to project power
from the sea, highlight that security in
Northeast Asia has assumed a decidedly
maritime flavor.
Competing interests and local concerns
abound. China desires to be a world
power and regional leader, if not a
full-fledged Asian hegemon. Japan qui-
etly remilitarizes as it accepts a larger re-
gional security role. South Korea desires
unification of the peninsula under demo-
cratic rule, eagerly awaiting the collapse
of the intransigent and Stalinist regime.
Finally, the United States and Russia have
growing regional economic and political
interests, accompanied by a waning mili-
tary presence brought on by budget con-
straints and defense retrenchments. Thus
Northeast Asia, a bubbling cauldron that
may boil over at any moment, is a focus of
world attention.
This book is largely based on research
for the author’s doctoral dissertation.
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Commander Duk-ki Kim, Republic of
Korea Navy, has developed a wonderful
primer for anyone desiring to understand
the underlying factors of Northeast Asian
international relations and emerging
maritime issues. Kim’s purpose for writ-
ing this book was to design a cooperative
maritime security structure to enhance
security throughout Northeast Asia.
In this scrupulously footnoted and docu-
mented work, Kim calls for bilateral and
multilateral cooperative security among
historically adversarial Northeast Asian
nations. This framework for security will
not only strengthen understanding of
mutual security needs but also broaden
the definition of security beyond the tra-
ditional approach of unilateral defense.
Kim defines cooperative security as a sys-
tem of security practiced with, rather
than against, adversaries. His suggested
maritime measures for security forums
include: naval arms control to provide
limitations and constraint; maritime
confidence building measures to provide
reassurance, confidence, and transparency;
and maritime cooperation to introduce hab-
its of cooperation.
Kim argues that the opportunity exists
now for the regional powers to turn to
cooperative security measures in order to
lend stability to this historically unstable
area. This cooperation, he believes, will
go far in allaying fears of China’s growing
power-projection capability and Japan’s
acceptance of its growing regional secu-
rity role. Cooperative security measures
will also help in resolving resource and
fisheries claims that threaten to erupt into
open hostilities. By providing a vehicle for
dialogue, cooperative security may serve
as an acceptable alternative in the
absence of any other formal institutional
structure to manage growing disputes.
Kim’s first three chapters make an excel-
lent summary of the overarching mari-
time political and strategic concerns that
undergird naval strategy in the region.
Kim follows with chapters that describe
U.S., Russian, and Japanese maritime
strategies and concerns, and he concludes
by showing how trying to amalgamate
these diverse interests can be greatly
eased by U.S. and Northeast Asian coop-
erative approaches on bilateral, regional,
and international levels to provide stabil-
ity through a framework of dialogue on
peace and security.
As a naval officer intimately familiar
with the region, Kim assesses the limita-
tions of his proposals, such as Northeast
Asian nations that are not yet ready for
full-scale negotiations on reductions in
naval forces. As these navies continue to
grow, he sees a need for agreements to
mitigate the inevitable high-seas misun-
derstandings. He also calls for more
transparency through increased ship vis-
its and high-level official exchanges, as
well as cooperative development of off-
shore natural resources. As a further pre-
ventive measure, Kim suggests rules
governing fishery violations, to help
avoid dustups over fishing rights.
Although an excellent background read,
this book contains two flaws that, while
they do not detract from the central
theme or lessen its value as a resource,
may disconcert the reader. First, al-
though much of Kim’s work was com-
pleted before 1999, the copyright date is
2000. Thus in a number of places Kim re-
fers to actions that should occur “by the
next century,” or “by the year 2000.” Ad-
ditionally, because of the dynamism of
naval growth within Northeast Asia,
much of the force structure he projects
for the future already exists (e.g., the
Luhai-class DDG alluded to on page 146
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joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in
January 1999, and a Sovremenny DDG
entered the Chinese order of battle in
early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat
the Republic of Korea Navy as a major
regional actor, leaving it conspicuously
absent from his chapters on strategy and
concerns about cooperative maritime
security. This is a significant omission.
Korea is a growing naval power with
extensive regional concerns, and it is pos-
sibly the nation most likely to find itself
in armed conflict across its borders.
These gaps aside, this is a book worth
having in a library on modern Asia. The
extensive selected bibliography adds
value to this work as a resource on
Northeast Asian politico-military mat-
ters. It obviously should be required
reading for those involved in Northeast
Asian regional maritime issues, and it
would also be of interest to anyone seek-
ing to understand the unique problems
of Northeast Asia and possible solutions
to them.
ROBERT MARABITO
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and
the Undoing of an American Hero. New York: Free
Press, 2000. 385pp. $27.50
No figure of the Korean War looms quite
so large as General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, ar-
rogant, inscrutable, successful, and
fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy.
His military career, spanning the major
portion of the twentieth century, also ren-
ders him appealing as a symbol of broader
themes of that war and of American soci-
ety. So we come to Stanley Weintraub’s
MacArthur’s War, advertised on its dust
jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered
history of the general who refuses to fade
away,” a book based on “extensive re-
search in primary and secondary sources
and laced with colorful anecdotes.”
Unfortunately, the book is none of those
things but rather a facile, cobbled-together
mishmash of principally secondary
sources, laced with myriad errors of chro-
nology, fact, and interpretation—all
poorly documented. When reading this
book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral
James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a
Korean War history sent to him in the late
1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon as-
sault and Hungnam redeployment contain
so many errors and distortions of fact and
of emphasis that I am unable to assist you
with my comment.” However, I would
like to make note of a baker’s dozen of
errors to provide specific evidence for my
general assertions.
The author states on page 107 that the
amphibious commander, Rear Admiral
Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly
Turner’s operations officer in the final
months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle
served on Turner’s staff from August
1942 to March 1943; in the final months
of the war, Doyle was commanding the
cruiser Pasadena. These are not obscure
facts but can readily be found both in
George Dyer’s biography of Turner, The
Amphibians Came to Conquer, and in
Doyle’s official biography at the Naval
Historical Center.
Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral
Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur
the need to sail early for Inchon because
of the typhoon season. “Although nearly
a month remained before departure, the
ship movement orders were issued im-
mediately,” which would suggest that
the conversation took place around 15
August. Burke was good, but probably
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not that good. He did not arrive in Japan
until 3 September 1950, twelve days be-
fore the operation. He did have such a
conversation with MacArthur, but only
several days before the scheduled sail-
ing, and with respect specifically to
Typhoon Kezia. This is all described in
Burke’s oral history, which is available
at the U.S. Naval Institute, and which ap-
parently Weintraub consulted.
We also learn that during World War II
the 1st Marine Division “had stormed the
beaches of Guadalcanal, New Guinea,
New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa.” The
1st Marine Division did not assault any
beach or conduct any operation in New
Guinea, although several other smaller
Marine units did. That was an Army show.
Weintraub contends that Inchon was
largely possible only because a World
War II study conducted for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff assessed Inchon as a possi-
ble landing site: “Without such detailed
earlier data, MacArthur could not have
carried out Chromite on such a short
fuse.” None of the principals involved
have, to my knowledge, made reference
to such a study. Poor institutional mem-
ory is not unusual. Little was known
about Inchon in 1950, but someone re-
called that Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh
Fleet, had accepted the Japanese surren-
der there in 1945. The U.S. Army had
run the port for a time. At Doyle’s insis-
tence, a “frantic search turned up an
Army warrant officer, W. R. Miller, who
had lived on Wolmi Do and operated
Transportation Corps boats over Inchon
Harbor. . . . [He] forthwith joined Admi-
ral Doyle’s staff.” (The reader can refer to
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.’s Victory at High
Tide [Lippincott, 1968.])
In chapter 8, the author quotes from
James Alexander’s Inchon to Wonsan:
“On the destroyer Borland, accompany-
ing the escort carrier Badoeng Strait as
the Inchon flotilla moved north[,] . . .
Marine and FEAF [Far East Air Force] pi-
lots could be picked up on ship’s radio.”
There has never been a U.S. Navy de-
stroyer Borland, which one can confirm
in the Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, volume 1. Better yet, sim-
ply read the publisher’s description of Al-
exander’s book: “Alexander has created a
fictional destroyer, the USS John J.
Borland, and he records through this sin-
gle ship the actual experiences of a num-
ber of real destroyers through their logs
and diaries.”
At one point, Weintraub has Lewis B.
Puller commanding the 1st Marines,
which he did. Later in the book, how-
ever, the author has Puller commanding
the 5th Marines; this would have un-
doubtedly surprised Ray Murray, who
actually did command the 5th Marines.
Also, Homer Litzenberg is given the 11th
Marines—he commanded the 7th
Marines—and Ray David, who won the
Congressional Medal of Honor at
Chosin, will be pleased to learn that, ac-
cording to Weintraub, he became a Ma-
rine Corps commandant.
During the delay in landing X Corps be-
cause of land mines, Weintraub writes,
MacArthur “insist[ed] that the amphibi-
ous operations proceed but with the 7th
Division now to make an alternative as-
sault at Iwon.” That decision was mutu-
ally made by the X Corps Commanding
General (CG), Major General Edward Al-
mond, with Doyle and Struble, aboard
the USS Mount McKinley on 24 October
1950. The reader can refer to the Naval
Historical Center’s Operational Archives.
Weintraub also tells us on page 169 that
“for Wonsan, Admiral Struble hastily as-
sembled a twenty-one minesweeper
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flotilla, including nine ships from the im-
pounded Imperial Japanese Navy.” This
short sentence contains three errors of
fact. Struble, as Commander, Joint Task
Force, did not assemble the minesweeping
force. Captain Richard Spofford, com-
mander of Mine Squadron 3, in fact re-
ported to Vice Admiral Turner Joy as
Commander of Naval Forces Far East. Joy
intentionally kept control of the “sweeps.”
Burke requested the Japanese minesweep-
ers on 2 October. These were not im-
pounded Imperial Japanese Navy ships
but Japanese Maritime Safety Agency
(JMSA) vessels that had been actively
sweeping the Inland Sea since the end of
World War II. On 6 October, the JMSA
quietly authorized twenty minesweepers,
four patrol boats (to act as mother ships),
and one other vessel, to deal with mag-
netic mines. Some went to Korea’s west
coast, and ten or twelve went to Wonsan,
as stated in Burke’s oral history.
It is in its discussion of Hungnam, how-
ever, that the book really shines. On page
287, Weintraub blithely writes that “stow-
age diagrams for troops and equipment
were ignored daily as troops filled whatever
ships were available.” This statement implies
a willy-nilly process of outloading at
Hungnam. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. Burke began to hold shipping in
Japan in mid-November; Doyle issued Op-
eration Order 19-50 on 29 November, for
planning purposes; his control and loading
plan was issued on 11 December; and he is-
sued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 Decem-
ber. Doyle’s action report describes an
expeditious but well organized movement
of shipping in and out of Hungnam Har-
bor. Loading officers quickly developed an
ability to estimate loading capacities with-
out diagrams. The author’s casual assertion
not only is inaccurate but does a disser-
vice to those who did the job. One need
only read Doyle’s article “December
1950 at Hungnam,” in the April 1979
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, to un-
derstand this.
The author then puzzles over why Chi-
nese forces did not put more pressure on
the Hungnam perimeter. He concludes it
was “as if a gentlemen’s agreement were
in force.” Major General O. P. Smith, CG
1st Marine Division, had a different
notion. In a 12 December letter to his wife
Esther (which can be found in his per-
sonal papers at the Marine Corps Univer-
sity Research Archives, Quantico), the
general observed that “six Chinese divi-
sions will not bother anyone for a while”;
the Marines, assisted by “old man winter,”
had already taken a terrible toll on their
attackers. Organic X Corps artillery was
used for close support. Doyle had used
two heavy cruisers, four to seven de-
stroyers, and three LSMRs (medium
landing ships equipped with rockets)
throughout (augmented on “Dog Day”
by the battleship Missouri) for naval gun-
fire support, area harassment fire, illumi-
nation, and deep support. Doyle also had
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Yongpo
and Task Force 77 aircraft on call. From
9 to 24 December, 2,932 eight-inch
high-capacity, 14,491 five-inch proxim-
ity-fuzed, and 3,741 five-inch illuminat-
ing rounds were fired at Hungnam.
Weintraub also errs in his summary of
the outloading statistics for Hungnam,
which are among the most widely published
figures from the Korean War, asserting
that “550,000 estimated tons of bulk cargo”
were lifted. The actual figure was “350,000
measurement tons” (refer to the Opera-
tional Archives, Naval Historical Center).
The caption for a photograph of Mac-
Arthur and other officers on Mount Mc-
Kinley’s flag bridge on the morning of the
Inchon landing mislabels one of the
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officers as Vice Admiral Struble; it was
actually Rear Admiral Doyle. Struble was
aboard his own flagship, the cruiser Roches-
ter. According to protocol, MacArthur
should have been aboard Struble’s ship;
however, he elected to go with Doyle in-
stead. The irony is that Doyle and Struble
enjoyed a strong mutual antipathy.
It would have been useful to be able to refer
to Weintraub’s sources to trace the origins
of his errors, but unfortunately, he conde-
scends that “endnote numbers are eschewed
as intrusive, as are most footnotes.” He be-
lieves that “extensive back matter notes”
on each chapter’s sources would suffice.
(It is worth mentioning that the Marine
Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0,
Leading Marines—primarily intended for
young enlisted Marines—shows there as
FMFM 101.) It is impossible to ascertain
from his back-matter notes where specific
material originated, unless one compares
the text line by line with each source men-
tioned. I tried to do that for the dialog the
author offers for the famous 23 August 1950
“showdown” meeting regarding the Inchon
landing. Parts comport with published ac-
counts and participants’ recollections, but
some of it I have never seen before. Per-
haps it came from sources unnamed, but
without notes one cannot be certain.
Notes are not a luxury or, to use Weintraub’s
word, an “intrusion.” The author must
know that. Notes are at the heart of rigor-
ous scholarly research. Research is a so-
cial process, and its linchpin is the ability of
other scholars to check the validity of re-
ported findings. Ultimately, MacArthur’s
War contributes little to our understand-
ing of the Korean War. It is so fraught with
errors that it cannot be taken seriously.
It is a regrettable book.
DONALD CHISHOLM
Naval War College
Cable, James. The Political Influence of Naval Force
in History. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998. 213pp.
$59.95
Sir James Cable is a noted writer on naval
affairs. His Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991
is a well regarded classic on the role of
naval force.
His latest work is a historical survey of
the political purposes for which gov-
ernments have made use of naval force.
Cable defines “naval force” as that “ex-
ercised by fighting ships manned by
disciplined sailors at the direction of a
central command responsible to the
political leadership.” His definition is
necessary to distinguish naval force as
we understand it today from the force
exercised by pirates, privateers, adven-
turers, and users of “landing craft”
(such as those that brought Roman sol-
diers to Britain in 55 A.D.) or galleys,
which served merely as conveyances to
bring soldiers together for seaborne
hand-to-hand combat.
Cable examines the extent to which naval
force furthered the political purposes of
the governments that used it—the scale
and nature of the force employed are not
otherwise considered relevant. He focuses
on examples of the use of force “for po-
litical purposes in which the naval element
is significant, the facts are reasonably well
established, and the degree of success or
failure and the durability of the result
are clear enough for useful conclusions
to be drawn.”
This definition thus largely excludes
consideration of fighting at sea before the
1500s, because standing navies were rare,
thus precluding the presence of disci-
plined officers and sailors. Portugal in
the sixteenth and the Netherlands in the
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seventeenth century first used naval
force for political purposes, with great
success in founding large empires. The
establishment of global empires and
expanded seaborne trade fostered the
emergence of significant national navies
(as opposed to privateers and pirates).
Cable surveys various instances when the
use of naval force had profound,
long-lasting political effects. Obviously,
victories in major sea battles like Trafalgar
or Tsushima, the ultimate use of naval
force, could have significant political fall-
out. Yet the uses of naval force did not
have to be that dramatic to have such
effect. Cumulative efforts—such as those
of the British to attain command of the
seas in the eighteenth century; of the
British (and others) to stamp out the
slave trade in the nineteenth century; of
the Union navy to blockade the Confed-
eracy during the Civil War; of the Ger-
man submarine campaigns to interdict
sea traffic to Great Britain; and of the
Japanese campaign to conquer Southeast
Asia—all had long-lasting political con-
sequences, even if the eventual outcomes
were not always intended.
Discrete exercises of noncombat naval
forces have also had huge political conse-
quences. For instance, the Dutch navy’s
successful landing of William of Orange
in England enabled the Glorious Revolu-
tion and all that followed from it in Brit-
ain (and Ireland). French naval
intervention off Yorktown in 1781 was
critical in ending the American Revolu-
tion. (“Indeed, we can scarcely expect to
encounter any result of the use of naval
force for political purposes that is larger
or more lasting than the independence of
the United States.”) The U.S. Navy’s
“opening of Japan” had profound effects
on that nation’s development and thus
Japan’s impact on subsequent world
history. More recently, the Royal Navy’s
attack on the French navy in July 1940
was intended in part to influence Ameri-
can political opinion concerning British
resolve to resist Nazi Germany.
Political influence from naval force can
be latent as well. German construction
of its High Seas Fleet, as well as British
contemplation of “Copenhagening”
that fleet in the decade before World
War I, negatively affected the political
environment of that era. The rise of the
Soviet Navy in the 1970s and 1980s sig-
nificantly affected U.S. political debate
about national security; arguably, “the
growth [in the 1980s] of the U.S. Navy
probably caused greater harm to the So-
viet Union than all the confrontations at
sea put together.”
Cable does not really address “dogs that
did not bark”—that is, the absence of
naval force, or more properly, the fail-
ure to use it. A counterfactual argument
is usually difficult to make convincingly.
However, the Royal Navy’s failure to
stop Italy from using the Suez Canal in
1935 during the Ethiopian campaign,
and the impact of that failure on the Eu-
ropean political scene, would appear to
be a good case in point. It has been
thought that the absence of strong Royal
Navy forces in Singapore in 1941 played
into Japanese political calculations. This
would seem a good area for inquiry as
the United States enters the Quadren-
nial Defense Review season. The Navy,
like the other services, generally makes
affirmative arguments for what it pro-
vides the nation; the possible conse-
quences of not having the capability to
be engaged is less often argued, yet may
be even more compelling.
Cable ends with some “lessons and spec-
ulations.” These are, unfortunately, not
sharply focused. As he admits, it is hard
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to discern any real patterns from his his-
torical survey, and even if any exist, the
stockbroker’s warning that “future results
cannot be predicted from past performance”
applies. At best, “if anything approaching
a principle emerges from the confused
record of the past it may be that the nat-
ural political environment for navies,
their raison d’être, is the unforeseen. . . .
Warships allow choice, naval force is a
flexible instrument.”
The book is a good short summary of the
political uses of naval force, both in-
tended and unintended, over the past
fifty years. However, it is of limited value
in helping today’s defense analysts and
policy makers think through the require-
ments for tomorrow’s naval forces.
JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy
CNO Executive Panel Staff
Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revo-
lution. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press,
1999. 364pp. $39.95
This is a very good book and a very im-
portant one. Nicholas Lambert has fol-
lowed in the path of Jon Sumida’s In
Defense of Naval Supremacy to present a
lucid, compelling, and comprehensive
analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir
John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the
decade before 1914. This work is based
upon Lambert’s doctoral study of the de-
velopment of the submarine, but it goes
much farther than his original work in
explaining the fundamental elements of
Fisher’s naval policies and their effects on
the Royal Navy.
Lambert’s command of the primary
sources is remarkable. He supplements
grand strategy, national financial policy,
and politics with the details of
operational and tactical concepts with a
skill that illuminates the linkages between
the various levels and gives them all suffi-
cient and appropriate weight. His treat-
ment not only lays bare the superficial
nature of much previous historical re-
search in this era but also indicates the
degree to which that superficiality has
caused our understanding of the period
to be profoundly flawed.
The book is not an easy read, but Lam-
bert’s solid prose and grasp of his narra-
tive allow the reader to follow his way
through the labyrinth that was British
naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail
all its facets would take up an entire issue
of the Naval War College Review, but
some explanation is worthwhile.
Lambert makes clear that Fisher was in-
stalled as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily
to cut spending at a time when the Brit-
ish government desperately needed to
achieve economies in its budget. He shows
that Fisher developed extraordinary
schemes to utilize emergent technology
to maintain Britain’s naval dominance
when that dominance was being increas-
ingly challenged and the country’s ability
to pay becoming ever more dubious. He
shows too that Fisher’s ideas of dominance
always focused on Britain’s worldwide re-
quirements, particularly in the protection
of sea communications (the threat from
Germany was not the primary motivation
of British naval policy until much later).
Lambert shows the devious way in which
Fisher operated, often concealing his true
motivations from politicians and naval
colleagues alike, but he also maps out the
logic behind the admiral’s approach. To
Sumida’s explanation of the origins of
the battle cruiser as the worldwide in-
strument of commerce protection, Lam-
bert adds the concept of the “flotilla,” by
which small craft—both surface and
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submersible—with torpedoes would
close the “narrow seas” around the Brit-
ish Isles and the Mediterranean to the
operation of enemy battle fleets and pro-
tect Britain and its possessions from at-
tack. “Flotilla defence” would effectively
replace the capital ship as the primary el-
ement in Britain’s naval strength.
Lambert shows how Fisher always returned
to these ideas as the best ways for Britain
to utilize both its technological advantages
and its strategic geography to achieve af-
fordable naval supremacy. Even in retire-
ment Fisher continued his efforts, and
Lambert has discovered incontrovertible
proof that in 1914, when the overseas
building rates of battleships had become
more than British finances could match,
Fisher persuaded Winston Churchill, the
young First Lord, to cancel the construc-
tion of at least two battleships and divert
the funding to submarines and destroy-
ers. In other words, the British in 1914
were on the point of stopping battleship
construction altogether.
Lambert’s mastery of detail is apparent
throughout this volume, but there are
four aspects that are most important for
the readership of the Naval War College
Review and for the challenges ahead.
The first is Lambert’s exposition of the
issues that the Royal Navy faced as an or-
ganisation, some of which will have a
particular resonance for the contempo-
rary audience. Finance was always a fun-
damental concern, but there were other
factors as well. Cutting construction to
save money jeopardised the existence of
the industrial capacity on which Britain’s
latent supremacy at sea rested. Much of
Britain’s power derived from the fact that
it could, in the final event, construct and
arm more warships more quickly than
any rival; it was essential that this ability
be maintained. The “We Want Eight”
crisis of 1909 may thus have had Fisher’s
desire to sustain that capability as its pri-
mary cause, rather than his fears of Ger-
man expansion.
The British also faced a crisis of man-
power. Not only was the Royal Navy
hard pressed to recruit sufficient per-
sonnel to man the increasing numbers
of battleships and armoured cruisers
entering service in the first years of the
century, but retention was poor, partic-
ularly amongst the more highly skilled
ratings vital to their operation. Even if
the government provided the funds,
the Navy did not have the human ca-
pacity to expand indefinitely to match
increases in foreign naval capability. The
primary focus of the redeployment pro-
cess, which saw the removal of ships
from overseas stations and the appar-
ent concentration of forces in British
waters, was not the German threat but
the need to employ manpower more ef-
ficiently; perhaps, also, by retaining
ships in home waters rather than keep-
ing them semipermanently overseas it
would improve the quality of life of the
ships’ companies. The peacetime de-
ployment of the fleet therefore did not
necessarily reflect the intentions for its
operations in a conflict.
A corollary to this is the fact that the pri-
mary focus of the Admiralty’s effort was
the defence of the empire as a whole; the
force that it sought to create was always
intended to have worldwide responsibili-
ties. The fleet that fought the 1914–18
war in the North Sea, the “Grand Fleet of
Battle,” was an attempt to use resources
that had been created the previous decade
to the greatest effect within a theatre that
was much more confined than had been
expected only a few years earlier. The en-
emies that Britain faced in 1914 did not
include Italy or any other power with the
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potential to interfere with British mari-
time communications to the degree Rus-
sia or France could have. As it was, the
problems of organising the Grand Fleet
to be an effective tactical entity were such
that many in the Royal Navy did not re-
gard it as a practical offensive force. The
results of Jutland show they had a point.
Thus we see the importance of Lambert’s
careful inclusion of what was going on in
the fleets at sea in terms of operational inno-
vation and development. Sir John Fisher’s
Naval Revolution makes it absolutely
clear that whatever their failings in criti-
cal thinking, staff work, and analytical
method, the senior officers of the Royal
Navy were not operating in an intellectual
vacuum, and that those in seagoing com-
mand were energetically attempting to
exploit the emergent technology to the
full. Because these officers were responsible
for the fighting efficiency of the Royal
Navy, however, they were required to work
with what they had. As with the aircraft
carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, this reality
explains the contemporary logic of many
decisions that seem misguided in retro-
spect. It also explains a good part (though
not all) of the opposition to Fisher’s ideas,
even amongst his erstwhile supporters,
and thus a good part (though not all) of
Fisher’s deviousness. At the same time,
Lambert does not neglect the effects of
personality and party in his description of
the controversies that raged over Fisher
and naval policy. There are human beings
in this book.
Lambert’s mastery of context is, above
all, why this work should be read by all
who are involved with naval policy. He
analyses the elements of British decision
making and its consequences in terms of
contemporary conditions, not hindsight.
Lambert clearly explains the ways in
which solutions and makeshifts were
developed to answer, in the time avail-
able, the problems that the Royal Navy
faced. He places clear and necessary em-
phasis on the British need to maintain
warfighting capabilities year by year, in
spite of all the stresses on the budget and
the “stop-go” nature of so many of the
new capabilities, such as the submarine
and long-range gunnery fire control. In
the uncertain strategic environment of
the opening years of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Royal Navy could not afford to
surrender existing or immediately avail-
able battle power in favor of unproven
systems. Nor could it permit the deterio-
ration of the industrial capacity that al-
lowed it to outbuild rivals in an
emergency, or continue to seek “more of
the same” at the expense of national fi-
nances. However ambitious Fisher’s
ideas, all of what he did was influenced by
these imperatives, as he sought to position
the navy to exploit new possibilities.
Lambert’s story of the Royal Navy before
1914 presents a picture completely differ-
ent from the accepted one, but it is a pic-
ture that is solidly founded in primary
sources. Equally to the point, it is one
that is wholly convincing in total and
represents a more satisfying explanation
of what happened, and why, than we
have ever had before. It is a study that
should sound a familiar note for those
who have themselves had to struggle with
the same sort of problems in other navies
and defence forces in recent years.
As one who has written on the opera-
tional history of the Royal Navy in the
opening months of the First World War,
I now believe that such history, and in-
deed the entire history of the war at sea,
needs to be approached anew. I also be-
lieve that Lambert’s work proves that we
should look again at more of the history
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of twentieth-century navies with the
same comprehensiveness.
JAMES GOLDRICK
Captain, Royal Australian Navy
Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: In-
telligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, Md.: Na-
val Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. $32.95
In Most Secret and Confidential, Steven
Maffeo has written an exceptional study
of how intelligence was collected and
used during the French Revolutionary
Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
To limited degrees, the intelligence activi-
ties of the United States, Spain, Russia,
Denmark, and several other European
nations are described. More detail is pro-
vided concerning the excellent French in-
telligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk
of the text, however, deals with the use of
intelligence by the British government,
especially the Admiralty, during the years
between 1793 and 1815.
Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval
reserve intelligence unit, has combined
his intelligence expertise with the skills
of an accomplished historian to write
this informative and most enjoyable
history of British intelligence efforts
during this period. His knowledge of
the history of intelligence operations is
excellent, and his grasp of the British
navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses
not only primary sources (government
papers and personal letters) to docu-
ment his work but also the books of such
novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick
O’Brian to make his points.
The opening chapter describes how the
British government collected intelli-
gence. It has been clear that Lloyd’s of
London, by means of its agents located
around the world, was able to provide a
continuous flow of intelligence to the gov-
ernment, but it is fascinating to learn
that by virtue of opening diplomatic and
personal mail, the British Post Office
became the largest intelligence-gather-
ing branch of the government.
Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of
the British intelligence effort. The Admi-
ralty’s collection and use of intelligence is
discussed in depth, and so is the transmis-
sion of information. The difficulties are
shown of sending any type of message, es-
pecially when the usual form of communi-
cation at sea was signal flags, which were
useless at night or in limited visibility,
such as in battle. The subject of several
chapters is the commander as his own in-
telligence officer. Some commanders, such
as Nelson, were expert intelligence offi-
cers; others were not. However, all com-
manders had to sort through whatever
information was available to them and
make the best decisions they could—they
were literally on their own. Communica-
tions between detached fleets and the Ad-
miralty often took weeks, if not months.
Commanders, therefore, without knowl-
edge of the current government policy,
would ultimately decide on courses of ac-
tion. The fact that they were fully sup-
ported by the Admiralty and the
government demonstrates the high level
of intelligence skills among the officers of
the Royal Navy.
The concluding chapters are case studies
that show what role intelligence, or the
lack thereof, played in three naval en-
gagements. They are remarkable summa-
tions of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo
Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen
expedition of December 1800–April
1801, and the Nile campaign of March
through August 1798. These three chap-
ters form an excellent conclusion.
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This is a must read for every intelligence
officer, and for any member of the mili-
tary who is interested in the history of in-
telligence. It should also be on the
reading list of every military and naval
historian, most history buffs, and fans of
naval fiction of this period. It
substantiates that such fictional charac-
ters as Horatio Hornblower and Jack
Aubrey are soundly based on historical
fact, and that their activities, especially
concerning intelligence, are authentic.
MICHAEL RIGGLE
Naval War College
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FROM THE EDITORS
SPECIAL RECOGNITION
Professor Donald Chisholm, of the Naval War College’s Joint Military Opera-
tions Department, has been selected for “Special Recognition” in the Surface
Navy Association’s 2000 Literary Award competition, for his “Negotiated Joint
Command Relationships: Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950,” in the
Spring 2000 Naval War College Review. Congratulations!
“THE CONFERENCE ROOM”—OUR ON-LINE FORUM
To facilitate and stimulate exchanges of views between our readers, authors,
editors, and the Naval War College research faculty, we have estab-
l i shed a forum on our Website—find links on the Press homepage
(http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press) and on the homepage of the Review itself,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review.htm. We hope you will use the Confer-
ence Room as a vehicle for pursuing substantive issues raised in the journal
itself—by posting, reading, and replying to bulletin-board comments; and
posting and commenting on drafts of papers-in-progress.
BOOK REVIEW INDEX
The beginning of a comprehensive index of our book reviews, review essays, and
“Recent Books” notices has been posted on our Website—visit the Press or
Review homepage and click on “Indexes.” The entries, organized by subject, will
soon be expanded (with links) to all on-line Review issues, and thereafter in
stages to earlier issues.
TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS
Every two years, as the U.S. Postal Service requires us, in order to maintain our
Periodicals Postage privilege, to “validate” our mailed circulation. Each year we
do half, and in 2001 it will be the turn of individual subscribers—those who re-
ceive their copies in their own names, vice those of institutions. (None of this
applies to U.S. Navy, Marine, or Coast Guard readers who receive it at their stan-
dard distribution list addresses.) Individual subscribers should watch in the
Spring 2001 issue for a tear-out card, to fill out and return to us (remember to
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add a stamp). We will need to hear from you by 30 September 2001 or we will be
obliged to drop your subscription as of the Winter 2002 issue.
IF YOU VISIT US . . .
Our editorial offices have moved from Luce Hall to a suite on the second floor of
Pringle Hall, south wing (rooms 244–250). All our telephone numbers, e-mail
addresses, and postal addresses are the same, except for our fax, which is now
(401) 841-1071.
ERRATUM
Our heading to the review of The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower
Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger, in the Summer 2000 issue gave incorrect
publication data: the publisher is Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama; the price is $39 (free for military).
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and address of managing editor is Pelham G. Boyer, Code 32A, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.,
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
ANNOUNCEMENT: SIXTEENTH SIENA COLLEGE WORLD WAR II
SYMPOSIUM
The sixteenth annual Siena College multidisciplinary symposium on World War
II, for the sixtieth anniversary of the war, will be held 31 May and 1 June 2001.
The focus for papers to be delivered embraces fascism and Naziism; literature,
art, popular culture, and film; diplomatic and military history; and women’s and
Jewish studies. Pearl Harbor, Japanese expansion and occupation, Greece, Yugo-
slavia, the Soviet Union, North Africa, and collaboration are of particular rele-
vance. Pertinent Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics are
also encouraged.
CALL FOR PAPERS: SEVENTEENTH SIENA COLLEGE WORLD WAR II
SYMPOSIUM
The seventeenth annual Siena College multidisciplinary symposium on World
War II will be held 6–7 June 2002. The focus for papers will be 1942. Topics wel-
comed include, but are not limited to, fascism and Naziism, Midway, New
Guinea, Guadalcanal, North Africa, the North Atlantic, literature, art, popular
culture, film, diplomatic and military history, and women’s and Jewish studies
dealing with that year. Papers on collaboration and collaborationist regimes, the
home front, conscription, and dissent are encouraged as well. Inquiries from
persons wishing to chair or comment are also invited. Deadline for submissions
(brief outline or abstract, with c.v.) is 15 November 2001. Final papers are due 15
March 2002.
Replies and inquiries, for either symposium, to Prof. Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena Col-
lege, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, N.Y., 12211-1462, tel. (518) 783-2512, fax (518) 786-5052, e-mail
legendziewic@siena.edu. Website http://www.siena.edu/sri.
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